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abstract
In the South of Italy, the personal vote has represented a synonym for 
clientelism, understood as a political exchange between votes and par-
ticular benefits. The available literature traced the roots of clientelism, 
from the 1950s onward, to either cultural or structural social determi-
nants, such as cynicism, disenchantment, fatalism or, on the other side, 
lagging or lacking economic development. Only recently, Political 
Science has tried new approaches to this phenomenon, by adopting ra-
tionalist frameworks to define the strategies underpinning the clientelist 
bargain. Such a perspective proposed new concepts, a “virtuous cliente-
lism” resembling the Anglo-American constituency service: in this type 
of clientelism, both voters and candidates are inspired by the desire to 
provide universal benefits to their community, rather than being limited 
to egoistic gains. This research wants thus to uncover this type of clien-
telism through a qualitative research involving in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, performed with a sample of electors in four of the most 
important regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno: Calabria, Campania, 
Apulia and Sicily. This research also provides a map of the desires, 
expectations, hopes and disillusions of the southern Italian voters. Hen-
ce, this study does not limit itself to the research question and goes on 
to provide more insight on the private and public reasons underpinning 
political choices and to open further avenues for qualitative research on 
the topic.
Keywords: elections, clientelism, constituency service, personal vote, 
Mezzogiorno.
PERSONAL VOTE IN SOUTHERN ITALY: 
PARTICULARISM OR UNIVERSALISM?
7IntroductIon
 The reasons which inspire personal voting and the relation-
ship it entails between voter and candidate have always been proved 
as fruitful research topics in Political Science, even though they are 
very difficult to flesh out in all their implications. Some of the features 
of this type of ballot often involve less than desirable practices such 
as clientelism and patronage. In other cases, however, personal voting 
can assume more appreciated forms, such as the constituency service, 
which is especially known and accepted in Anglo-American democra-
cies. Many researchers focused, over the years, on Italy and, especially, 
on the South of the country: the southern regions of Italy, in fact, are 
considered especially informative for studies on the personal vote, both 
on quantitative and qualitative grounds. First, constituents in the South 
tend to use preferences (hence personal votes) much more frequently 
than in the rest of Italy ever since the first elections for the House of 
Deputies in 1948, with a propensity towards preferential ballots which 
cuts across parties and political orientations. Second, qualitatively, the 
personal vote has gained, over time, different meanings and traits, de-
pending on the different regions, the social composition of the electora-
te, the relative strength or weakness of parties, and so forth.
 Both these peculiarities, together with the chronic underdeve-
lopment and the archaic social structures of peripheral territories in the 
South, triggered the interest of many scholars. Already in the 1950s 
and 1970s, structuralist and culturalist studies pointed at traditionali-
sm, familism and clientelism of southern Italian politics. Subsequently, 
approaches more disciplinarily connected with Political Science, while 
still maintaining the focus firmly on the link between personal voting 
and clientelism. Many contributions on southern forms of clientelism, 
especially connected to the ruling parties in the different regions, have 
stressed time and again different typical elements of clientelism, which 
remain similar even in different contexts or in different times. First, the 
client-patron dichotomy that defines the clientelist bargain. Second, the 
object of said bargain, which is realized by casting votes for the patron 
in exchange for selective benefits. These two elements, which define 
clientelist essential features, are always accompanied with a negative 
appraisal of clientelism and, to some extent, of personal vote more in 
general as a vehicle for clientelism. This propensity for personal for-
ms of relationship with candidates has been defined, with suspicion or 
outright disdain, as linked to several pernicious social determinants: 
amoral familism, lack of real free markets, lack of national unity and 
8the delegitimization of the state. Moreover, some have pinpointed other 
anthropological reasons such as cynicism, apathy and fatalism. Other 
authors share this adversity towards the personal vote, and they stress 
its detrimental consequences in the form of parochial policies and the 
explosion of selective benefits for few people, instead of the realization 
of universal benefits for the whole community, being it local, national 
or international. Even in the public discourse, the personal vote has 
been subjected to harsh critiques, which resulted in legislation such as 
the law no. 270/2005, which completely abolished the possibility to 
cast individual preferences. This law, in short, introduced a closed-list 
system which mirrored the regional legislation passed, in 2000, by Tu-
scany: that was the first Italian region ever to abolish preferences and to 
introduce closed lists for the election of the regional legislative council. 
The studies produced so far essentially concur in this definition of per-
sonal voting, and in its allegedly negative correlation with clientelism.
 This project wants to turn this long-lasting evaluation onto its 
head, and it wants to assess the existence, among southern Italian vo-
ters, of a type of personal voting driven by universal expected benefits. 
This research’s starting point is a typology of voting behaviors which 
combines the type of vote (ideological vs. personal) with the nature 
of the expected benefits (particular vs. universal). It then proceeds to 
search for the existence and the defining feature of a personal and uni-
versalist voting behavior. This project, while drawing upon a post-posi-
tivist epistemological stance, employs qualitative methods in the form 
of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which have been realized du-
ring a long fieldwork. Almost 70 interviews have been performed with 
a reasoned sample of people coming from the four biggest regions in 
the South of Italy, i.e. Calabria, Apulia, Campania and Sicily. Before 
conducting fieldwork an in-depth review of the literature on the theme 
was necessary, to understand the different nuances of the personal vote, 
as well as the subtle distinctions between it and other political practices 
such as clientelism and patronage. The empirical research, moreover, 
entailed many organizational and methodological difficulties. Moreo-
ver, as the methodological chapter will elaborate, the interviews often 
unfolded intense personal stories, with interviewees often recounting 
themselves through their relationship with politics, and analyzing their 
socio-economic condition through their voting choices.
 This research, while remaining focused on the research question, 
represented a true journey through the complex condition of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, hence providing more insights than the leading question 
can synthesize. The interviews unfolded a depiction, or better multiple 
9depictions of the southern Italian society, and of the constant, contested 
and complicated relationship between politics and citizens, in diverse, 
although contiguous territories. For example, Sannio, in the province of 
Benevento, structurally and traditionally presents more direct and less 
mediated relationships between voters and their representatives than in 
the case of Naples. Another example lies outside territorial divides and 
concerns the degree of political sophistication of the voters, as will be 
further specified in chapter IV. The research showed that Sicilian voters 
show more political sophistication, regardless of their formal education 
or social background, hence they show a more complex reading of po-
litical and electoral phenomena than, for example, Calabrian voters. It 
is paramount, however, to avoid simplistic generalizations. The presen-
tation of the results will follow the research question precisely, the aim 
of which is to empirically assess the existence, among the interviewed 
sample, of a personal vote inspired by universalist expectations.
The research, as we shall see in due course, is underpinned by more 
general considerations, namely that, in the absence of big parties and of 
ideological centers, the personal vote can potentially prompt virtuous 
practices such as the constituency service in the UK and USA, i.e. a 
right balance between the need of the local community and national 
interests. However, it is important not to get lost in the journey and 
to keep the research question firmly at the center of this thesis, which 
wants to recognize and charting something that only very few scholars 
have thus far even fathomed: a type of personal vote oriented towards 
universal benefits.
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A personal vote beyond clienteles?
1.1 Personal vote: an introduction.
 One local politician is spending political capital and his own 
time to prevent a local car factory from closing. To win this battle, he 
will join forces with trade unions, interest groups, individual citizens 
and local institutions. He will fight both within and outside his party, 
which, for the time being, is the ruling national party. After a hard bar-
gain, the national government commits itself to keep that factory open.
A second politician, endowed with a widespread personal consensus, 
is getting ready for the parliamentary campaign: he will try to gather a 
team, and to receive as many votes as possible, regardless of the party 
he will be a candidate within, or the program he will endorse. This 
politician commits himself to provide staff members and their families 
with advantageous job positions. For example, he could convince a car 
factory to hire staff members or their relatives; civil service in local 
institutions also represents a valid alternative.
A third politician, more unscrupulous and without any party affiliation 
whatsoever, decides to run for office. Businesspeople, retailers and all 
those who may have an interest – either licit or illicit – in the con-
stituency, back his campaign. Among the others, the owner of a car 
factory decides to endorse this third politician: he will need political 
support whenever the plant risks going bankrupt again in the future. 
This candidate splits the funds raised among highly trusted people: they 
will spread out to the poorest neighborhoods of the constituency to buy 
votes for as little as 50 euros per ballot. The payment will happen in 
full, in cash, outside the poll office.
Lastly, a fourth politician, who also runs for office, has solid roots in the 
local constituency but with national ambitions, but he uses a different 
strategy: from Rome, and thanks to his communication skills, he can 
run a pervasive marketing campaign based on TV and other mass me-
dia. He is highly capable in building his public image: in time, he will 
become the gathering point of some local interests more because of his 
celebrity than his actual work within the district.
 Personal vote, such as in the above said examples, has always 
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been one paramount element of voters’ behavior in every democratic 
country, even though it is called in different ways in different contexts. 
The examples above might look very similar to each other to us. In fact, 
they all follow a similar pattern: in each story, a politician balances 
interests, distributes benefits and improves the conditions of a given 
community. The motives behind candidates’ choices are simple and lin-
ked to the desire for election or re-election in office (Downs 1958). 
This research, however, sheds light on the other side of the coin, i.e. the 
reasons behind voters’ behaviors and choices. While local ties and per-
sonal consensus within one constituency seem the predominant forms 
of political relationship between one candidate and his constituents, the 
above said examples show differences and nuances. In the first case, 
the commitment of the candidate towards his constituency is clear and 
transparent. For sure, the priority goes to the wellbeing of the people li-
ving in the district, even to the detriment of a more general good and na-
tion-wide analysis. However, the relationship of the first candidate with 
his community is still inspired by universalist benefits: safeguarding 
employment and growth, securing livelihoods to households and busi-
nesses, with no priority given to one particular interest group. On an in-
stitutional and formal ground, the first approach is based on apparently 
more clear institutional and intra-party relations. Thus, the first exam-
ple represents the kind of candidate-constituency relationship which is 
most widespread and which describes, for instance in Anglo-American 
contexts, one of the most important qualities for a candidate to have, to 
be elected in office. In the second example, there are relevant differen-
ces in the function that the individual candidate performs. In particular, 
voters’ motives are strongly different. While the first community is mo-
ved by universal motives, the second one is much more particularist. 
The first candidate clearly prioritizes his staff, and the potential voters 
want a personal benefit to derive from their support to a specific can-
didate. In conducting this operation, the second candidate secures only 
the particular interests of localized groups, which are closer to himself. 
These interest groups, in turn, will mobilize themselves for the candida-
te: relationship between candidates and constituents resembles a closed 
circuit based upon a recognized and acknowledged bargain. The stakes 
of the deal (Pasquino, Parisi, 1977), of course, are the votes. These bal-
lots will go towards one specific candidate in exchange for selective 
and particular benefit: for example, one job position within the car fac-
tory. The bargain is patronizing in nature, which invests small portions 
of the overall community, and it is not limited to the voters-candidate 
relationship: the candidate might secure his influence by distributing 
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power resources among his staff and by appointing loyal people in the 
major positions of the local government. The third example is more 
morbid in nature: the candidate, in this case, creates a clientelist system 
with the vital economic interests, by promising fiscal benefits or ad hoc 
regulation, to favor the particular interests in his support. The strategy 
employed by the third candidate ceases to be clientelism and becomes 
outright corruption, in which votes are bought and sold, using raised 
money to obtain support and reputation. Finally, the fourth case descri-
bes a personal consensus dynamic, which is well known in media de-
mocracies, characterized by media leaders (Barisione 2007, Mazzoleni 
2012). The support for the fourth originates from very different sources, 
and the relationship with the electors is different in nature from the third 
previous ones: reputation builds up through an emotional connection 
between the candidate and his supporters, through his image and appea-
rance, and through mass media. The physical presence of the candidate 
in the district is not mandatory since it is sufficient for the candidate 
himself to be continuously present in the press. The image of the leader 
is created and secured through the mechanisms of political-electoral 
communication, in the context of a never-ending electoral campaign.
 In synthesis, the proposed mental experiment tells us that per-
sonal vote may assume different shapes and features: while the relevant 
actors – voters and candidates – are the same, the object and nature of 
their mutual relationship changes all the time. Expected benefits always 
shape and direct voters’ choices, but the particular or universal cha-
racter of these anticipated benefits changes the relationship with can-
didates profoundly. It is never simple to draw lines between particular 
and universal personal votes: as we will see in the literature review pro-
vided by this thesis, this difficulty in operating distinction will emerge 
clearly. However, most of the reflection and academic debate around 
personal vote precisely stems from this difficulty in solving the parti-
cular/universal dichotomy of expected benefits. When turning attention 
towards the south of Italy, for example, scientific literature on the topic 
has thus far collapsed personal vote and clientelism, personal vote, and 
corruption, hence labelling personal vote itself as a pathologic and de-
viant political behavior.
1.2 Clientelism: a pathology of democracy?
 The characterization of personal voting as deviant and connected 
15
to clientelism is the predominant approach in the literature. Clientelism 
is a democratic pathology describes most of the contributions to the 
study of clientelist systems from WWII onwards. One of the aims of 
the next chapter will be to provide an overview of the debate about the 
compatibility between personal vote – broadly defined to comprehend 
clientelism, patronage and other phenomena – and democracy. Howe-
ver, it is unavoidable to describe the well-known assumption on the link 
between clientelism and the detriment of democracy.
First, the first studies on clientelist systems in Italy shared two appro-
aches:
•     The choice of southern Italy as the most suitable case study.
• These contributions were informed by structuralist and cultura 
list assumptions, hence neglecting strategic-rational approaches.
 I will explain the choice of southern Italy as a case study in due 
course. For now, I will summarize some milestones in the scientific 
literature on personal vote and clientelism to date.
Wolf (1966) explained clientelism in micro-structural terms, by stu-
dying two small villages in the Non Valley (valle di Non) in Northeast 
of Italy. While the two communities seem similar, inhabitants pursue 
different strategies to create and distribute power. These strategies stem 
from different family structures and by various ways of passing down 
power from one generation to the next one within the same family. Wolf 
describes the first village as having rather rigid family structures, cha-
racterized by passing power down from the father to the firstborn son, 
leaving the other children with the alternative between serving their 
brother and emigrating. Families in this first model are self-sufficient 
worlds that interact with the external world as one unit, as when they 
interact commercial relationships (markets, fairs) or when they partici-
pate in the local culture (festivals, celebrations, music). Friendship ties, 
according to Wolf, are based on sentiments and affect, and family is 
more recognizable from prestige and lineage and breed rather than from 
the individual members of the family itself (Wolf 1966). Wolf’s second 
case study, on the other hand, allows for more individual self-expres-
sion, and with looser hierarchical structures. Individual members of one 
family have ties with people other than relatives, and their network of 
acquaintances is free to expand horizontally beyond the borders of the 
family. Moreover, the involvement of people in their community is ba-
sed on individual action and not on family interests, and “instrumental” 
friendship ties can develop.  These ties are necessary conditions for the 
development of the patron-client relationship. More specifically, Wolf 
retrieves in “instrumental friendship” the balance between independent 
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subjects engaged in mutual exchange. This symmetrical relationship 
becomes clientelism when the client becomes subordinated to the pa-
tron, hence breaking the “instrumental friendship” tie. By focusing on 
micro-structural explanations of clientelism, Wolf attributes to family 
structures the tendency to develop forms of social clientelism, which, 
in turn, may pave the road for political clientelism as a widespread phe-
nomenon.
Different, and more value-charged, is Banfield’s take on the subject 
(Banfield 1958). His explanation of clientelism is micro-cultural, and it 
derives from the study of a small village in the south of Italy. Montegra-
no’s society – Montegrano was the fantasy name given to the case study 
– was described, by Banfield as imbued with apathy and desperation. 
The author does not focus on the social and economic conditions of the 
village: his approach is more concerned with the cultural features that 
inform the community. While paying less thorough attention to collecti-
ve dynamics than Wolf, Banfield focuses on the characters of the peo-
ple inhabiting the town: he describes them as lacking self-help, and in 
most cases even unfit for establishing clientelist systems, precisely due 
to their inherent lack of initiative and individual autonomy. Banfield’s 
approach, then, is culturalist insofar as he studies clientelism from the 
vantage point of the “cultural, psychological and moral conditions of 
the political organizations, and of other forms of organizations” (Ban-
field 1958). Nevertheless, this is not the only point in which Banfield 
and Wolf’s part ways: Banfield is remarkably fiercer in his critique of 
clientelist systems, which are linked, in his view, to underdeveloped 
social and cultural contexts. His vision of clientelism as a less than de-
sirable phenomenon is marked by his definition of “amoral familism” 
as instrumental for patronizing relations, and by the account, he gives 
of the Montegranese society as one in between tradition and modernity, 
hence anachronist in comparison to the rest of the western world.
 The two proposed analyses tackle the problem of clientelism 
from the “demand” side of the client-patron bargain, i.e. from the van-
tage points of the clients, their collective and individual strategies. 
However, other approaches exist, which focus on the supply side and, 
hence, try to provide macro-structural and macro-cultural explanations. 
In particular, World System Theory-inspired scholarship is primarily 
interested in the macro-structural drivers of the clientelism relationship. 
Some authors relate personal vote with the degree of capitalist deve-
lopment reached by the country at hand. Some areas in southern Italy 
are semi-peripheral, hence not keen on modernization and more likely 
to develop patrimonial-absolutist forms of political structures (Arrighi 
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-Piselli 1987). Ertman (1997), similarly, underlines the role of national 
parliaments in transforming a patrimonial-absolutist state into a bureau-
cratic one, with an independent and advanced administrative apparatus. 
According to Ertman, some countries such as Great Britain effectively 
changed their regulatory structures thanks to the representative and 
elective institutions, which favored local governments and enabled a 
group of representatives to emerge, which heralded universal demands 
coming from their home communities. Conversely, Ertman considers 
the Italian case as informed by feudal structures, hence favoring the 
interests of local lordlings and nobles. This system, in Ertman view, 
seconded patrimonial political representations oriented towards obtai-
ning particular benefits (Ertman 1997). Finally, when it comes to ma-
cro-cultural approaches, Putnam’s contribution is noteworthy. His stu-
dy focused on the lack of “civicness” as distinctive of southern Italian 
regions. Putnams dates back the birth of civicness to the 12th century, 
and he identifies this virtue with the centralized government adopted 
by the Normans. The lack of civicness in southern Italy, hence, derived 
from the absence of a centralized government in this area. Naturally, 
different viewpoints on the origins of clientelism bring about different 
research results concerning personal vote, yet all the accounts provided 
in this section concur in defining personal vote as tantamount to politi-
cal clientelism, and in assigning a derogatory meaning to personal vote 
itself. Personal vote, as clientelism, is considered by all the authors as 
a political and democratic pathology. Other strands of literature, whi-
ch will be accounted for further on in this research, associate personal 
vote to corruption and organized crime, especially in southern Italy. 
However, scientific rigor suggests some degree of skepticism towards 
personalization of politics more in general, and towards clientelism in 
particular.
 The unfavorable opinion about personal vote is echoed, in the 
Italian public discourse, by a widespread dismissal of preferential vo-
ting on the same grounding. Not only insiders and experts but also a sub-
stantial number of people interested in politics are very critical towards 
introducing personalist mechanisms of the vote (such as preferential 
voting) in electoral regulation. In general, the tendency is to collapse 
preferential voting with personal vote, clientelism, mafia and corrup-
tion, in particular concerning southern Italian regions. Many observers, 
moreover, link personalization of politics with growth in campaign 
spending, the end of the gate keeping function of parties and other or-
ganizations. These observers sometimes say that personalization might 
foreshadow politics as based solely on leaders, and not on ideas and ide-
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ologies. Especially in Italy, many scandals backed the thesis according 
to which personal voting has inherent detrimental consequences, such 
as selective benefits, clientelism, corruption, and misbehavior more in 
general. People such as Sicily’s former President, Salvatore Cuffaro, 
or – less recently – Achille Lauro in Naples, plastically demonstrated 
that personalism and clientelism offer less than inspirational examples 
of civil service and public virtues (Barisione 2007). Overall, from whi-
chever vantage point one sees the issue, the identity between the per-
sonal vote, clientelism and political and electoral misbehavior appear 
inescapable. However, the purpose of this research is precisely to turn 
the question onto its head, by retrieving voting choices, which, though 
aimed at electing one specific person, are inspired by universal moti-
ves, hence not directly oriented towards obtaining specific, individual 
and exclusive benefits and gains. Hence, this research wants to show to 
what degree and extent there are personal voting strategies, which are 
not identifiable with clientelism and corruption.
 This research will develop insights from some case studies from 
southern Italian regions. This not only because most of the literature on 
the topic has been produced in said regions, but also for the propensity 
towards expressing preferential and personal votes retrieved in these 
populations. One should notice that there are very few studies, which 
endorse a more “secular” approach to personal vote and clientelism. 
Moreover, most of these contributions have been written and published 
only recently. One piece of research, which is worth mentioning, is S. 
Piattoni’s “Le virtù del clientelismo. Una critica non convenzionale”. 
The first reason for having a theoretical anchorage in the endeavor of 
identifying a form of clientelism oriented towards universal benefits and 
gains rests upon the strategic-rational approach that informs Piattoni’s 
research. As underlined above, the studies of clientelism undertaken 
by Wolf and Banfield, despite pointing at different causes for the same 
phenomenon, concurred in ruling out as irrelevant both the individual 
and collective rational choices of the concerned actors. Piattoni, on the 
other hand, openly endorses a rational and strategic analysis of voters’ 
behavior, and proposes a fourfold categorization of clientelism in four 
different Italian regions.
This is the summary of Piattoni’s categorization:
•     Vicious Clientelism (Sicily): Neither public nor private goods. 
Economic involution. Non-existing legitimacy.
•     Ineffective Clientelism (Apulia): Private goods equal to public 
goods. Economic stagnation. Declining legitimacy.
•     Challenged Clientelism (Campania): Either private or public 
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goods. Inconsistent economic development. Fluctuating legitimacy.
•     Virtuous Clientelism (Abruzzo): Public goods equal to private 
goods. Consistent economic development. Growing legitimacy.
We will go back and analyze the typology in due course: for now, it is 
sufficient to point out the presence of a form of clientelism with positive 
economic and political outcomes, both for clients and for patrons.
 The proposed analysis unveils evolutionary dynamics of the 
phenomenon of clientelism, from hindrance to asset regarding eco-
nomic development and political representation. The positive case of 
Abruzzo is explained by the absence of intra-party competition within 
the Christian Democracy – which, in other regions, was marked by fier-
ce internal struggles – and by the presence of a strong opposition and 
minority in the region. Both these drivers made local leaders (Christian 
Democrats) pursue public goods alongside private and exclusive bene-
fits. In turn, particularist and patronizing behaviors, transformed into 
universalist ones, which are peculiar to the Anglo-American constituen-
cy service. One can easily retrieve the sources of positive clientelism 
within the social and political context, the institutional arrangements 
and regulation. Within this setting, actors can adopt rational strategies 
(Downs 1958) to diminish or removing negative outcomes produced 
by the pursuit of selective benefits, for universalist behaviors, in turn, 
able to produce universal benefits. One can easily understand that the 
field of inquiry expands tremendously by bringing positive clientelism 
into the picture. In some respects, the virtuous approach to clientelism 
brings back the discussion within the borders of physiological, social 
dynamics and gives great relevance to the capability of the actors of 
making independent and rational choices. In other words, this resear-
ch gives up on the search for external causes of clientelism, such as 
culture or structures, and recognizes that institutional settings exert a 
significant amount of influence. It is paramount to specify that Piatto-
ni’s analysis is focused on the “supply” side of clientelism, hence on 
politicians and their behavior both within their parties and when acting 
as local administrators and civil servants. Conversely, this thesis wants 
to apply Piattoni’s approach to voters and their choices, to investigate 
the relationship, which ties individual voters and individual candidates 
together. Moreover, the identification of only one case of virtuous clien-
telism (Abruzzo) in a specific span of time (1970-1992) is not enough 
to demonstrate a general tendency towards transformation of clientelist 
systems – both Italian and European more in general – into virtuous 
examples.
However, the path paved by Piattoni’s work seems to be in line with 
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the main hypothesis of the present research, which aims to retrieve a 
virtuous clientelism by looking at voters’ expectations – i.e. the clients 
– and within a peculiar configuration of the partisan conflict, which is 
strongly different from the one of the so-called First Republic.
1.3 Southern Italy as a case study
 The choice of southern Italy as the case study for this research 
appears compelling. Wolf (1966), Banfield (1958), Putnam (1964), Tar-
row (1956) and many others, each of whom with different approaches, 
chose this area of Italy as the preferred research field for clientelism 
or, more generally, for peculiar forms of relationships between elected 
officials and voters. The common finding of the above said research is 
that clientelism seems inherent to southern Italian voters’ behavior. As 
the aim of this research is to uncover the presence of non-patronizing 
personal vote, the south of Italy represents a paramount case in which 
to demonstrate this phenomenon. The reasons behind this choice rela-
te to the different approaches that, over time, characterized the study 
of clientelism and the personal nature of vote and political relations 
more in general. As said above, structuralist and culturalist approaches 
have traces the origins of clientelism, respectively, either in an outdated 
social and economic environment or traditionalist cultural conditions 
separated, to some extent, from modernity. These approaches all con-
curred in their critique both of clientelism itself, and of the causes that 
brought it into being. However, these contributions fall short regarding 
criteria for choosing the case studies, and in terms of generalizability of 
findings. For example, many scholars have questioned the representati-
veness of Banfield’s case and sample, first because it does not depict the 
completely southern Italy, and because the Montegranese community is 
peculiarly isolated from the rest of the region and of the country.
 Recent contributions offered more rational and less anecdotic 
explanations and expanded the range of case studies to the whole of 
Italy and not just the south. In these cases – most importantly, in the 
studies that focused on the fiscal and monetary outcomes of clientelism 
– the justification of the choice of Italy and the south as case studies 
were based on macroeconomic and institutional variables, and upon the 
way, democratic mechanisms worked in these contexts. For example, 
the extraordinary production of specific ad hoc laws and regulation and 
the abnormal production of legislation in Italy as a whole, are an inte-
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resting point of departure for research, in particular if one focuses on 
the transition between the First and the Second Republic. Furthermore, 
some scholars studied clientelism as a dependent variable of income 
levels and other economic conditions: in this case, the weaknesses and 
backwardness of Italian capitalism and industrialization are two featu-
res that make Italy a compelling case study.
This thesis address itself to the question: Are there personal vote choi-
ces driven by universalist motives?
From this vantage point, the selection of the south of Italy becomes 
grounded in objective criteria. In fact, if voting is the behavior under 
investigation, then we can reasonably state that the south of Italy is the 
area which is most inclined to preferential voting. It suffices to observe 
some figures to have a clear depiction of the situation.
Table 1.1. Preferential voting rates (percentage of personal preferential votes of 
the total number of valid casted ballots) in 12 Italian regions between 1995 and 
2010.
1995 2000 2005 2010
PIEMONTE 16,8 34,4 41,3 35
LOMBARDIA 11,6 23,9 26,6 23,3
VENETO 16,3 33,4 39,1 35,2
LIGURIA 26,3 41,6 46,2 42
EMILIA ROMAGNA 11,1 22,4 28,2 25,7
TOSCANA 15,4 28,6 0 0
UMBRIA 30,7 51,2 55,7 53
MARCHE 28,6 44,6 49,5 49,4
LAZIO 26,6 47 54,4 50,9
CAMPANIA 46,4 70,6 76,8 (90,6)*
PUGLIA 41 69,8 78,5 75,7
BASILICATA 63,4 85,8 89,6 85,9
CALABRIA 61,5 82,3 87,4 84,1
Media 12 regioni 56,1 54,2
Table 1.1. points out a strikingly apparent situation. Northern and cen-
tral Italy witness a small or even negligible inclination to preferential 
votes. Conversely, it is evident that southerners strongly favor preferen-
tial voting. Moreover, we can observe an interesting diachronic pattern: 
Basilicata, Apulia, Calabria, and Campania, for example, saw their sha-
re of preferences grow over time, with a substantially higher growth 
in Apulia. The phenomenon of preferential voting has ancient roots in 
Italian electoral behavior and choices, which dates back to the first ge-
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neral elections in 1948. The party that championed preferential voting 
was, of course, Christian Democracy: here personal votes worked as a 
means of conflict resolution among the different internal factions, and 
as a criterion for the distribution of power resources and for distributing 
offices. However, the data reveal a surprising fact about supporters of 
the second biggest party, i.e. the Communist Party. While this party has 
always been remarkably less inclined to use preferences to settle inter-
nal struggles and to distribute power, this propensity strongly varies 
across Italy.
Table 1.2.: preferential votes in 30 provinces in 1948 and 1953 (General Elections)
(Source) il voto di preferenza in Italia, D’amato pp 35.
Table 1.2. has a double significance. First, it reaffirms the paradigmatic 
assumption according to which, in the north of Italy, communist voters 
were less inclined to express individual preferences. However, the same 
table shows that this lack of inclination was not equally distributed 
throughout the country. Preferential voting appears to be a rather com-
plex and faceted phenomenon, and this complexity must be considered. 
In 1948, for example, preferential voting was homogeneously distri-
buted across the country, with only negligible interregional variations. 
This consistency in figures can be explained as the product of rational 
choices of both, voters and candidates: in 1948, the Italian Communist 
Party and the Italian Socialist Party formed, together, the Popular Unity 
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Front, which was not very successful but which determined an unba-
lanced distribution of elected members of parliament. Precisely due to a 
careful use of preferential votes, the Communist Party won three times 
as many seats as the ones obtained by socialist candidates (Pasquino 
1993). In subsequent elections, in the absence of intra-party competi-
tion (both the Communist and the Socialist Parties decided to break off 
their alliance, after the disappointing results of 1948 elections), nor-
thern provinces saw a remarkable decrease in the number of preferen-
ces as a share of the total in both Christian Democracy and the Com-
munist Party. Southern regions, conversely, confirmed their inclination 
to preferential and personal voting, by maintaining the same or higher 
preference rates. Naturally, one could unpack and flesh out the pheno-
menon even further by constructing a broader number of variables and 
by crafting more precise depictions. The purpose of these few pages, 
however, is to back up with numbers the demonstration that there is 
almost no alternative to the choice of southern Italy as a case study. The 
personal vote has a long tradition in the south of Italy, and many time 
series are available, which show preference rates divided by region and, 
often, by province and city. If it true that personal vote is widespread all 
over the south of Italy, it is not diffused in all the southern regions in the 
same way. As Table 1.1. shows, there are profound differences between 
Calabria and Apulia, and even more intense ones between Sicily and 
Campania: in short, there is not one South, but “many Souths”, each of 
which with its specific variety of personal vote.
Beyond Clientelism: A Universalist Personal Vote?
Table 1.3 percentages of presidential candidate vote in regional elections 1995-
2010.
REGIONI 1995 2000 2005 2010
PIEMONTE 17,5 15,9 15,8 8,5
LOMBARDIA 14,3 15,6 17,2 7,2
VENETO 13,4 15,4 14,7 7,5
LIGURIA 8,6 6,8 13 4,8
EMILIA ROMAGNA 8,2 6,8 9,8 5,5
TOSCANA 9,8 6,7 12,6 8,2
UMBRIA 6,3 5,5 9,4 5,2
MARCHE 10,7 5,9 8,7 3,7
LAZIO 14,8 9,6 14 6,4
CAMPANIA 9,4 6,7 6,6 0
PUGLIA 9,2 7,9 8,5 4,3
BASILICATA 7,2 3,1 2,6 2,2
CALABRIA 10,3 3 3,1 1,9
tot 11,9 10,2 12 5,45
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Overall, it is apparent that the study of personal vote and of cliente-
lism has in the south of Italy its most suitable case study. However, 
data about regional elections from 1995 onwards show another no less 
important phenomenon connected to electoral competition 
 
 For regional elections, voters are allowed to express one vote 
for the President of the Regional Government, and one vote for one of 
the parties running for seats in the Regional Council – it is notewor-
thy that voters might vote a party for the Council, which does not 
support the chosen candidate as President. In other words, there are 
two distinct competitions: one for members of the Regional Council 
and on for the President. In particular, this second arena represents a 
peculiar variety of personal vote and one in which the normal beha-
vioral patterns in the north and the south of Italy are inverted. In fact, 
voters in the center-north are more eager to express a preference for a 
candidate for President of the Regional Government, while southern 
constituents more often vote for individual candidates for the Regional 
Council. Hence, the north is more sensitive to the collective leadership 
of candidates for Presidents. In the south, individual candidates for the 
Council attract much of personalization of politics, while the Presi-
dent balances between different territorial interests expressed by the 
same candidates for the Council. Conversely, in the north the relative 
share of individual preferences for each candidate to the Council is 
remarkably smaller: the candidate President, hence, has a stronger 
role regarding exposure and authority. This, in turn, is reflected in a 
greater degree of freedom of the President in appointing members of 
the Regional Government, or in determining the contents of regional 
policies. In this second case, personalization of politics operates as a 
consequence of media dynamic and charismatic leadership, more than 
being a result of real ties with local communities and societal interests.
This is the last side of personalization, i.e. personal vote connected 
to mass communication and media politics. The question is whether 
there is a personal vote linked to universalist motives, thus related 
to political and electoral communication in local contexts. If we go 
back to the four examples described in the first part of this chapter, we 
imagined different forms of bargains. In particular, the first three cases 
were different regarding legitimacy and respect of rules, yet they were 
all marked by evident do-ut-des dynamics. The motives for choosing 
one candidate, in the last case, seem to differ: apparently, they escape 
rational and strategic cost-benefit calculations (Downs 1958). This 
fourth variety of personal vote is not in contrast with the former three: 
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it is rather a deviation from the norm.
Going back to the example provided by regional elections, we could 
reasonably say that, while the first three types of voting behavior 
explain rather precisely the Regional Council arena, the last example 
is suitable to understand how competition for the President of the 
Region works. However, none of the cases excludes the others, and 
reality falls in a gray zone in which the different mechanisms overlap, 
combine and operate together. Candidates for the Council, who are not 
experienced but are well-known (celebrities in sports, media or other 
fields) or, conversely, candidates for President with little or no media 
coverage yet firmly tied with local communities might be both elected 
in the same region. This, in particular, applies to small regional, such 
as Basilicata and Molise. The power of image, hence, influences 
local dynamics and might, in turn, pave the way for the emergence of 
new leaders. The purpose of this research is not to craft new generic 
ideal-types, as other have done before (Barisione 2006. pp 113-120) 
to describe the features and skills that leaders might embody in the 
public space. Rather, it is of fundamental importance to reconstruct 
specific experiences through a thorough study of the peculiar Italian 
case.
 We can draw some concrete experiences for each of the types 
above of personal vote. First, Illy’s presidency of Friuli-Venezia-Giu-
lia, in the northeast, is an example of an entrepreneur “borrowed” by 
politics, with strong ties with Trieste as a city, but with much looser 
connections with the rest of the regional territory. In 2005, thanks to 
an effective media campaign, and thanks to the support of a non-parti-
san list (Illy Presidente), the coffee mogul won the election in most of 
the region and not only in Trieste. A similar case is Penati’s election to 
President of the Province of Milan: in that case, too, the bannerman of 
a center-left coalition could boast a long experience of mayor of Sesto 
San Giovanni, but he suffered from a lack of visibility in other parts 
of the Province. This experience as a “good administrator” became 
the brand of his campaign, which enabled him to win the elections 
in 2004. Lastly, the most striking example of this phenomenon is the 
election of Guazzaloca as mayor of Bologna in 1999. Also in this case, 
the process of constructing a public image within the local community 
was crucial to Guazzaloca’s ability to win. Depicted as the “ordinary 
man”, as a candidate beyond parties, as a civil society exponent and 
as a champion of “decency”, Guazzaloca was able to win Bologna to 
the center-right for the first time after WWII. All these examples are 
of historical relevance: in all the three cases, the winning candidate 
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started as an underdog. Illy candidate as President for a region with 
a long-lasting center-right government; Penati was to lead the cen-
ter-left in a conservative region. Lastly, Guazzaloca run for mayor 
within a center-right coalition in a historically “red” city (Barisione 
2007). None of these candidates, to bargain for votes, could distribute 
either exclusive or universal benefits. Illy might have been the candi-
date who had more to offer since he was, at that time, a quite wealthy 
entrepreneur: his influence, however, was limited to Trieste. Penati, 
on the other hand, was able to develop some degree of clientelism 
over his community of Sesto San Giovanni, but this consensus was 
not nearly enough for him to win one of the biggest provinces in Italy 
regarding population, with Milan making up the vast majority of the 
votes. Guazzaloca represents the clearest example of how important 
the image and the public persona of the candidate is, regarding politi-
cal and electoral communication, in particular in a local and bounded 
community. Voting choices in Bologna departed from rational calcula-
tions since Guazzaloca had little political and no administrative expe-
rience. Hence, the only relevant variable for Guazzaloca’s election 
in 1999 seems to be the effectiveness in harnessing mass media for 
building up consensus.
 Personal vote is a phenomenon that goes beyond the relation-
ship between patron and client: it is a strategic and rational choice, one 
that is often accounted for by universalist reasons, such as moral and 
ethical judgments about the candidate’s behavior and character, or on 
his reliability as a civil servant. The object of the bargain might misle-
ad us: in the first three examples, the bargain between candidates and 
voters was evident (jobs, promises), and in some case quite substantial 
(a sum of money). In the last case, on the other hand, there is no tangi-
ble payoff as an exchange for the given vote, there is a sort of emotio-
nal and charismatic payoff. The candidate offers a “cognitive shortcut” 
to the voter when too much information and too many stimuli are in 
place. He thus provides a reference point for the aftermath of the vote, 
being a referent for future times. In light of this evidence, it seems ne-
cessary to investigate also this last side of the relation between candi-
dates and voters, to understand whether, how and to what extent media 
influence the elected-voter relation. This forms one of the dimensions 
of the phenomenon under investigation: the existence of a personal 
vote driven by universalist motives.
Naturally, before answering the question, an analysis of the available 
literature on the topic.
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chapter II 
Vote orientation and expected benefits: two dimensions of analysis.
2.1 Party- vs. candidate-oriented vote: a first dimension of analysis.
 In the forthcoming pages, I will analyze the two dimensions 
upon which the different definitions of personal vote will be grounded. 
First, the difference between party-oriented vote and candidate-oriented 
vote will be provided. Then, I will divide expected benefits, which drive 
each voting behavior, in two categories: universalist benefits (which can 
be enjoyed by the whole community), and particularist benefits. This 
theoretical framework will pave the way for the subsequent empirical 
and field-based research, which is addressed to verifying the existence 
of a kind of personal vote oriented towards the achievement of univer-
salist benefits. First, we have to provide a definition of personal vote 
and of ideological vote, so as to understand how and why they differ. 
Whilst the previous chapter reviewed several core concepts connected 
to personal voting, the difference between the former and ideological 
voting was, deliberately, left aside, and this definition will form the core 
of the present section of this research. Borrowing from Anglo-Ameri-
can literature, we can provide the two following definitions:
• party-oriented vote: It concerns an electoral process foun-
ded on party strength.  Mass parties’ age was closely related 
to this concept. Voters chose the party first because cleava-
ges and ideological positions were what really mattered.
• Candidate oriented vote: It deals with the personalization 
of electoral competition. The candidate is the focus in this 
system (with his leadership, appeal, etc. etc.) and the party 
is just an electoral support.
Moreover, we can group ideological vote (see e.g. Fuchs and Klinge-
mann 1989) together with party-oriented vote (Campbell et al 1960), 
insofar as they are both based on strictly political attitudes, which are 
deemed relevant for the voter in order to form his or her preferences 
and to cast a ballot. The “mass party” mentioned in the above cited 
definition of party-oriented vote strongly resembles the practice of ide-
ological voting. Conversely, candidate-oriented vote can be defined as 
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personal vote (Wattenberg 1996, 73). In this case, as the definitions 
suggests, the relationship between a candidate and the party is com-
pletely reversed: the party is merely an instrument for several candi-
dates who run for office. Before analyzing some historical examples 
of candidate-oriented voting behavior, we have to clarify one element 
of this specific phenomenon: from the provided definition of candida-
te-oriented vote, the role played by “leadership and appeal” is notewor-
thy. Grounded in literature on political and electoral communication, 
this definition of personal vote addresses itself to the role of the public 
image of the leader, as conveyed by the media (Barisione, 2006). This 
definition is especially suitable for contemporary democracies, which 
are characterized by the importance of mass media and, hence, of the 
need (for any politician or public figure more in general) to convey a 
reassuring, familiar, captivating and winner image of oneself in order to 
achieve good election results. In other words, this type of personal vote 
is based on the use of different instruments for communication, and on 
the construction of different types of leadership (Barisione 2006). Whi-
le still being a type of personal vote, the candidate-oriented vote repre-
sents a different model of elector-candidate relation, articulated in the 
three subtypes of constituency service, patronage and clientelism (Cain 
1987, Kopecky, Mair, Spirova 2012, Piattoni 2007). In this case, al-
though mass media and communication still play a relevant role, voters 
choose among candidates according to more direct reasons. Voters in 
this second scenario rely on an almost direct and personal acquaintance 
with the chosen candidate, and they exercise a form of direct pressure 
on him by voting. This bound between elected and elector is very often 
active through time and in between elections, and it does not expire on 
election day alone: the candidate, more than being a media leader, is a 
local leader, who speaks for his community in the national parliament, 
and who always tries to maintain this direct relationship with his pre-
cinct and electoral district. 
 One should not, however, divide the two types of personal vote 
outlined above: rather than being mutually exclusive, the two defini-
tions are complementary (Barisione 2006). Especially in the case of 
local leaders, the two dimensions (mass media and local community) 
tend to overlap and to spur a number of different behaviors and strate-
gies, from the face-to-face direct relationship between voter and can-
didate, to the media exposure of the candidate. In the same way, one 
should not consider party-oriented and candidate-oriented vote as ful-
ly mutually exclusive, as both are at play in determining preferences 
and voting choices, while still remaining two different concepts. It is 
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unlikely, for example, that a candidate could attract votes independently 
from his or her party of affiliation and vice versa: it is logical, hence, 
that party reputation influences candidates’ performances and, at the 
same time, candidate reputation plays a role in determining the perfor-
mance of the party (Cain, Ferejohn e Fiorina 1987). With reference to 
the Italian case, the coexistence of both patterns of voting behavior has 
been widely verified by the use of preferential votes within a pre-set 
party list of candidates during the so called First Republic (D’Amato 
1964). During this period of Italian history, the constituencies of both 
the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party were influenced by 
preferences either for one party, or for one or more specific candidates, 
or for both (Parisi and Pasquino 1977).  That being said, the last needed 
clarification concerns the distinction between personal and ideological 
vote, which in turn is needed in order to fully understand the difference 
between party-oriented and candidate-oriented vote as applied in this 
research. Personal and ideological votes represent two types of approa-
ches adopted by voters in determining their preferences and choices. An 
elector who is more or totally inclined to ideological vote will choose 
based on his or her allegiance (Parisi e Pasquino 1977), or on a pro-
gram, or on the party’s positioning on some specific issues and on more 
general social and political cleavages within one specific political con-
text (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Conversely, a candidate-oriented voter 
will decide based on either the candidate’s charisma (Barisione 2006, 
Noelle-Neumann 2002) or, more functionally, on his ability to defend 
and prioritize specific interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
2.2 Universal vs. particularist expected benefits: a second dimension 
of analysis.
 While the former section of this chapter was focused on the 
“who” in the relation between electors and elected by distinguishing 
between candidate-oriented and party-oriented vote, in this section it 
is necessary to define the “what”. In other words, if it is paramount to 
define who are the relevant actors in electoral competitions, it is cor-
respondingly unavoidable for us to define what constitutes the object 
of the political bargain (Piattoni 2007) and, hence, what is the nature 
of the expected benefits which are either promised by candidates or 
desired by voters. As outlined in the first chapter, the main feature of 
the voter-candidate relationship is the rational and strategic way in whi-
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ch both candidates and voters behave (March, 1978). The cornerstone 
of the political bargain is the rational strategy employed by who asks 
for support and votes (candidates) in exchange for “believable” promi-
ses and at least the attempt to deliver on some of them, to create and 
reinforce the bound between them and the electors. Likewise, on the 
supply side, electors will try to allocate their vote in a rational and ef-
ficient way, to maximize their utility (Wolf 1999). Promises and utility 
are cornerstones, as they define the political bargain which takes place 
between elected and electors – “bargain” is here used without any value 
judgement and wants to be only a descriptive term.
 What has now to be defined is the object of said bargain, i.e. the 
expected benefits. 
First, benefits are here defined as not only material goods, but also as 
immaterial results: the object of the bargain might be either an appoint-
ment of someone in the bureaucracy, or a public recognition which pro-
vides prestige and visibility to the beneficiary (Di Mascio, 2012). Other 
two aspects of expected benefits are relevant, and allow for a classifica-
tion: benefits are characterized by being exclusive and subtractable – i.e. 
they are scarce and one unit of a good given to someone is automatical-
ly taken away from someone else. In this way, we can divide expected 
benefits in four categories: private goods, club goods, common goods 
and public goods (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994). Exclusivity of a 
good stands for the ease or difficulty with which some individuals or 
groups can be excluded from the enjoyment of said good: a high exclu-
sivity means that the cost of cutting someone off the enjoyment of the 
good is low, while a low exclusivity means that one has to pay a high 
price to exclude anyone from using the good. In the same way, a good 
is, or is not subtractable if the enjoyment of one unit of said good by so-
meone hinders the capability by someone else to enjoy the same unit of 
the same good, either simultaneously or in different moments. A highly 
subtractable good deprives all those who do not have direct access to 
the good from the ability to enjoy it, while a non-subtractable good is 
not easily assigned to a few people to the detriment of others. This first 
clarification allows for a first definition of a typology of goods:
• Private goods: are highly subtractable and highly exclu-
sive goods. These goods are scarce, and the enjoyment of 
them is easily delimitated. In politics, this kind of goods 
is represented by tenders, contracts and concessions such 
as construction authorizations, public funding or job posi-
tions.
31
• Club goods: are highly exclusive, but scarcely subtractable, 
for entire categories can enjoy them. This kind of goods 
comprehends benefits accorded to specific categories of 
workers, especially those employed in strategic economic 
sectors. 
• Common goods: are endowed with low exclusivity but are 
highly subtractable due to the fact that they can be used in 
ways which reduce the overall efficacy and efficiency of 
these resources. Unemployment benefits, social and inva-
lidity pension schemes and other forms of social rights are 
comprehended in this category.
• Public goods: are constitutional rights as granted in all li-
beral democracies, such as protection against external ene-
mies, political participation rights, freedom of expression, 
opinion and religion. They are inherently scarcely exclusi-
ve and scarcely subtractable.
Table 1.4  Universal and Particular benefits classifiction 




High Private Goods Club Goods
Low Common Goods Public Goods
The aforementioned four types of goods are ideal-types and are almost 
never encountered in reality in their pure form: most often, each good 
can be defined as in between two or more of the four categories, and 
at the same time the political bargain might involve several different 
goods at a time. Moreover, the population to which these benefits are 
addressed can be defined according to exclusivity and subtractablility 
of the benefits: exclusivity is a barrier to citizenship insofar as it limits 
the interests that are represented, while subtractability is a distributio-
nal barrier as it operates by prioritizing consumption or enjoyment of a 
given good or benefit by a given group and neglecting others (Piattoni, 
2001). Therefore, policies which are based on high exclusivity barriers 
and high subtractability are defined as elitist policies, the subsequent 
benefits are limited to a narrow group, and the goods are scarce and 
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highly rival. Low levels of subtractability combined with high levels 
of exclusivity define consociative policies: they are addressed to inter-
nally homogeneous social groups defined according to their productive 
function, ethnicity or religion. Third, low levels of exclusivity together 
with high levels of subtractability are associated with populist policies, 
which aim to represent broad social sectors (with particular attention 
paid to low income groups), but that in fact limits to a small group the 
actual enjoyment of the provided benefits. All in all, different policies 
and political strategies bring about different kinds of benefits and, in 
turn, this generates different types of voter-candidate interaction and 
relationship. Arguably, also the personal relationship plays an impor-
tant role in this system, as it determines the nature of particular forms 
of personal vote as patronage and clientelism. By simplifying all the 
variable according to the nature of benefits, and by departing from the 
fourfold definition provided by Ostrom, Gardner e Walker (1997), uni-
versal benefits are defined as benefits which can be enjoyed by the vast 
majority of electors. Hence, these benefits are inherently difficult to 
make exclusive or subtractable: examples are maintenance of roads and 
infrastructures, public education or tax reduction. Conversely, particu-
larist benefits are those who can be enjoyed by a narrow group of pe-
ople, despite being funded thanks to public expenditure and collective 
tax revenue. Example of this latter kind of benefits are ad-hoc financial 
emoluments (Golden 2003) or bureaucratic advantages to a few, such 
as changing the kind of use someone can make of a given allotment of 
land – from agricultural to residential zoning. While all goods can be 
defined according to the four categories provided above, both the field 
work and the results of the research have shown that it is sufficient to 
divide benefits based on their either universalist or particularist nature.
 Coming back to clientelism, and using this concept as an exam-
ple, another variable that enters the picture, one that closely resembles 
political sophistication, i.e. political mobilization. Some authors de-
scribe the sort of social relations which provide the basis for clientelar 
politics: relations among people within the same family network (Ban-
field, 1958), relations grounded on comparaggio (Arrighi and Piselli 
1985) or among people within the same community. These networks 
of primary relations are distinguished in formal and informal networks, 
and they grant a sufficient degree of political mobilization sufficient to 
involve 
a sizable number of people with a fairly limited organizational invest-
ment and effort. 
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Tab 1.5 Source “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative organi-
zation” (Martin, S., 2011, 353). 
The proposed figure summarizes what said until now. It is important to 
bear in mind that this typology has been specifically devised and ap-
plied to the case of clientelism (which will be defined in due course in 
this chapter) and not to the complex universe of practices which is the 
personal vote. What remains relevant of Piattoni’s typology, however, 
is the complexity of the connection between the benefits which form the 
object of the bargain, on one side, and electors and candidates, on the 
other, which, in turn, influences policy supply strategies. The outcomes 
of these policies influence society at large in electoral terms.
 Another crucial element is the impact that these voter-candidate 
patterns have on political mobilization processes, especially in coun-
tries which are in democratic transition, or that are new-born democra-
cies. For example, democratic regimes which are not fully or scarcely 
mobilized are prone to generate informal and family-based relational 
networks, while highly mobilized regime also show a high degree of 
formalization of social and political structures. Finally, if political mo-
bilization refers to collective processes, political sophistication under-
stood as either political awareness (Sniderman et al 1991) or political 
involvement (De Sio 2006) represents the necessary condition for the 
individual to act (or desist to act, or to subdue) in collective processes 
of political mobilization.
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2.3 The role of political sophistication.
Coming back the first variable, the dialectics between party-oriented 
and candidate-oriented vote, however, reveals more than just different 
types of voting behaviors: this differentiation provides a measure of 
voters’ sophistication and abstraction. To define these two concepts, a 
short disciplinary digression is due: if one studies sophistication as an 
individual cognitive process, hence disembedded from collective dy-
namics, cognitive psychology becomes a necessary vantage point from 
which to study voting choices. While a full-fledged analysis of the lite-
rature in political psychology is beyond the scope of this research, we 
can assess how sophistication and abstraction are studied in different 
ways, and with different assumptions, in political psychology and in 
political science. 
 Sniderman’s conceptualizes political sophistication as “diffe-
rences between people in their level of political awareness that syste-
matically affect their reasoning about political choices” (Sniderman 
et al., 1991). Accordingto this definition, political awareness influen-
ces political assessments and, in the end, voting choices. Moreover, 
political sophistication provides a set of cognitive shortcuts that help 
deciding based on available information (Sniderman, 1989). The role 
of cognitive shortcuts in defining voting choices is known in political 
science, specifically in political marketing and communication (Mazzo-
leni, 2012). A cognitive shortcut is considered as an alternative mental 
route which is followed by the elector to synthesize overabundant infor-
mation or, to the contrary, to compensate for a lack of information. The 
degree of one’s political sophistication determines the type of cognitive 
shortcut which will be chosen: high levels of sophistication allow for 
more complex – hence better – shortcuts, while a low degree of sophi-
stication will constrain cognitive shortcuts to more simple routes, and 
the resulting choice will be based often on feelings and emotions rather 
than on rational calculations.
 How should we consider and define political sophistication to 
explain better the difference between ideological and personal voting 
choices? Many authors have proposed different indicators to assess the 
degree of sophistication, education being one of the most widely used. 
Stimson (1975) made a fundamental contribution to research in this 
field: he was the first scholar to discover a correlation between educatio-
nal achievements and the formation of political opinions. Subsequently, 
other studies privileged the relation between education, political sophi-
stication and political information and their role in determining beha-
viors and choices (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). On the other 
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side, other approaches studied the interaction between political sophi-
stication and awareness (Zaller 1992). Lastly, political sophistication 
has been studied as either a filter to synthesize relevant information or 
as a tool to escape one’s social context by new social contexts (Simmel, 
1890). Political sophistication influences voting choices not only as a 
rational tool for making sense of information, but also as a motivational 
tool: political sophistication determines how a voter reacts to emotional 
triggers. This motivational side of sophistication is important as it often 
works in combination to the rational side in determining voting choices 
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993).
 In sum, we can define sophistication as the degree and depth of 
one’s knowledge of political facts (Zaller 1992): sophistication, thus, is 
an estimator of electors’ degree of access to information about the poli-
tical process. In other cases, political sophistication has been defined as 
the set of competences and skills with which the electors are endowed, 
and which help them navigate the political process (Sniderman, Brody, 
e Tetlock 1991), or as the magnitude of an elector’s psychological in-
volvement in politics, and political involvement more broadly (De Sio, 
2006).
Is it possible to associate different degrees of political sophistication 
to different voting patterns? Departing from the Italian example and 
the distinction between allegiance vote, opinion vote and vote-selling 
(Parisi and Pasquino 1976, 170-176) it is possible for us to define these 
three voting behaviors according to (a) the level of integration of the 
elector in the system, (b) the degree of trust in the possibilities for chan-
ge and (c) the capability to make electoral choices which are consistent 
with the aims to achieve and the interests to protect. Allegiance vote, 
during the Italian First Republic, was understood as a testimony to in-
dividual and collective interests, but this testimony was not limited and 
concluded by voting itself: voters’ integration was conflictual, trust in 
rules and institutions was scarce. Opinion vote, conversely, represents a 
choice based on the supply of political propositions coming from politi-
cal parties and on the idea that personal interests and collective interests 
were somehow linked: integration in the system is strong, as is trust in 
norms. Finally, vote selling is merely a service provided by the elector 
in exchange for a payment and, clearly, it involves only an immediate 
and individual interest: voters who sell their vote perceive themselves 
as complete outsiders from the political system and its rules and norms. 
From the vantage point of political sophistication, we can define opi-
nion vote as a vote characterized by a high level of sophistication, while 
the allegiance vote is medium-range and vote-selling represents choices 
made with scarce or absent sophistication.
 During the Italian First Republic, the three aforementioned 
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types of voting choices could easily be associated with discrete social 
segments: allegiance vote was common among urban and rural working 
class, associated with either the communist or the catholic sub-culture; 
opinion vote, was characteristic of middle class and more affluent so-
cial strata, and vote-selling was common to urban and rural workers, as 
well as middle-income electors, in the South of Italy (Parisi e Pasquino 
1976). It is important, again, to acknowledge the three voting choices 
as complementary and, despite being apparently incompatible with one 
another, they have coexisted in several elections throughout the First 
Republic. Indeed, it is unrealistic to think that the Christian Democracy 
and the Communist Party did not rely, to various degrees, on all three of 
the above said types of voting choices, since they had such a widespre-
ad consensus (Parisi, Pasquino 1976). These caveats will be reassessed 
at the end of the chapter, where the final typology will be proposed to 
simplify the endeavor of addressing the research question of this thesis. 
It is important to underline, however, that choice-making patterns asso-
ciated with ideological and programmatic considerations are connected 
to medium to high levels of sophistications, while choices based on 
individual interests are endowed with low or absent sophistication.
2.4  Rationality in voters’ actions and interactions
The first two paragraphs attempted to define the protagonists which ani-
mate the processes associated with personal vote, and which will come 
back in the methodological discussion and in the analysis of the inter-
views. In synthesis, the last pages provided a definition of the “who”, 
the “what” and the “how” of the political bargain: in other words, the 
interaction of the two former elements it is possible for us to define 
different types of personal vote, thus shaping definitions of patronage, 
clientelism and constituency service. Before we delve into these defini-
tions, however, it is necessary to clarify important aspects regarding the 
relationships that intervene between candidates, electors and the bene-
fits which form the object of the political bargain (Parisi and Pasquino 
1977). It is indeed apparent that the interactions between these three ele-
ments, as well as the study of the outputs of said interactions, ought to 
be interpreted following a clear approach. As outline in the first chapter, 
the rationality of electoral choices (Downs 1957) is the central point of 
this thesis. According to Downs (1957, 1998) a voter follows a rational 
behavioral pattern when: i) he or she is always able to make a choice, 
ii) when he or she is able to name and order his/her preferences, iii) the 
ordering of said preferences is transitive, iv) among alternative options, 
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he or she will always choose the preference that is placed higher in the 
list, v) when put different times in the same conditions, the rational 
voter will always make the same decisions. This kind of rationality is 
defined as action-oriented rationality, as opposed to aim-oriented ratio-
nality (Downs 1998 pp 34-40): while the latter stands for the attempt to 
find out the most rationally desirable aim, the former indicates the most 
efficient action to achieve a given goal. Downs’s approach is rooted in 
a description of the voter as a homo oeconomicus: voters act as consu-
mers who, with a given budget, have to allocate resources to maximize 
their utility. It is beyond the scope of this research to outline the several 
critiques which were addressed at this approach ever since its first in-
ception: the homo oeconomicus has been, from time to time, opposed 
to homo politicus (Veblen 1924), or to the “foolish rationality” (Sen 
1998) that has been attributed to the voter. Within the limits of rational 
choice approach, however, it is natural to ask to which of the actors one 
can attribute rational behavioral patterns. Until now, the focus has been 
given on the “demand” side of the political market, hence to the consti-
tuency of voters. However, the rational logics informs and characterizes 
also the behavior of political parties, interest groups and middlemen 
(Downs 1957), i.e. the heterogeneous group of actors which operate to 
secure their power, to condition politics and government, and to orient 
policies towards specific and delimited sectors of the constituency. All 
in all, if the rational model works for electors (demand), this is because 
also elites (supply) act in a rational way, and the overall result will be 
probabilistically foreseeable (Downs 1958). This research, by focusing 
on voters’ expectations concerning the benefits offered by candidates, 
inherently favors a demand-oriented analysis, i.e. an analysis which is 
focused on voters. As outlined above, however, rational logics also in-
form the choices on the supply side of the equation: aims and means 
employed by parties, leaders or both are of great importance. In betwe-
en supply and demand, we retrieve other actors such as committees, 
interest groups and other kinds of intermediaries which act as brokers 
both in terms of consensus (Fenno 1978, Cain 1987) and in terms of 
policy-making and advice (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova 2012). 
 Having outlined all the protagonists, we can try to point out the 
possible rational strategies that each actor puts in place. Parties and 
candidates may decide to adopt different strategies to gain consensus, 
the first of which is to make themselves recognizable (Mayhew 1974). 
Visibility is the first and foremost aim that a candidate wants to achie-
ve during electoral competitions, in which the boundaries of a given 
constituency are clear and unchangeable. Visibility is achievable, for 
example, by sending letters and e-mails about policy propositions or 
past political experience. Another form of visibility-building can be the 
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so called “door-to-door” system or more classical media coverage such 
as ads and interviews on radio, press, cable channels and the Internet. 
However, it is important to distinguish between reputation and visibility 
(Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987, Webb 2004, Venturino 2005, Pizzorno 
2007): the former differs from the latter in that reputation is concerned 
with how the public image of one candidate is judged by electors (Ba-
risione 2007). In some respect, visibility reveals the level of popularity 
and, in quantitative terms, the level of media exposure, while reputa-
tion asks for voters and public opinion to form a more complex and 
articulated qualitative judgement, which can change over time (Haber-
mas 1977, Noelle-Neumann 2002). Moreover, a candidate’s reputation 
depends on party’s reputation and it often varies regardless from the 
qualities of the candidates or of his/her political behavior, as we will see 
when analyzing the Anglo-American concept of constituency service. 
Arguably, visibility is not the only resource that candidate can draw 
upon in order to gain support: position voting (Mayhew 1974), which is 
a tool for evaluating a candidate, is undoubtedly relevant for voters in 
evaluating a candidate, insofar as it allows voters to form a precise elec-
toral identity through evaluation of how the given candidate has voted 
on each policy and piece of regulation. Constituents, hence, will judge 
politicians based on the actual output of their political activity, synthe-
sized in the acts and policies which are made effective. At the same 
time, candidates will use their voting choices in representative bodies 
in the political discourse in order to differentiate themselves from other 
candidates and reaffirming their political identity. Position voting can 
naturally take a broader meaning and significance: a given candidate 
may position himself in a specific way in the political spectrum, regar-
dless of the actual behavior assumed within representative institutions. 
For example, said candidate may connote himself as moderate to maxi-
mize electoral support (Arrow 1951, Mayhew 1974). Position voting, in 
short, defines the capacity of a candidate of defining himself regarding 
specific and socially relevant policy issues, and especially to do so du-
ring the electoral campaign. Finally, position voting, understood as a 
voting choice formed depending on politicians’ behavior in elected bo-
dies, becomes relevant for the re-election of a politician through credit 
claiming, i.e. “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political ac-
tor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the gover-
nment, or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) 
considers desirable” (Mayhew 1986 pp 373). It is fundamental to notice 
that this definition depicts a relationship between a) the candidate, who 
must engender the expectation that he actually can turn promises into 
policies, and b) voter who are asked, in individual or collective form, to 
form expectations and requests, and to be able to recognize the candi-
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date who is most capable of delivering on them. Moreover, there is an 
implicit middle ground between supply and demand, made up by inte-
rest groups that mediates – especially in large constituencies – between 
voters and politicians and, in so doing, may influence the orientation of 
choices and preferences of both voters and candidates (Snyder Jr, Ting, 
2004). Interest groups and committees are crucial for rallying votes, 
for maintaining support within a precinct and, in turn, consolidating 
and stabilizing this support over time (Cox, McCubbins 1984). Policy 
choices are made to gather support: this means that a candidate will 
need to take inputs coming from committees, interest groups and vo-
ters into account to be re-elected. In doing so, said candidate can and 
will employ the political resources that come from the institutional role 
he assumes (Olson, 1971). Specifically, the candidate has an incentive 
to protect and prioritize his support groups’ interests through patrona-
ge (Cox, McCubbins 1984), understood as a redistributive strategy in 
favor of the interests represented by the elected candidate. Overall, it 
is evident that there are several means, and for each means there are 
several ways in which the interaction between politicians, electors and 
interest groups can be articulated and structured, both before and after 
elections.
2.5  The context: electoral systems, forms of government and other 
elements.
 In depicting the different types of voting choices, and in descri-
bing the benefits connected to each of them, this research stressed the 
relationship between candidates, electors, and intermediaries such as in-
terest groups and committees. These interactions play a paramount role 
not only in building up support but also in maintaining an electoral coa-
lition around candidates (Cox, M.D. McCubbins 1984). This thesis also 
positioned the types of action and choices within an overarching ratio-
nal choice framework that stresses action-oriented rationality (Downs 
1957). Most important, we emphasized that all the actors involved in 
the political process are capable of rational choices and strategies.  The 
interaction between voters and candidate might be simple or more com-
plex, according to the range of intermediaries (interest groups, com-
mittees) that enter the picture. Moreover, some institutional variables 
intervene in different forms: the form of government, the electoral sy-
stem, the relationship between center and periphery and the relationship 
between a party and its candidates. All these elements play a role in sha-
ping actors’ behavior and, hence, they concur in determining the overall 
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result. For example, parties play a paramount role in determining the 
political career of their candidates, and vice versa. First, a party confers 
visibility (Mayhew 1974) and reputation (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1983) 
to its candidates: it is decisive for a candidate to be part of a popular 
party with a capillary territorial articulation. It is also important that 
this party does not “embarrass” its candidate by supporting undesired 
regulation or, worse if the party is the object of bad press and scandals 
(in particular financial scandals). The party strength, thus, enormously 
influences both the possibilities of rallying support by the candidate and 
the political activity of the elected candidate regarding the distribution 
of benefits. In some cases, e.g. States in the US system, this relation-
ship is more intense. In these cases, the strength of a party is correlated 
with the supply of public goods: the stronger the party strength, the 
weaker the need for s and, in turn, the bigger provision of pure public 
goods (Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). In other words, the American context 
reveals that strong, capillary and structured parties cause government 
spending to orient itself towards national and universal interests, due 
to the absence of centrifugal forces coming from individual candidates. 
Conversely, where parties are mere “containers” of diverse and hete-
rogeneous interests, the action of individual representatives becomes 
more and more often oriented towards providing direct answers to their 
constituencies’ requests, hence giving way to s which very often (yet 
not always) are at odds with national interests. When the driving force 
pulls towards public goods, spending is lower and targeted to a bigger 
number of beneficiaries (disregarding the individual constituencies and 
precincts). On the contrary, s bring about higher sums of taxpayers’ mo-
ney, addressed to fewer people, located in each congressman’s district. 
Moreover, one has to bear in mind the peculiar power structure between 
center and periphery to understand how party strength influences pu-
blic spending. Again, if one considers the example of the United States, 
which are characterized by a multilevel governance system, one noti-
ces that the transfer of resources from the federal government towards 
states and local authorities, with the presence of strong and cohesive 
local parties are lower (Rodden 2005). Influential parties imply lower 
expenditures and higher savings for local governments, in turn making 
them less in need for federal funding. Hence, the overall result will be 
a generalized reduction of public spending, both at the local and at the 
federal/national level (Mayhev 1986, Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). Conver-
sely, in the absence of strong candidates committed to the distribution 
of single-district benefits, there will be no pressure either on the local or 
on the national government to increase spending, and this will prevent 
public funding to soar. While most of the evidence of this process come 
from the American case (Mayhev 1986, Rodden 2005, Primo, Snyder 
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Jr 2010), similar results have been retrieved in contexts in which parties 
are more pervasive at all institutional levels (Keefer, Khemani 2009).
However, if public expenditure and distribution of benefits are funda-
mental in defining personal vote, other variables are also at play in the 
voter-candidate interaction, and they are worth mentioning here. One 
of these intervening variables is electoral legislation and regulation, not 
only in its narrow sense of electoral model and algorithm for assigning 
seats in elective bodies (proportional, single transferable vote, plurality 
and so forth), but also as “the complex of norms which regulate the 
entire electoral process” (D’Alimonte, Fusaro 2008). Winner-takes-all 
electoral systems (such as the one established in the UK) tend to be less 
efficient than proportional systems if the expected policies are desirable 
by the electorate, while the latter is less effective than the former when 
policies are not beneficial (Lizzeri, Persico 2001). In other terms, win-
ner-takes-all systems engender a kind of competition among candidates 
which is based on the willingness to satisfy particularistic desires wi-
thin the constituency, to the advantage of the few and the detriment of 
the efficiency of public spending. Conversely, nation-wide districts wi-
thin proportional elections determine a post-electoral bargaining which 
involves all candidates that diminish the tendency to distribute public 
goods to narrow sectors of society (a distributional policy choice that is 
less desirable because it produces widespread, and not isolated, gains), 
thus providing a more efficient allocation of resources.
Moving away from the economic dimensions of personal vote, and 
adopting a political science perspective, we can correlate the effect de-
riving from specific electoral systems with higher or lower levels of 
personalization of political competition. While proportional and win-
ner-takes-all systems are often considered to be opposed to one another, 
they both show, in different ways, personalist mechanisms which in-
fluence the practical use of personal vote. There is widespread evidence 
of a correlation between the incentives towards personal vote and the 
various electoral systems. More precisely, by dividing electoral systems 
according to some independent variables which interact with personal 
vote, it is possible to register the effects produced by each electoral mo-
del on the incentives towards maximization of personal reputation. Let 
us consider ballot, pool and votes as characteristics through which one 
can define a given electoral system and, thus, the relative importance of 
rallying personal votes (Carey, Shugart 1993).
 
• Ballot: the control that the party’s ruling class exerts in de-
termining the composition of the list of candidates for the 
elections.
• Pool: whether one expressed vote contributes first to the 
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product of the list and, only after, to the result of a given 
candidate.
• Voters: how many ballots one elector can cast (whether one 
to the list, one for a candidate or both).
Finally, let us consider the most important variable, which is crucial for 
the strategic coordination of voters in their choices (Cox 1997): the ma-
gnitude of the electoral districts, as a result of a given electoral system. 
By cross-checking these variables, J.M Carey and M.S. Shugart (1993) 
classified electoral systems according to their capacity to incentivize 
or hinder personal vote. The result of that research was that closed-list 
systems with one round, for example, have very weak or absent in-
centives towards personal vote (ballot=0, pool=0, voters=0 with M=1) 
and, therefore, candidates will be less concerned about their personal 
reputation, and more concerned about their party’s reputation. Open-list 
formulas with multiple votes, conversely, produce a balance between 
incentives towards personal vote and party influence (ballot=0, pool=0, 
votes=0 with M higher than 1).
Tab 1.6: An ordinal scoring system of electoral system according to the incentive 
to cultivate a personal reputation. (Carey and, Shugart 1995, p 425 ).
 In short, the different combinations of values assumed by the 
variables and the magnitude of the precinct (M higher than, or equal 
to 1) produce different effects on the personal vote depending on the 
chosen electoral system. This same result has also been confirmed in 
countries with mixed electoral systems such as Germany. Here, MPs 
who are elected with the plurality system are more attentive to their in-
dividual precincts’ needs and interests than the MPs elected with the 
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proportional system (Lancaster and Baur 2002). In Ireland, the Single 
Transferable Vote (STV) actively pushes towards taking care of personal 
votes, despite Ireland being a political system characterized by active 
and influential parties. This kind of incentive towards personal vote, 
however, only applies to inter-party competition, and it is absent among 
candidates within the same party (Martin 2010). As was noted above, 
committees are crucial players in electoral dynamics, and they are of 
particular importance in the correlation between personal vote and be-
nefit (re)distribution. The case of Germany, besides the already men-
tioned contradictory incentives for MPs elected with either plurality or 
proportional systems, also shows a differentiated role of committees. In 
plurality, electoral districts, committees are well-considered by candida-
tes. On the other hand, they are less relevant in proportional precincts 
(Stratman Baur 2002). Another fundamental theme within the political 
bargain is the possibility for an MP or a party to propose advantageous 
pieces of legislation. A parliament which allows candidates to produce 
fiscal advantages for their supporting committees, will, in turn, rein-
force personal vote dynamics (Meccanismi di Cura del Personal Vote – 
MCPV). On the contrary, MCPV will be weaker in institutional systems 
which prohibit such type of legislation to be passed (S. Martin 2011). 
To assess the intensity of personal vote dynamics in each country, we 
need to combine the different types of legislative organizations with the 
electoral systems, i.e. ballot, pool and votes (Carey and Shugart 1993). 
Then, we need to measure the effects of these variables on MCPV (Mar-
tin 2011).
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Fig in “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative organization” 
(Martin, S.,  2011, 353).
     
 The figure offers a brief overview of the results of this model, as 
applied to several country-specific case studies, and clearly underlines 
that, where the legislative organization allows for “orientable” legisla-
tion, i.e. legislation that can be targeted on specific social sectors, this 
reinforces personalization and personal vote. This is the case of Italy, 
where the possibility of ad-hoc legislation to the advantage of indivi-
dual electoral districts (so called leggine), produced strong incentives 
towards MCPV (Golden 2003). In conclusion, one ought not to overlo-
ok the correlation between personal vote and the territorial dimension 
of voting, or local vote. We can define local vote as “the degree to whi-
ch district-level factors affect voter’s decision” (Morgenstern, Swindle 
2005, 145). The authors tried to measure the importance of local vote 
in twenty-three democracies, and thereby produced a model which tests 
the influence of some variables on local vote. In particular, Morgenstern 
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and Swindle concentrated upon three institutional variables, two spatial 
variables, and two political-institutional variables:
The first three variables identify the institutional features of a given 
system which orient towards, or aside from personal vote. They are:
• Presidentialism vs parliamentarism
• Electoral system
• Campaign finance
Two more variables then describe the spatial articulation of the political 
competition:
• Number of electoral districts
• Federalism and characteristics of the communities
Lastly, two variables represent how a political system is articulated wi-
thin one country.
• Party organization
• Ideology and cohesion
• This categorization resembles the measurement of personal vote 
according to the feature of the electoral system (Carey e Shugart 
1993), and draws upon Stokes’ (1965, 1967) conceptualization, 
which decomposes party vote’s variables into i) District heteroge-
neity, ii) Volatility, iii) local votes. By analyzing the results from 
Morgenstern and Swindle’s study of twenty-three countries men-
tioned above, it is possible to produce a multivariate regression, 
having local votes as a dependent variable: 
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Tab 1.7 Regression Results (dependent variable: local vote). 
Source (Morgenstern, S., Swindle, SM., (2005) 
Are politics local? An analysis of voting patterns in 23 democracies, pp. 162
   In short, this regression suggests a higher propensity to 
local vote in presidential than in parliamentary systems. Furthermore, in 
contrast with some analyses which propose a strong correlation betwe-
en electoral systems and personal vote (Carey e Shugart 1993, Martin 
2011), this regression shows no evidence of a paramount role of electo-
ral systems in reinforcing local vote mechanisms. In conclusion, before 
defining patronage, clientelism and constituency service, it is important 
to underline that the voter-candidate interaction – and, thus, also perso-
nal vote – is complex and influenced by several variables and mechani-
sms. In some cases, institutional and electoral factors are determinant 
in defining the degree of personalism in electoral competitions (Cain, 
Ferejhon, Fiorina 1983, Carey e Shugart 1993, Martin 2011). In other 
contexts, one retrieves a stronger influence of material factors such as 
the control of economic resources during campaigns, or the possibility 
for MPs to propose and pass legislation with localized beneficial effects 
for their constituents (Lizzeri, Persico 2001, Morgenstern and Potthoff 
2005, Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). In other systems, finally, the ideological 
characterization of the candidate and its position towards specific issues 
(Mayhew 1974), or the position, cohesion and ideological consistency 
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of one party (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005) play a pivotal role. All 
these nuances show how the interactions between elected, electors and 
intermediaries (interest groups and committees) are complex in nature. 
In the last lines, we stressed the crucial role of the one of the two main 
variables: party/candidate vote. But, after this section we explored other 
important features that have a big influence on the electoral relationship 
between voters and candidate. Especially the last part is fundamental 
in order to considerer personal vote as a phenomenon “involved in so-
ciety” and strictly related to electoral system, form of government and 
other contextual elements. In the next chapter, we introduce the second 
main variable considered in the research: universal/particular benefits.
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chapter III
Disentangling the personal vote: particularism vs. universalism
3.1  The relationship between patronage and clientelism.
As outlined at the beginning of the second chapter, the personal vs. 
partisan dimension of voting, and the universalistic vs. particularistic 
nature of the expected benefits are two critical aspects, through which 
I will elaborate a typology of personal vote patterns. This classification 
will combine the type of vote and the kind of expected benefits, and it 
will include clientelism, constituency service, patronage and the ideo-
logical vote. Due to the scope of this research, most of the attention will 
be devoted to clientelism and constituency service, as they represent 
two extreme versions of the personal vote. They differ on the nature of 
the expected benefits: while, in the former case, anticipated benefits are 
particularistic; universalistic ones characterize the latter. Once again, 
the aim of the present research is to demonstrate the existence, among 
voters in the South of Italy, of forms of personal vote motivated by uni-
versalistic benefits, i.e. constituency service (or “virtuous clientelism”).







a) Clientelism: personal 
particularistic vote





c) Patronage d) Allegiance/ideological 
vote
 First, we have to define clientelism, since this concept and pa-
tronage are often used as synonyms in the literature (Piattoni 2011, p 
81-83). This uncertainty is not unexpected since both clientelism and 
patronage share a dyadic relationship between a patron and a client (Fo-
ster 1961, 1963, Scott 1972, Landè, 1961): hence, it is natural to consider 
these two concepts as proximate to one another, even as complementary 
concepts. The second premise of this analysis concerns the approaches 
to the study of patronage. Despite acknowledging the paramount im-
portance of rationalist framework, it is important to account for other 
approaches, such as the micro-structural one. As said above, this latter 
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approach found that family structures, “instrumental” and “unbalan-
ced friendships” between the client and the patron the defining features 
of patronage (Wolf 1966, Pitt-Rivers 1971). Other scholars identify the 
micro-cultural dimension, and in the presence of “apathy and despair” 
the defining cultural features of patronage, especially in Latin cultures 
(Banfield 1958). This latter set of contributions, together with others 
that will be re-examined when defining clientelism, are concerned with 
exogenous determinants of patronage – hence not directly related to the 
institutional and legal electoral environment – while they overlook the 
rational-strategic dimension of the personal vote (Piattoni 2006). 
3.2  Patronage
 First, it is important to distinguish between the study of patro-
nage defined as a study of political parties and machines, on the one 
side, and morally and ethically charged definitions of patronage as a 
political “evil” (Berafield 2009, p 66). The contributions which share this 
latter approach describe patronage as an inherently unproductive and 
destructive (evil) activity that cannot contribute to the progress or im-
provement of society (Mosher 1982, Van Riper 1958). Moreover, patro-
nage is considered a “bureaupathology,” i.e. the vehicle through which, 
by the necessary interaction between patronage and civil service, bure-
aucracy becomes affected by “vices, maladies, and sickness” (Caid, 1991, 
490). This approach might unfortunately end up in biased, self-fulfilling 
analysis: in fact, researchers tend to study the phenomenon of patronage 
only where it assumes deviated and degenerated forms (Berafield 2009), 
thus obscuring a broader view of the process. This approach overlooks 
“the examination not only of any potential positive benefits that may 
result from the patron-client relationship but also of analysis of the very 
concept of patronage” (Powell, 1970, 412). 
 Moreover, one needs to differentiate between an anthropological 
study of patronage and one based on political science and policy studies 
theories and methods. The former focuses on “how persons of unequal 
authority yet linked through ties of interests and friendship manipulate 
their relationships in order to attain their ends” (Weingrod 1968, 379). 
Conversely, political science studies patronage as the phenomenon in 
which politics distributes public jobs or special favors in exchange for 
electoral support (Weingrod 1968). It is important to specify that the 
two approaches are not against each other: rather, the anthropological 
definition of patronage forms the pre-condition to the development of 
political forms of patronage. This link between anthropological deter-
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minants and political manifestations helps political science not to sepa-
rate patronage from its social and context-specific determinants. Quite 
the opposite, anthropological studies have provided solid groundings 
on which to unfold social and political investigations in places where 
this phenomenon is especially present such as the south of Italy (Arri-
ghi and Piselli 1985). Kaufman provides the first definition of patronage 
which focuses on the dyadic relationship between patron and client. He 
defined this interaction as:
“i) the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; 
ii) based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating 
from interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the 
return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and ser-
vices to the other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to 
materialize; iii) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored 
only loosely in public law or community norms” (Kaufman 1974, 285). 
In Kaufman’s definition, one retrieves all the elements mentioned above, 
both concerning patronage in its anthropological dimension and its po-
litical manifestation. However, there is no reference to the “functional” 
role of patronage, i.e. the distinction between different forms of patro-
nage, each of which characterized by various aims and expected benefi-
ts. Berafield added this further dimension to the definition of patronage 
and applied it to the American case: 
• Organizational patronage is used to strengthen or create 
political organizations.
• Democratic patronage seeks to achieve democratic or egali-
tarian goals using patronage.
• Tactical patronage uses the distribution of public offices to 
bridge political divisions or cleavages as a means of achie-
ving political or policy goals.
• Reform patronage emerges when those committed to refor-
ming the existing patronage system themselves engage in 
practice as the ways of replacing the corrupt political regime 
that preceded them. (2009, 69-72).
 These four patronage styles uncover the different functions 
that political patronage can perform: in fact, patronage can assume va-
rious forms concerning the aims, and it may become an organizatio-
nal resource to be drawn upon to maintain and reinforce power (Wil-
son 1961) as well as for the maintenance of a party apparatus. In other 
cases, the “reward” dimension prevails, hence patronage may become 
characterized by the distribution of public offices as a means of stren-
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gthening loyalty bonds, and for securing political support. All in all, a 
functional analysis of (political) patronage produces, as a first result, a 
simple distinction between patronage as either an electoral or an orga-
nizational resource (Kopecký, Mair, Spirova, 2012, 5-9). While the elec-
toral function of patronage will be fleshed out later in this work, it is 
important here to define the organizational role of this phenomenon: 
patronage serves parties and politicians as a means for control and ma-
nagement of power, and it manifests itself through the control of civil 
service and state bureaucracy. Moreover, patronage as an organizational 
resource explains parties’ effort to maintain direct ties with the state and 
its bureaucratic articulations, often regardless of their actual electoral 
performance (hence of parties’ rootedness in society), with the princi-
pal aim of political survival through the occupation of public offices. In 
this case, patronage is a party-state linkage (Van Biezen, Kopecky, 2007) 
which mainly acts within institutions and seconds the control of the 
state by parties. The occupation of the state by parties and politicians 
occurs through the appointment of people in public sector jobs such as 
state-owned enterprises, governing boards, universities, advisory com-
mittees and commissions (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012, p 7; Sorauf, 
1959; Wilson, 1973; Muller 1989; Berafield 2009). Di Mascio provides 
the most suitable definition of patronage in public policy studies: “pa-
tronage is the justified use of discretionary power by political actors, 
which control the appointment of offices in the public sector to obtain 
the support of those who are appointed”  (Di Mascio, 2012, 23). The 
power to appoint is hence the qualifying feature of patronage as an ad-
ministrative practice, and it overlaps with the concept of “top-down po-
liticization”, by which political criteria are employed to select people for 
public jobs, and for deciding upon their career progressions. In this de-
finition of patronage, it is the object of the bargain to be narrowed down 
to the mere assignment of jobs and positions in exchange for loyalty 
and support. Hence, more general, immaterial and indirect benefits are 
excluded from this analysis. 
 We can conceptualize patronage not only as an electoral resour-
ce but also as an organizational one. As Kopecky, Mair and Spirova have 
it: “patronage here represents a form of linkage politics - a mechanism 
through which individual politicians or parties obtain electoral support 
in exchange for selectively distributing (mostly material) benefits throu-
gh state institutions” (2012, 3). The central feature of this definition is the 
electoral bargain, besides the prevalently material nature of the expected 
benefits. Electoral patronage is a party-society linkage (Van Biezen, Ko-
pecky, 2007), and it inevitably resembles clientelism: this resemblance 
is even more apparent if we analyze in detail the different definitions of 
this phenomenon. As a matter of fact, most of the definitions of patro-
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nage and clientelism are focused on a dyadic relation between a patron 
who asks for votes, and clients who ask for benefits. However, the simi-
larity between the two concepts does not hinder the possibility to ope-
rate fine-grained distinctions. In particular, clientelism is preferred over 
patronage as it describes face-to-face interactions between a candidate 
and his constituency, especially in forms of local landlordship in poor 
and rural contexts (Gibbon and Higgins, 1974). Conversely, the party is 
the central actor in more modern forms of clientelism, especially when 
it comes to the distribution of benefits (Weingrod 1968, Caciagli 2006). 
It is important to remark that patronage and clientelism do not establish 
a complete picture of the different forms of interactions between elec-
tors and elected officials: aside from patronage and clientelism, brokera-
ge also plays an important role. This way of exchanging and managing 
political resources consists of a mere intermediation between voters 
and candidates, performed by committees, opinion leaders or interest 
groups in support for a candidate, which are not able to directly control 
said resources. In some cases, this ability to manage political capital de-
rives from proximity to power, or from particular knowledge of the bu-
reaucratic apparatus. Brokers, in turn, can draw upon their know-how 
more than upon friendship and connections (Komito 1984, 174). 
TAB 1.9 Source (Kopecký,P.,Mair P., Spirova, M., (2012), Party patronage and 
party government in European democracies, pp 8)
 The proposed scheme provides an efficient synthesis of the defi-
ning features of patronage and clientelism. In particular, the last row of 
the table opens a critical reflection on the criteria on which to distingui-
sh between patronage and clientelism, as defined both by Kopecky and 
Spirova (2008) and by Scherlis (2010). As most of the literature does, 
the two authors leave corruption aside from the rest of the analysis. 
The authors individuate the nature of the political bargain as the pri-
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mary distinction between patronage and clientelism: while the former is 
longer-lasting and more based on loyalty, the latter is more contingent 
(typical of electoral campaigns), and more strongly oriented towards 
achieving an advantageous exchange of (material) benefits. Patronage 
understood as an electoral resource, hence, becomes closer to cliente-
lism, because in both cases the reward prevails in the dyadic relation-
ship (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012): many contributions deal with the 
definition of patronage in a similar vein. In some cases, “patronage” 
defines the object of the bargain as “a selective benefit which politicians 
distribute to individual voters, activists or donors in exchange for poli-
tical support”  (Shefter1994, 283). Similarly, Blondel defines patronage 
as “the distribution of favors to individuals in exchange for achieved or 
expected advantages for political actors”  (Blondel 2002, 241). Howe-
ver, the two most relevant definitions of patronage are Mainwaring’s 
and Muller’s. The former defines patronage as “the use or distribution 
of public resources based on non-meritocratic criteria in order to achie-
ve political advantages”  (Mainwaring 1999, 177). Muller (2006) con-
curs with Stokes (2009) in focusing on the direct and particularistic 
nature of the exchange. However, Stokes does not speak generically 
about “political support”, and he rather mentions the vote as the pre-
dominant form of support given by clients to patrons. These last two 
definitions are of importance not only because they are the most widely 
employed in comparative analyses of patronage, but also because they 
are also definitions used in many studies of clientelism: hence, they 
lie somehow at the crossroad between the two phenomena. Moreover, 
the interchangeable use of patronage and clientelism reveals that, in 
some respects, party-directed patronage might be acknowledged as a 
direct evolution of landlord clientelism (Graziano 1968, Tarrow 1972), 
which was widespread in the south of Italy in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War. The evolution from landlordship to clienteli-
sm comprehends patronage as a “social unifier which binds clientelist 
networks together” (Mainwaring 1999, 180). In this view, patronage is 
an umbrella concept which comprehends the definition of clientelism 
as a peculiar variant (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012). Moreover, pa-
tronage represents a systematic way of organizing social relations by 
individual candidates on the ground, which allows the different parties 
to manage power in a more orderly way, to prevent internal conflicts, 
especially during the distribution of benefits.
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3.3  Clientelism
 We have thus far shown that, based on the definitions retrieved 
in the scientific literature on the matter, patronage and clientelism are 
difficult to distinguish from one another. This difficulty, however, does 
not debunk the idea that clientelism is the clearest example of a parti-
cularistic personal vote. The connection between patronage and clien-
telism shows that “patronage is both one of the objects of the cliente-
list bargain, and the tool for perfecting other clientelist exchanges” 
(Piattoni, 2007, p 34). According to Gingerich (2004) and Sotiropoulos 
(2004), one could define the patron-client bargain in two ways. On the 
one hand, “job patronage” or “clientelism at the bottom” defines, for 
example, the barter of administrative positions in exchange for votes. 
On the other hand, “resource patronage” or “clientelism at the top” 
synthesize the loyalty that binds civil servants to the parties and politi-
cians which appointed them in the first place.
 Political clientelism has an independent social dimension: the analysis 
of the social side of political clientelism comprehends eminent contri-
butions, such as the one made by Scott (1972, 128) which sets aside 
the “clientelist relations” from other models of social interaction, such 
as the class-based model, or the primary solidarity ties. Scott defines 
clientelism as “a particular dyadic relation (between two people), whi-
ch implies a mainly instrumental friendship, and by virtue of which 
and individual of higher status and wealthier background (patron) uses 
his influence and resources to procure protection, benefits or both, to a 
lower-status individual (client), who in turn repays by offering support 
and assistance to the patron, comprehending also personal services” 
(Scott 1972, p 128). Graziano’s contribution is similar, though more 
complex and more sociological in nature. Graziano defines clientelism 
as a social phenomenon which is:
 
• Dyadic, and which does not engender any super-personal 
entity.
• Connoted by direct exchanges and bargains, i.e. the barter 
of immediate, and mostly material benefits.
• The exchange generates benefits which are external to the 
bargain itself, hence not elements such as personal sati-
sfactions or sense of belonging.
• The bargain is social in nature, and does not imply the 
exchange of undefined services.
• The exchange takes place between subjects with asymmetri-
cal access to resources.
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 In synthesis, the clientelist association can be defined as a so-
cial and political exchange of external benefits, which is dyadic, direct 
and asymmetrical in nature. Also, Eisenstandt’s and Roniger’s (1980; 
1984) definitions comprehend many elements of Graziano’s: cliente-
lism is i) the simultaneous exchange of various resources, ii) the re-
lations are not legally binding, in fact, they are often against the law, 
iii) these relationships are mostly vertical. What is most striking about 
these definitions is the concurring reference to generalized and specific 
exchanges which characterize the clientelist association between patron 
and client: the former are bargains which tantamount to the opening of 
unqualified and long-term credit, while specific transactions constitute 
punctual and symmetrical bargains (Eisenstandt and Roniger, 1980; p 
51). Piattoni’s conveniently synthesizes the different analyses and defi-
nitions of clientelism according to their chosen theoretical approaches 
(culturalist, structuralist, and rationalist) and the relevant level of analy-
sis (micro-, macro- and meso-level analyses) (Piattoni 2007, 53). The 
final scheme is here briefly outlined:
• Micro-structuralist approach provides a study of the mono- 
and bilateral relation, and of its effects (e.g. Wolf 1962, Ro-
niger 1994).
• Micro-rationalist approach: analyzes restrictions and in-
centives deriving from individual propensity to risk, and 
describes the outcome of such constraints and incentives on 
individual behavior (e.g. J. Boiessevain 1974, S. Silverman 
1965)
• The micro-culturalist approach analyzes the moral values 
which inform individual choices, and the effects thereof. 
(Banfield, 1958)
• Among the macro-level studies, we can distinguish betwe-
en:
• The macro-structuralist approach is concerned with the 
study of the geopolitical collocation of the democracy un-
der scrutiny, and the effect of this structural positioning on 
local institutions (e.g. Arrighi 1985, Eisenstadt 1981)
• The macro-rationalist approach provides a study of the re-
strictions and incentives deriving from critical junctures in 
the making of a state and their effects on the supply of po-
litical options.
• The macro-culturalist approach constitutes the analysis of 
broad cultural and religious ensembles within a given social 
system (e.g. Pitt-Rivers, Putnam 1985). 
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• The Meso-level studies constitute the bulk and the vast 
majority of empirical studies of clientelism. These studies 
divide themselves into:
• Meso-structuralist approaches, which explore the role of 
economic and social marginality, and their consequences re-
garding power relations (e.g. Graziano 1984, Piselli 1987).
• Meso-rationalist approaches that unpack the restrictions 
and the incentives deriving from networks of social rela-
tions, and their effects on clientelist networks (e.g. Golden 
2003, Zuckerman 1979)
• Meso-culturalist approaches, which provide an analysis of 
shared values of their effects on political machines such as 
parties and other organizations (e.g. Caciagli 1977, Tarrow 
1972).
 Different methods tend to prioritize different levels of analysis 
(Piattoni 2007, 52): micro-level studies tend to focus on the demand-dri-
ven conditions for the existence of clientelism, while macro-level stu-
dies prioritize supply over demand. Macro- and micro-level studies 
“delimit” both level of analysis and the chosen theoretical approach. 
Meso-level analyses, however, are prone to confusion, since they make 
different mechanisms indistinguishable from others. For example, stra-
tegic approaches help to focus actors’ behavior, hence providing a more 
dynamic depiction of clientelism (e.g. the study of strategic choices at a 
meso-level concentrates on collective choices of groups or individuals, 
and how these choices may influence the macro-level), as opposed to 
the more deterministic undertone of culturalist and structuralist appro-
aches (Piattoni, 2007). It is important, hence, not to confuse and blur 
boundaries between theoretical approaches, if one wants to preserve the 
meaningfulness of categories and the validity of the results. To clarify 
the stakes of the different approaches, and to further remark the centrali-
ty of the rationalist approach, let us draw upon some examples retrieved 
in the literature, which describes clientelism, at both the macro- and mi-
cro-level as a strategic phenomenon. Silverman’s studies (1966, 1970, 
1975, 1977) focused on clientelism in extensive agricultural estates in 
Umbria during the 1950s and 60s: here, we retrieve an attentive depi-
ction of the interactions between the landlord (patron) and sharecrop-
pers (clients). The author highlights the existence of a direct relation-
ship between the patron (who often would live in the estate where the 
sharecroppers worked) and clients. This relationship was a mix of both 
affective and instrumental friendship ties, but still, this was a “genui-
ne” relationship. Moreover, Silverman underlines how patrons not only 
cultivated clientelist relations within their territory (i.e. only with their 
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tenants and sharecroppers): they also funded public initiatives ranging 
between the local band to charities, hence producing a further, parallel 
track for clientelism. Silverman, hence, points on selective clientelism, 
which is centered on people who are close to the patron, which does not 
prevent the patron himself from cultivating a more public clientelism 
and public patronage.
Still within the rationalist approach, on the macro-level, the most fru-
itful contribution is Shefter’s (1994), who, criticizing the neoclassical 
approach to clientelism (Banfield 1958, Wilson 1961), focused on the 
strategic choices made by political leaders, hence adopting a supply-o-
riented analysis of clientelism. Shefter focuses on party leaders who 
occupy powerful positions (internally mobilized) who face external 
pressure coming from parties which are excluded from power (exter-
nally mobilized). The possible strategic choices employed by elected 
politicians follow the ensuing scheme:
• Collusion: when internally mobilized leaders co-opt exclu-
ded leaders, hence resisting external pressure by attenua-
ting conflict.
• Counter-mobilization: when politicians in power try, by ral-
lying support, to push back external attacks.
• Coercion: when one tries to repress the external impulses 
(an option which is not feasible very often in modern de-
mocracies).
If none of the above-listed choices is practicable, then clientelism re-
mains, in Shefter’s view, the last resource of elites. Shefter convenient-
ly focuses on context variables which determine the development of a 
political system into a clientelist system, which are: i) party genesis, 
i.e. the orientation of party leaders to act according to either collecti-
ve or immaterial incentives (programmatic incentives), or according to 
selective and material interests (clientelist incentives). Another impor-
tant element is ii) bureaucracy’s degree of autonomy, which means that 
the more permeable civil service is to political demands (hence scar-
cely autonomous), the more frequently clientelism will be employed 
to legitimize and strengthen power relations. These contributions (and 
Shefter’s in particular) are of fundamental importance because they 
read through rationalist lenses paramount political mechanisms such 
as majority-opposition dynamics in managing power (Shefter 1994). 
In turn, this rationalist takes on clientelism might unveil whether it is 
possible to have, alongside selective clientelism and patronage, also a 
form of public clientelism and public patronage (Silverman). Hence, 
disregarding the level of analysis, the rationalist approach tends to be 
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the most suitable one to study the phenomenon of clientelism, also and 
especially in cases in which clientelist associations are widespread, such 
as in the south of Italy. Precisely the Italian case provides an example of 
how the typical phenomena occurring during the First Republic could 
be interpreted differently, according to either the rationalist, culturalist 
or structuralist approaches. One should be careful, before studying the 
south of Italy, not to overlap very different phenomena which are too 
often conflated into the concept of clientelism. First, corruption, despite 
resembling clientelism, differs from it regarding the object of the bar-
gain: while corruption has money as the means of payment, clientelist 
exchanges trade votes. Hence, corruption consists of “obtaining, throu-
gh a payment in cash to public officials or party members, of public 
decisions in favor of specific individuals or firms”  (Piattoni, 2007, 43).
 Mafia differs from clientelism on the nature of the privatized 
goods. Criminal organizations own the monopoly of violence, i.e. they 
trade in protection from violence (Piattoni 2007, Gambetta 1993); hen-
ce they privatize force, which is one of the paramount resources of pu-
blic power and State power. Naturally, mafias also privatize and distri-
bute other goods and assets. Moreover, there is widespread evidence 
of multiple ties and relations between mafia-men and politicians, due 
to the capacity of the former to rally votes, to be delivered to the latter, 
among other assets subjected to bargain. In any case, one should keep 
mafia and clientelism distinct: if the relation between mafia and clien-
telism exists, it is also true that clientelism is born and also develops in 
places which are not characterized by organized crime and mafia. As 
said above, the historical phase of the First Republic in Italy, and, in 
particular, the internal dynamics within the Christian Democracy may 
represent a suitable case study for a rationalist analysis of clientelism. 
Indeed, the Italian case represents one of the most fruitful sources of 
case studies ever since the end of the Second World War, and it attracted 
significant scholarly attention over time. In synthesis, post-war Italian 
political system was based on the ideological rupture between commu-
nists and anti-communists. Among the latter, the leading party was the 
Christian Democracy that, through an extensive and capillary power 
network (especially in the south), was able to deploy a deep and rooted 
clientelist network, hence making the Italian political system the most 
intensely clientelist among western democracies. Naturally, also con-
text-specific conditions influenced the outcome: a purely proportional 
electoral system without any threshold to representation; the possibility, 
for the voter, to express up to three preferences among the candidates 
in a given party list; the consociative nature of the political system. All 
these variables concurred in bringing about a system with a substantial 
stress on personalist mobilization, despite the unmistakable presence, 
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within Italian society, of an intense ideological mobilization. The only 
notable dynamic and modern element in the Italian political system was 
the transformation, of clientelist relations, from landlord-based ones to 
mass-based (Caciagli 1977) and party-based ones (Graziano, 1974).
As said above, the chosen approach has grave implications for the in-
terpretation of the observed phenomenon: if one observe the Italian 
First Republic through structural lenses, as in Caciagli’s (1982)  and 
Fantozzi’s (1993) studies, the (structural) causes of clientelism are re-
trieved in i) the partial or distorted modernization of the Italian poli-
tical system (Graziano 1980), ii) in the lack of regionalist parties and 
iii) in the absence of an actual middle-class, burgeois party, so that the 
Italian bourgeoisie has not been able to differentiate itself from the ari-
stocratic classes and to perform a dynamic and propulsive social role. 
These approaches, hence, are concerned with the overly particularist 
nature of party power, thus defining clientelism as the product of the 
incomplete rationalization of southern economy . Culturalist studies by 
Allum (1973) and Tarrow (1967), on the other side, stress the morally 
charged of people in the south and their interpersonal relations. Beside 
the well-known contribute made by Banfield (1958), who singles out 
apathy and amorality as the peculiar defining features of interpersonal 
ties in the Mezzogiorno, Tarrow’s research (1967) results useful in defi-
ning not only the cultural values, but also the strategic behaviors which 
define clientelist relations: 
“The cultural values in the Mezzogiorno are maybe 
the most exotic aspect of the social configuration in 
the area. Generations of writers have notices the pre-
valence of violence and of the awareness of death, the 
modest position of women in society, and the almost 
occult role of corruption in economy and in politics. 
First, values seem to be formed, and loyalties seem to 
coalesce around primary centers, parochial places of 
social life. Second, modern values inherent to indu-
strial societies, such as rationality, entrepreneurship 
and efficiency were not able to penetrate social life 
as they did in most of the western world. Third, cy-
nicism and disaffection pervade the whole of Italian 
society”. 
 Hence, according to Tarrow, the roots of Christian Democracy’s 
clientelist network are to be found in the nature and in the culture of 
Southern society. Yet, at the same time, individual citizens operate 
strategically through clientelist channels. Thus, clientelism cannot be 
explained merely by recurring to character or culture: a strategic analy-
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sis is needed. If we turn to this strategic-rational analysis, the develop-
ment of clientelism in the Christian Democracy after the Second World 
War, and the interpretations thereof, different considerations emerge. 
First, the process of constitution of the Christian Democracy as a party 
was influenced by CD’s failed attempt to disengage itself from local 
landlordship ties: conversely, local landlords were coopted at a natio-
nal level by virtue of their electoral support. Moreover, the presence 
of preferential voting in the Italian electoral legislation allowed to i) 
“subvert” the order of the candidates in the list, hence to subvert the 
party’s choice over the priority given to each candidate. This, in turn, ii) 
caused that the attribution of bureaucratic, administrative and govern-
mental positions followed the individual endowment of votes and pre-
ferences for each candidate. Consequently, the political debate within 
the Christian Democracy became articulated in party factions, with the 
sole objective, on the side of clientelist politicians, of preserving politi-
cal survival and power. Clientelist networks, hence, became “modes of 
promoting leaders’ careers and of controlling governmental positions” 
(Zuckerman 1975, 14). Through the strategic-rationalist approach, 
clientelism is finally analyzed as national in nature, hence losing the hi-
therto unquestioned meridional nature. All the factions within the Chri-
stian Democracy are involved in the clientelist game, as Zuckerman 
shows when he turns to the study of inter-faction competition between 
Colombo, CD’s leader in Potenza; and Rumor, leader in Vicenza. As 
Zuckerman has it, “As Rumor and Colombo, Gava (Naples) and Bisa-
glia (Rovigo) dominated political life in their respective districts, and 
they rallied a massive amount of votes and preferences, both within and 
outside the party. […] They controlled appointments and elections wi-
thin the party, and they had the last word on local party decisions. The 
rise to leadership of all of them depended on the control they had over 
public offices: they all began their rise towards leading positions in the 
regional and national hierarchy after having served in different gover-
nments and having had access to national patronage resources” (An-
geli) Through these examples, it seems that clientelism has farther-re-
aching boundaries, being it a national phenomenon, and it appears as 
a paramount power resource and means of regulation and settlement 
of intra-party conflicts. However, it is important not to consider clien-
telism as the single available strategy for political actors. The struggle 
among factions within the Christian Democracy moved around leaders 
who, besides the construction and the strengthening of a wide net of 
clientelism, differentiated themselves from other factional leaders on 
a programmatic and ideological basis (i.e. through position voting and 
credit claiming). This behavior, as noted by some had the objective of 
widening the electoral basis: on one side, local clientelism represented 
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the core of the electoral basis upon which a national career was built; on 
the other, personal commitment to more “general” battles, and the in-
dividual positioning on the right-left axis with respect to economic and 
social policies represented a valid and useful strategy to broaden one’s 
support and, in turn, one’s political survival and permanence in office 
in the medium and long run. Important personalities such as De Mita 
perfectly depicted the dimensions of this phenomenon: the well-known 
politician from Campania, in fact, often adopted clientelist strategy in 
the province of Avellino by distributing public assets in a semi-private 
way (in this respect, it is interesting to read some of the interviews re-
alized for this thesis); yet, the same person was committed to national 
left-oriented social policies, consistently with De Mita’s membership 
of the “progressive” faction called “La Base” (“The Basis”) (Piattoni 
2007, 134).  
Even clearer is Golden’s (2003) example: 
“From 1954 to 1959 he (Rota, the local party boss) 
was […] town councilor in charge of public works 
and urban planning. […] A second crucial resource 
was also available to Rota for political patronage. At 
the beginning of the fifties, three of four tobacco fac-
tories of the town were bought by a state-controlled 
agency. The Party Boss […] knew most of the direc-
tories of the factories and it was, therefore, easy for 
him to influence the placement policy of the industry; 
he claims that between 1954 and 1959 he placed more 
than 600 workers in these factories.
Rota could finally have recourse to a third fundamen-
tal resource, namely his Rome party connections […] 
He claims, for instance, that he obtained the funds 
for a new elementary school directly from Emilio 
Colombo (Dc national leader). In general, his con-
nections allowed him to intervene in all sorts of infor-
mal arrangements whereby local people could obtain 
through his mediation the intervention of influential 
political figures in Rome for the solution of their per-
sonal problems” (L. Graziano, 1977, 360-378).
 However, the importance of Golden’s work goes far beyond this 
quote: he underlined how politicians produced “bad government” on 
purpose, to simplify the deployment of clientelist strategies. As the au-
thor has it “legislators have an interest in generating excessive bureau-
cracy rather than reining in expansionary ambitions on the part of agen-
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cies; secondly, voters act to reward rather than punish this behavior” 
(Golden 2003, 192). In short, Golden criticizes culturalist and structura-
list accounts of clientelism in they identify only endogenous drivers of 
clientelism (especially in the Mezzogiorno). Conversely, Golden shifts 
the focus on strategies that politicians and electors deploy to satisfy 
their respective ambitions. Besides the results, Golden’s viewpoint is 
critical for at least two reasons: on one side, the battleground where 
clientelist networks are born and grow is rightfully identified in the pu-
blic sector and the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Golden’s research 
describes how lawmakers deliberately cause bad government by acting 
on legislation with the objective of producing overly detailed and often 
incomprehensible laws. Starting from the questions: “Through which 
methods of public law infringement do the politicians act so as to create 
a malfunction in the state’s administrative apparatus?”, and by using 
Key’s (1935) classification, Golden produces the subsequent typology:
• Limiting the scope of merit laws: i) spoils system where 
civil service procedures were not required, ii) ordinary 
ministerial departments, by legally bypassing the normal 
appointment procedures, iii) by appointing public servant 
selected by partisan criteria.
• Appointing the “right guys”: i) by appointing people to no-
minally elected positions, for instance in the local or na-
tional administrative councils responsible for overseeing 
public agencies.
• Manipulating the selection process: within ordinary mini-
sterial departments by fixing examination results.
• Shaping the movement and promotion of personnel: i) wi-
thin ministerial departments by promoting persons by poli-
tical, not professional, merits.
 According to Golden (2003), lawmakers create the conditions 
for clientelism by sabotaging the relationship between a citizen and pu-
blic administration, so that the voter will turn to the politician to obtain 
intermediation with bureaucracy. Clientelism is not limited to this set 
of practices: for examples, ad-hoc pieces of legislation are passed with 
the sole purpose of satisfying the needs and interests of one precinct and 
one constituency. The function performed by the so-called “leggine” 
(laws oriented towards specific needs) in Italian politics, for example, 
is well documented by Golden (2003, 206). He focuses on the “decreto 
milleproroghe”, which is passed each year by the Italian Parliament and 
which funds policies as diverse as the wages of forest and wilderness 
police in Calabria, to the incentives for renewable energy production, 
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to the funding of community service jobs employed in Sicilian schools. 
Such a decree is often an omnibus, a collector of individual requests 
coming from deputies and senators, hence, indirectly, from their con-
stituencies. Considering these practices, Golden’s approach avoids the 
pitfalls of culturalist and structuralist approaches. These studies could 
have been valid to understand the first forms of clientelism, which was 
typical for the few years which immediately followed the end of the 
Second World War. However, they lose their explanatory potential if 
one studies the period from the 1990s onwards, with the emergence of 
a modern clientelism, more refined and capillary than the early manife-
stations of clientelism.
In contrast with culturalist and structuralist approaches, a broad litera-
ture has been rising (e.g. Golden’s, 2003; Kopecky, Mair, and Spirova, 
2012; Piattoni, 2007; Di Mascio, 2012) which has the merit of reinsta-
ting the role of rationality in electoral choices. This literature, while 
focusing on diverse time periods and different territorial case studies, 
makes the study of clientelism and constituency service less determini-
stic and more scientifically manageable.
3.4 Constituency Service.
 We defined patronage and clientelism as forms of personal vote 
oriented towards selective benefits. Clientelism represents the most di-
rect form of the personalist personal vote because it concerns indivi-
duals and it disregards the party hierarchy and structure. In short, it is 
more personalist and more focused on selective and immediate benefi-
ts. Conversely, patronage is more connected to the party, its structure, 
its diffusion and its network of relations and support. Clientelism is 
common in recently formed democracies and some consolidated we-
stern democracies such as Italy, while constituency service – i.e. a kind 
of personal vote motivated by universalist objectives – seems rarer in 
these countries, although not absent altogether. Piattoni first introdu-
ced the definition of “virtuous clientelist” to describe the Italian re-
gion of Abruzzi, and she isolated the following core elements of such 
a clientelist association: i) public goods and private goods are equally 
distributed among voters ii) economic development, iii) waxing legiti-
macy (Piattoni 2007, 158-166). In other words, the provided depiction 
of Italian clientelism (or patronage) represents no less than the Italian 
example of the Anglo-American constituency service (Piattoni 2007, 
138). Likewise, Golden offers a definition of constituency service (or 
virtuous clientelism) through the distinction between this concept and 
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clientelism itself: 
“Instead of a factory that enlarges employment opportuni-
ties, patronage offers a job to specific individual; instead of 
a road improving transport, it offers rides to the polls to par-
ty members; instead of a school, it offers a party member’s 
teenage child entry to a specific educational establishment; 
instead of a harbor whose ships all firms can use for moving 
their goods elsewhere, it gives only some firms authoriza-
tion to export goods.” (2003, p 200)
 This significant distinction between patronage and constituency 
service helps better to define and apprehend this latter concept. As in 
other cases of personal vote, constituency service is set by i) a dyadic 
relation; ii) a political exchange in which votes are the means of pay-
ment. Constituency service differentiates itself from other forms of per-
sonal votes on iii) the nature of expected benefits: in this case, personal 
vote is motivated by anticipated universalist benefits. Hence, consti-
tuency service represents a particular type of relation between voters 
and candidates, in which actors orient their strategies towards public or 
semi-public goods, albeit these goods being located and concentrated in 
a specific territorial unit (the electoral precinct). Candidates, motivated 
by voters, behave in a way that can be called district service, i.e. their 
actions are driven by the needs of the district where they have been 
elected and, in so doing, candidates act as intermediaries between their 
precincts and the national government.
Fenno defines the manifold activities which can be labeled as district/
constituency service, and he concludes by saying: “but the core activity 
(of the constituency service) is providing help to individuals, groups, 
and localities in coping with the federal government” (Fenno, 1982, 
101). As derived from Fenno’s definition, a politician tries to aid the 
people and groups within his precinct, i.e. the candidate will not direct-
ly barter votes in exchange for benefits. Rather, he will make himself 
known and respectable. Hence, he will try to build public reputation 
among the people inhabiting his electoral district. Cain, Ferejhon and 
Fiorina (1987, 50-51) studied constituency service in countries (such as 
the US and the UK) in which this phenomenon is most common, and 
provided the following sequence of mechanisms within a constituency 
service relation:
• The demand of service: this phase stands for the capacity of 
politicians to mediate with bureaucracy by influencing the 
decisions of the latter and making them more profitable for 
the constituents. Examples of this phase are social security 
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and veterans’ benefits in the US; and pensions, health care 
and military problems in the UK.
• Solicitation of Cases: in this phase, congressmen or MPs 
activate themselves in their constituencies to make the de-
mands from their communities to emerge, thus intercepting 
the growing demand for district/constituency service.
• Resolution and Publicity of casework: during this phase, 
the elected official must solve problems to be perceived as 
useful. 
Moreover, the candidate has to show the capacity to disclose results 
to build up reputation (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 60-79). Con-
stituency service is more diffused in Anglo-American democracies; 
hence most of the literature is focused on the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina (1987) started precisely 
from the different ways of performing constituency service in the two 
countries, and the result is one of the most full-fledged contributions 
on the theme. Beyond the aforementioned mechanics of constituency 
service, authors shed light on some crucial aspects of the phenomenon, 
which in turn might draw useful insights on the other forms of personal 
vote. When it comes to benefits, it has already been said that, as Fenno 
has it, the nature of expected benefits which are traded in constituency 
service differs from the kind of advantages bartered in patronage and 
clientelism. However, it remains to be understood how said benefits are 
evaluated and understood by electors. For instance, Cain, Ferejhon and 
Fiorina illustrate that the form of government and the electoral formula 
are important in determining how a candidate is judged and evaluated, 
for example where a plurality electoral system is in place, in contrast to 
other electoral systems. Departing from the US case study, the authors 
underline how, in presidential countries, congressmen can differentiate 
themselves from the actions and agenda of the President in charge, even 
when the President and the Congressman are in the same party. A simi-
lar strategy can be employed, for example, by Democratic congressmen 
even when the Congress has a Democratic majority (the same goes, mu-
tatis mutandis, for Republicans). In all cases, the need for congressmen 
is to acquire a distinct and discrete profile, an individual reputation and 
visibility, even if this means to be perceived as against one’s party and 
its pro-tempore policy positions (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 198-
199). In the UK, this kind of strategies is less effective and desirable, 
for a number of reasons. First, Great Britain’s parliamentary system is 
articulated in clear, often mono-party majority in the Parliament, which 
in turn supports a cabinet. The strong ties between the legislative and 
the executive branches of government make it more difficult for MPs 
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to differentiate themselves from the policy choices of their party and of 
their Prime Minister. At the same time, MPs have to see to their con-
stituencies and take care of them: the margin for maneuver, however, 
is strongly conditioned by whether the party supports or opposed the 
Prime Minister. In case the party is in government, it will be harder for 
MPs to acquire an independent visibility and to position themselves in 
clear contrast with their party’s directives (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 
1987 200-204).
 In short, the form of government and the nature of the political 
system have a strong influence on the way in which constituency ser-
vice is carried out. In the American case, the distinction between the 
legislative and executive branch allows elected representatives a higher 
degree of freedom, together with a weak structuration of the American 
political parties. Conversely, in the UK the party system is considerably 
older and more structured, hence the strength of the tie between a can-
didate and his party becomes central also for voters. Arguably, the iden-
tity between parliamentary majority and the governments significantly 
hinders the possibility, for majority MPs to differentiate themselves. In 
some respects, this attempt for differentiation may not be desired by 
electors: loyal constituents might punish the lack of party discipline 
by voting other candidates. Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina synthesize the 
differences between the American and the British case of constituency 
service as follows: 
“1) Congressmen adopt a less personal staff-oriented style 
of constituency service, while MPs adopt a more personal, 
time-intensive style. 2) Congressional offices are small bu-
reaucracies whereas MPs are “mom and pop” operations. 
3)The American party and electoral system lead to greater 
payoffs for constituency service for congressmen than the 
corresponding British system allow for MPs. 4) Not surpri-
singly, party affiliations affect representatives’ reputation 
more in Britain than in the USA and 5) the evaluations of 
national leaders affect British voting behavior much more 
than American”. (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, pp 214). 
Hence, legislation, norms and rules (such as the procedures adopted to 
examine and pass laws) influence constituency service and thereby sha-
pes candidates’ choices and behavior, especially regarding legislative 
and electoral independence from one’s party of affiliation. In general, a 
higher degree of autonomy (as in the US) fosters constituency service. 
Conversely, in the UK, the MPs might be able to “conquer” some room 
for electoral independence by dissenting from the official party policy 
strategy: for example, the current Secretary General of the Labour Party 
Jeremy Corbyn voted against his party’s decisions more than 200 times 
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when he was just an MP. However, regarding legislative independence, 
British MPs have little room for legislative differentiation from their 
parties, especially MPs within the party that is in government at that 
time (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 217). The primary explanation 
for this phenomenon is that MPs have little access to public political 
resources and, when making use of said resources, they are less inde-
pendent from their party. This differentiated access to resources is a 
peculiar difference from other systems and the American one, where the 
party has a very loose influence on congressmen’s behavior, especially 
concerning their constituencies.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the impact of the electoral formula and 
its role in incentivizing and discouraging constituency service. As Cain, 
Ferejhon and Fiorina rightfully remind us:
“There is an inherent tendency for single-member distri-
ct, plurality rule system to move in the direction of grea-
ter decentralization and independence electoral standing 
[while] the proportional representation system, especially 
those with large districts, have low levels of constituency 
service.” (Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina 1987, 219).
If this tendency remains valid in general terms, it is necessary to clarify 
that the proportional system has led to a greater, not weaker, personali-
zation of vote and politics as a whole – in this respect, the Italian case 
is illuminating. Here, the number of preferences that each elector could 
cast – up to four in the biggest precincts - distorted the system as a 
whole. This observation might seem trivial, but it shows that the “pro-
portional system” label is far from satisfactory in describing the in-
fluence of electoral regulation over personal vote. Pasquino effectively 
showed that the number of available preferences can affect the degree 
of personalization of votes deeply: for example, the abrogation of mul-
ti-preferential voting in 1993, as it limited the number of preferences to 
only one, determined an overall majoritarization of the Italia political 
system (Pasquino, 1993). In synthesis, constituency service represents 
a variety of personal vote which is most common in the Anglo-Ame-
rican world. This concept is often analyzed in contrast with patronage 
and clientelism: while constituency service is considered a virtuous or 
neutral political behavior, the latter two concepts are judged detrimental 
and pathologic. Piattoni (2007), on the other side, tries to describe con-
stituency service through a lexicon which is more common and com-
prehensible for continental Europe and Italy (Piattoni 2007, 158).
 In conclusion, we have thus far reviewed the literature on pa-
tronage, clientelism and constituency service. We noted how difficult it 
might be to separate patronage from clientelism and, at the same time, 
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we tried to define a less known concept, i.e. constituency service. How 
does this differentiation aid us in answering the leading research que-
stion of this thesis – which is to demonstrate the existence of a personal 
vote oriented towards universal benefits? The answer will come throu-
gh semi-structured interviews in some urban and rural areas, in all the 
southern regions of Italy. The distinction of personal vote according to 
the two axes of ideological vs. personal vote, and of selective vs. univer-
sal benefits leaves aside some nuances which, as we noted before, are 
crucial to define patronage and clientelism. Let us consider, for exam-
ple, a vote oriented towards a party and towards universal benefits: this 
vote, as described in the former chapter, was labeled as allegiance vote, 
i.e. the satisfaction of individual aspirations and preferences through 
the realization of collective ones (Pasquino, Parisi 1977).  From this 
perspective, allegiance vote should be very different from patronage 
and clientelism. To the opposite, some authors define “ideological pa-
tronage” as a network of relations which ties groups and individuals 
with a specific party on ideological basis (Van Bienzen, 1958). 
 Rather than seeing the above-said strategies as discrete and 
self-exclusive, actors often deploy mixed strategies, which achieve 
mixes results. The several concepts are more the extremes in a con-
tinuum than fixed and unchangeable categories. Now, we just have to 
offer a synthetic outline of the definitions of the different types of per-
sonal vote hitherto described. First, the relevant actors in clientelist or-
ganization are candidates and elected officials, who distribute selective 
benefits, money and services in exchange for electoral support. Patro-
nage, conversely, is more centered on parties, which search electoral 
and financial support in return for their intermediation with the natio-
nal government, to distribute selective benefits and ad-hoc legislation 
– the so-called “leggine” (Golden 2003). Lastly, constituency service 
is mainly carried out by elected officials, citizens, and lobbies. In this 
case, the object of the exchange is electoral support and public endorse-
ment in exchange for territorial benefits and support and aid for indivi-
dual constituents living in the precinct.
3.5 Charismatic personal vote
The last stage of this literature review will be used to describe a type of 
personal vote which, in contrast with constituency service, patronage, 
and clientelism, is less often found in this thesis. In this case, a candida-
te is voted according to his personal charisma and his competence and 
expertise. While this type of personal vote can be found both at the local 
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and at the national level, leadership operates in different ways in each 
level. The national leader is appreciated because of his communicative 
skills, for his capacity to connect with public opinion (Noelle-Neumann 
2002), while local leaders are chosen mainly on the ground of their 
competencies and expertise, and the evaluation of a given candidate 
is more often based on failed or achieved results. The proposed distin-
ction is not clear-cut because the two types of leaders can merge and 
overlap, thereby producing charismatic national leaders and competent 
local leaders. However, this distinction can still provide some insight 
into the different mechanisms at play in determining charismatic le-
adership. Weber (1922) provided the first noteworthy definition of a 
charismatic leader: he is the one who perceives, and is perceived as 
having a “mission,” a “high task” to perform, unknown to anyone but 
the leader himself. Cavalli (1996) focused, instead, on the “certainty” 
that the leader produces on his constituency: the belief of being the only 
one capable of changing reality for the better. This belief on the side of 
electors is mirrored by the “internal” certainty of the leader about his 
capacities: he is confident and ready for the battle because he is the first 
to believe in his unicity. Charisma, hence, is the first feature of a leader 
with a double certainty (Cavalli 1996). This belief, in turn, allows the 
charismatic leader to establish a connection with different social strata 
by touching various, often irrational strings. However, charisma seems 
to be much more complicated than how it has been described so far: it 
involves i) the communicative and relational capacity of the leader; ii) 
the performative capability of the leader (Barisione 2006); iii) the sym-
bolic role that the leader might assume by assembling values and politi-
cal stances (Barisione, 2006 104-109). In turn, these elements allow the 
leader to engender a sense of belonging and mobilization of supporters. 
 The literature on charismatic leaders, especially since TV and 
mass media entered the political scene, has always been concerned with 
populism and its connection with charisma. In Italy, for example, a new 
breed of strong populist leaders emerged principally in the 1990s, alon-
gside with parties having a strong personal connotation in their leaders, 
such as Italia dei Valori (Di Pietro), Lega Nord (Bossi) and others (Tar-
chi 2015). While a full-fledged analysis of the concept of charisma is 
beyond the scope of this research, it is important to remark that a cha-
risma-based personal vote exists and that this type of personal vote is 
more based on emotional, rather than rational evaluation. Rather than 
on expected benefits, the charismatic personal vote is due to different 
assessments of the candidate himself and his virtues. As said before, the 
charismatic talents of a leader can be only one among many drivers of 
personal vote: especially in local elections, where popularity and visi-
bility are measured in narrow and small contexts, other elements may 
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very likely become decisive. Local elections show that, very often, the 
public image of a leader regarding competencies and personal virtues 
(hence not concerning charisma) might be the single most important va-
riable to decide an election. Barisione (2006) provided a ten-fold typo-
logy of leaders based on the characteristics upon which each type of 
leader builds his public image: i) the Manager is the ideal-type of the le-
ader that addresses a demand for efficiency coming from his constituen-
cy, hence constituting a less ideological and a more administrative type 
of leader. Also, ii) the Outsider is characterized by the performativity of 
his figure, in contrast with candidates coming from the establishment. 
The iii) Post-identitary leader, moreover, goes beyond the right-left axis 
and positions himself as a mere problem-solver, who is fit for every 
situation and evaluates action each time in an unbiased way (Barisione, 
2006, 113-118). One can often find empirical examples which fit into 
the ideal-types of leaders who are characterized by their competencies 
and virtues and not by their charisma. First, Guazzaloca in the “red” 
city of Bologna, tried to depict himself as the independent, non-partisan 
leader who could change the city, despite him being the candidate of a 
center-right coalition and not having a particularly widespread reputa-
tion or visibility in Bologna. Besides this well-known case, there are 
many other examples in Italian local politics, where the competencies 
and skills of the candidates played a stronger role than charisma and 
emotional reactions, notably where problems of mismanagement are 
particularly acute.
This section has pointed out charisma and competencies of leaders as 
defining features of, respectively, national and local politics. However, 
boundaries are always difficult to draw: quite often the local/national 
and the charisma/competence dyads intertwine and overlap. Nicola 
Vendola, for example, spent years to establish a public image of himself 
as a radical leader, a man “against” the status quo. Moreover, the former 
Communist Re-foundation MP employed a baroque, almost poetic di-
scourse which made himself recognizable, to the left. However, the cha-
risma deriving from the “first” Vendola provided the foundation upon 
which to build “another” Vendola, especially during the 2010 campaign 
for re-election: this new figure relied more on his capacity to deliver 
higher levels of growth than the rest of southern Italy (Barisione 2006). 
Vendola’s second campaign, hence, was more concerned with policies 
and results – such as the maintenance of the aqueduct network, or en-
couraging people from Apulia, who studied outside the region to come 
back to work. This transformation from a charismatic leader of the left 
to a competent and skilled administrator is opposite from the conver-
sion performed by Matteo Renzi. The current President of the Council, 
in fact, launched his public image as a confident, efficient man, belon-
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ging to the “class” of mayors, i.e. of that breed of politicians and civil 
servants who “get their hands dirty” to deliver immediate answers to 
their constituency’s urgent needs. The founding element of his campai-
gn to “wreck” old politics and old Democratic Party’s leaders was this 
commitment to be the “Mayor of Italy”. Guazzaloca’s, Vendola’s and 
Renzi’s stories show that the meaning of concepts such as charismatic 
and competent leaders might fluctuate over time and space. However, 
the examples of Guazzaloca, Vendola and Penati are not sufficient to re-
construct the true dimension of the role that personalization of politics 
and leadership played in the last years in terms of voting choices. These 
three examples, in fact, are almost isolated cases and symptoms of a 
shift in the electors’ and candidates’ choices. Yet, they do not suffice to 
describe a more general tendency in voting behaviors. 
Especially in the last years, many authors devoted attention to the role 
that leaders perform on their parties, and on their electoral performance 
(Shugart 2000). A common theme across western democracies is the 
role that individual leaders play in i) strengthening the executive; ii) 
exerting authority over their party, and iii) achieving electoral results 
(Poguntke and Webb 2005). This phenomenon is most intense in pre-
sidential systems, where personalism plays a crucial role. Karvonen 
(2010) specifically focused on the influence of leaders on the electoral 
performance of their parties. He studies the effects of the party-leader 
relationship in 25 democracies, obtaining unexpected results: first, de-
spite an overall growth in the importance of leaders in voters’ choices, it 
is not possible to retrieve an unambiguous trend in this respect (Karvo-
nen, 2010, pp 98-105). Second, it is easy to foresee that the leadership 
plays different roles in different settings. Hence, while in the UK and 
Sweden there is a clear growth in personalization over time (especially 
through an analysis of mass media), in other cases this trend is much 
weaker, if not absent altogether (Karvonen 2010). Italy shows some 
similarities with UK and Sweden: through an analysis of the last few 
decades, it is evident that the salience of leadership in terms of electo-
ral performance has grown significantly throughout the Second Repu-
blic, after the collapse of the old political system and the birth of new, 
strongly personalist parties such as Forza Italia – PDL (Garzia 2011). 
However, this trend does not seem to have completely supplanted the 
traditional identification of voters with a party, based on its platform 
and its stance on specific issues. Overall, while the Italian case seems 
to point towards a waxing importance of leaders in achieving electoral 
results, it is important to notice that this tendency does not seem to be 




Structure and method of the research
 In the following pages, the methodological choices which 
underpin the present thesis, will be explained and motivated as tho-
roughly as possible. This elucidation will ameliorate the internal 
consistency of the results and make the outline of said results clearer. 
This study is informed by a qualitative methodological framework, 
and by the choice of semi-structured interviews as the primary tool 
for inquiry. The qualitative approach, which will be further explained 
later in this chapter, is especially suitable to unpack ambiguous and 
elusive determinants of personal vote. For example, the motives that 
encourage voters to cast personal votes: as this project aims to show, 
these considerations can be directed towards expected universalist 
benefits. The complexity of the purpose and object of the present 
research hampers the capability of quantitative methods to flesh out 
the determinants of the personal vote. Semi-structured interviews, 
conversely, are particularly fit to the current research, due to the little 
standardization of questions and answers, and to the low directivity: 
they allow for a flexible list of questions and for follow-ups, hence 
allowing one to navigate diverse interview settings. These preliminary 
considerations solidly grounded the other choices about the geographi-
cal delimitation of the case study and the selection of the interviewees. 
This chapter will tackle these and other methodological problems in 
due course, and for each of theme, a research diary will be provided 
with extracts from both real-time notes and subsequent reflections. 
Both the two groups of methodological issues equally influenced 
strategies and choices and, in turn, the results and their interpretation. 
As a matter of fact, the sampling strategy and the geographical de-
limitation of the case studies were both planned well in advance. In 
this way, interview strategies were better organized and, in the end, 
more efficient. Alternatives have been put in place in case one or 
more interviews were made unfeasible due to lack of time, problems 
in interviewee-interviewer communication, or due to logistical chal-
lenges such as uncomfortable or unfit locations. For instance, most of 
the 64 interviews were programmed in advance, through either direct 
or indirect connections with the interviewees, and that the unfolding 
of the conversations was “imagined” in advance before setting up the 
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interviews. Conversely, if we consider obstacles in fieri, most of the 
times the researcher had to respond to them in real time. A substantial 
share of all successful interviews (around 20%) was organized on site, 
with various degrees of “improvisation”, even though they always 
adhered to the rigor and quality standards which informed the other 
interviews. To conclude, the present chapter will mainly focus on the a 
priori methodological criteria, while treating the other issues in a less 
systematic, though still deep way.
4.1  A qualitative research method: semi-structured interviews
 It is now important to outline the research tools and the stra-
tegies employed in conducting the interviews and to justify the choi-
ce of semi-structured interviews as the leading research method. Se-
mi-structured interviews are loosely standardized when it comes to the 
list of questions, and this enhances the non-directivity of this method 
in a beneficial way (Demaziere 1997, Bichi 2002). While conducting 
semi-structured interviews, the interviewer will have a loosely defined 
of open questions, each of which supported by follow-up questions. 
The list of questions employed in this study is somewhat a “classical”, 
handbook version of a qualitative semi-structured interview. The three 
chosen questions follow a “funnel” design: each of the items aims to be 
more detailed and accurate than the previous one. Follow-up questions 
are placed in between questions, to bring back the conversation to rele-
vant topics, to stimulate the discussion, to encourage the interviewee to 
flesh out some of the points and so forth. However, semi-structured in-
terviews can only be justified by demonstrating their suitability to tack-
le the chosen research question, as compared to other possible methods. 
The question that animates this research is to prove the existence, in 
southern Italian voters, of a kind of personal vote driven by univer-
salist motives. The small degree of standardization of semi-structured 
interviews allows the interviewer to follow logical pathways during the 
meeting, in turn, avoiding repetition if a given question was already 
answered, and allowing the researcher to perform more in-depth fol-
low-ups than “hence,” “thus”, and so forth (Demaziere 1997). More in 
specific, interviewees were encouraged by using stories and narrations 
(Marradi 2005), i.e. by referring to news and events connected to the lo-
cal political system (some neighboring cities, for example, were about 
to elect their local councils). While citing this news and events, one 
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need constantly beware of adopting a value-free approach, so as not to 
alter in any way the intervewees’ accounts of their voting choices. The-
se and other “expedients” are necessary due to the various and diverse 
interview settings and the different patterns followed by the different 
conversations. In any case, while drawing upon different theoretical 
and methodological refinements of the semi-structured interview, the 
nature of the list of questions used here is traditional: it conceded the 
researcher a substantial degree of freedom while preserving a minimum 
necessary level of standardization, to make interviews comparable with 
each other.
All in all, semi-structured interviews are the most suitable research 
method to address the central research question from the vantage point 
of the interviewees, of their perceptions of reality and their take on the 
proposed topic. While analyzing the answers in search for the presence 
of a personal vote oriented towards universalist benefits, the questions 
were never phrased in a probing way (which is typical of surveys), and 
the questions did not intend to confirm a given hypothesis. In line with 
the guiding principles of a qualitative study and of semi-structured in-
terviews, participants were free to explain their point of view. Most im-
portantly, their accounts were not conflated with objective facts: rather, 
these accounts are performative determinants of subjective realities, 
which constitute but one of many ways in which the same phenomenon 
can be interpreted and described.
As outlined before, semi-structured interviews are a knowledge route 
based on trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. The nature 
of semi-structured interviews provides freedom and flexibility in wri-
ting the list of questions and in the ways in which questions are asked. 
Moreover, and in relation to other forms of interviews such as parti-
cipant observation, semi-structured interviews carry several beneficial 
features and may be an extraordinary research method, for it entails i) 
a high level of rapport between interviewer and interviewee; ii) a high 
degree of reciprocity on the part of interviewer; iii) a non-hierarchical 
relationship (Bryman, 2008, 495-496). The lack of hierarchy between 
interviewer and interviewee was especially necessary for the success of 
most of the interviews.
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4.2  One or many Souths? Dimensions of heterogeneity and the Ci-
ty-Periphery Divide.
 To study a type of personal vote driven by universalist benefits, 
the South of Italy was a compelling choice due to the widespread diffu-
sion of personal voting in this geographical region. However, the South 
ought not to be considered monolithically (regardless of the theoretical 
stance of the researcher such as the structuralist and culturalist ones, 
as noted in previous chapters). Already in the 1970s and 80s, resear-
ch has shown that political choices differ across provinces concerning 
ethical issues (such as abortion), or gendered preferential and personal 
voting. Turnout in 1981 general elections, as compared with 1979 gene-
ral elections, was 21% lower in Crotone, Reggio Calabria, and Naples. 
On the other side, between 16% and 20%, fewer people voted in Avelli-
no, Benevento, Cosenza, Palermo, Trapani, Bari, and Lecce. Lastly, the 
number of voters turning out decreased less than 16% in Enna, Siracusa 
and Taranto (Cartocci 1987, 493). It is interesting to see the data above 
in couple with the number of personal preferences as a share of all votes 
received by the Christian Democracy in 1979. Said share was higher 
than 41% in Reggio Calabria, Palermo, Messina, Trapani, Crotone, Co-
senza, Catanzaro, Agrigento, Lecce, Bari, Foggia, Napoli and Avellino. 
Conversely, Christian Democrats in Enna, Siracusa, Caserta and Taran-
to voted for individual candidates in 40% of the cases or less. Hence, 
there are “many Souths”, and many different electoral environments 
within the area commonly labeled as “South” or “Mezzogiorno”. After 
all, the geographical and demographic size of the areas involved sug-
gests some healthy skepticism when using just one label to describe a 
complex territory: for example, Campania and Sicily are, respectively, 
the 3rd and 4th biggest regions by population and 11th and 1st regions 
by surface, while Apulia and Calabria might not embrace as many peo-
ple (Apulia is 8th nation-wide, while Calabria is 10th), or being as vast 
(Apulia is 7th, Calabria is 10th). However useful these data might be, 
they ought to be read together with data on fluxes, i.e. the ones which 
show intra-country migrations, especially the ones from the South to 
the North of Italy. For example, let us examine the diachronic analysis 
of the variations in population in the four regions under analysis (Apu-
lia, Campania, Calabria and Sicily) during the last ten years:
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TAB 2 local population in Campania, Calabria, Apulia and Sicily 2005-2015. 
Source (ISTAT 2015)
 The overall demographic trend is not uniform across regions, 
despite being downwards for the whole of Mezzogiorno. The two big-
gest regions kept constant or incremented their population up to 7,000 
units per year, and Apulia grows in terms of, especially in the last seven 
years. Conversely, Calabria is most intensively affected by a decrease 
in its residents which is big in size and constant through time: it is hard 
to imagine that this trend can be inverted in the near future.
While demographic and socio-economic data are unique to each region 
and contribute differentiating among them, these indicators are not the 
only ones that depict Mezzogiorno’s complexity. Indeed, after having 
decided that at least the four biggest regions of Mezzogiorno should 
be included in the study, the subsequent methodological problem was 
to choose which territories within each of the four regions to select 
for conducting fieldwork and for performing interviews. The differen-
ce between urban centers and provinces was especially important: as 
Lipset and Rokkan have widely demonstrated, the dialectics between 
cities and countryside constitutes a significant political cleavage in de-
termining party and political systems (Lipset e Rokkan 1967). More 
in general, the conflict between the center as a focal point for policies 
and resources, and the periphery understood as a neglected space in the 
policy making process, has always been a well-studied topic in politi-
cal science literature. Hence, the most rational choice was to include, 
within the sample of interviewees, people from both big urban agglo-
merations – such as region and province capitals – and the countryside 
around said conurbations.
TAB 2 interview local area







REINO, CIRCELLO (BENEVENTO) 6
NAPOLI (CAMPANIA) 9





LOCRI, SIDERNO, GIOISA, GIRIFALCO (CALABRIA) 10
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 Arguably, both the reach and the population density of a given 
territory has paramount implications for the relationship between elec-
tors and elected officials, both during the electoral campaign and, most 
importantly, in the aftermath of an election and between two elections.
The interviews, in fact, show a profoundly different approach towards 
public offices by electors:
“Yes … after the elections I follow the doings of the politi-
cians, but through informal channels … yes, such as the as-
sessor’s staff or in public meetings, in my case in particular 
the urbanistic and infrastructures assessor”1 (I 43).
“Daniele? Yes … that is a boy, we voted for him, but I don’t 
think he’s that good, he’s too strongly influenced by his fa-
ther, when I meet him on the street, I tell him ‘Daniè, take 
care of your city’”2 (I 37). 
 The two fragments tell two different stories about how politi-
cians are approached and confronted, which are influenced by territo-
rial-specific dimensions and determinants. I 43, on one side, utilizes 
informal meetings to get in touch with the portion of civil service which 
interests her the most (urbanistic, since Anna studies Architecture) or, 
at most, she employs “informal” channels with the staff of the relevant 
assessor. Antonietta, on the other side, lives in the outskirts of Naples, 
and she uses more direct, informal and personal channels to get in touch 
with local politicians (Daniele is the Mayor of Frattamaggiore), thereby 
constructing a direct approach which influences and conditions a per-
sonal acquaintance in electoral and other terms. These are obviously 
only some of the many ways in which local communities differ from 
each other: an exhaustive depiction of all the differences is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, as it would involve an elaborate account of the pre-
sent and historical social, economic and cultural condition of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno. For example, by excluding “objective” dimensions and 
including more sophisticated nuances, it is possible to discover pro-
found differences within the social fabric of each region and each pro-
vince in the South of Italy. For example, the concept of social capital, as 
defined by several indicators, it is possible to delve deeper and navigate 
the archipelago of the “many Souths”. The starting point will be a sy-
stem of four indicators proposed by Cartocci (2012, 6) and calculated 
for the 103 Italian provinces.
78
Tab 2.1 : provinces with maximum, minimum and median levels of social capi-
tal index, and of the single independent indicators (Index numbers: Italy=100). 
All the indicators were measured between 1999 and 2001 Source (Cartocci, R. 
200) Mappe del tesoro: atlante del capitale sociale in Italia)
 The indicators employed by Cartocci (2007) should be consi-
dered as forming two couples. First, the diffusion of newspapers and 
levels of electoral participation together show the degree of connection 
and involvement between ordinary people and politics. Second, the dif-
fusion of sports clubs and blood donors provide the oblative dimension 
of solidarity, i.e. the propensity to bear costs for others. It is apparent 
that the provinces of the South crowd into the last quartile in all the 
indicators, while center-north regions completely fill the uppermost 
quartile. However, quite substantial differences in scores both between 
and within regions remind us not to treat the whole of the South as a 
uniform body, but rather as a complex universe with striking internal 
differences which, in turn, arguably condition politics and the relation-
ship between electors and elected.
4.3  Sampling and contacting interviewees
 After the geographical delimitation of the case studies, another 
significant problem was the size and internal composition of the sam-
ple, and how to meet the interviewees. The final choice was for a pur-
pose sample, composed of 64 participants, divided according to some 
variables and all predisposed towards personal voting. The socio-demo-
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graphic variables which led the selection of the interviewees were:
• Gender: male or female.
• Age: 19-30; 30-60; 60+.
• Education: Middle school, high school, degree.
• Political orientation: self-assessed positioning on the 
left-right spectrum. 
By observing the final sample outlined at the end of this sub-chapter, it 
is apparent that the way in which the sample is structured, for reasons 
inherent to the research purpose, only partially resembles the list above 
of variables, even though the need to produce a purpose sample was 
mainly respected. For some of these dimensions such as gender and 
age, it was not difficult to obtain the necessary data, for said pieces of 
information are relatively “cheap” to attain and, for the interviewee, to 
give. The other two data, i.e. the highest education received to date and 
the self-positioning in the political spectrum, were considerably harder 
to obtain. In particular, it was hard for the intermediaries to evaluate 
effectively the interviewees’ propensity to personal vote: it is arduous to 
obtain that information without disclosing the purpose, aim, and focus 
of the research, the questions, and other elements which could influence 
the responses. For this reason, no question was asked about whether 
the interviewee liked personal vote or not. Rather, this propensity was 
indirectly evaluated during the interview itself, while bearing in mind 
that the vast majority of the voters in the South regularly make use 
of personal preferences to cast ballots. This strategy allowed perfor-
ming more in-depth conversations, in which personal voting emerged 
as an “unaware,” subconscious electoral behavior. Some dialogues, for 
example, stressed an unintended personalization of the vote, such as 
in the case of Apulia, where boys and girls (mostly to the left of the 
spectrum) evidenced a double phenomenon. On the one side, they pro-
vided a narration of politics as a collective movement, grounded in the 
importance of structured political parties, with constant references to 
the Communist Party and, more in general, to an “old world” where the 
party community was the elective place for politics and activism. Vis-
à-vis this “idealist” depiction, most of the transcripts show a comple-
mentary reference to individual politicians, disembedded from parties 
and structures, where the name of Vendola (who, after the Communist 
Refoundation Party never had an actual partisan allegiance), Grillo, and 
Berlusconi were cited often, while Left and Freedom, the 5 Stars Mo-
vement or Forza Italy were never directly mentioned. Concerning the 
highest education received by interviewees, there clearly was a veil of 
pride and shame to overcome, especially in the cases where responden-
ts only achieved middle school grades or lower. In these cases, the rule 
of thumb was not to insist and to try to obtain this information through 
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other channels, so as not to compromise the trust between interviewer 
and interviewee and, hence, the success of the interview itself. Simi-
larly, the self-collocation on the left to right spectrum was obtained in 
unobtrusive ways by giving complete freedom to the interviewee to 
collocate themselves as center-left, center-right, left, right, or center. 
Also, in this case, there were problems to overcome because many re-
spondents, especially less intensely politicized, who struggled to posi-
tion themselves, and this for two reasons. First, of all due to their high 
propensity to vote, specific candidates, regardless of their individual 
partisan and coalition allegiance. Also, in this case, the proposed solu-
tion was to desist from asking. Second, politics is currently understood 
in “liquid,” fluid terms, which make some say that “left and right… 
matter no more”, hence making people less eager to collocate themsel-
ves to the right, center or left of the political battleground. Unobtrusive 
approaches were always preferred to invasive ones, with the downturn 
of interviewing more people than initially planned and subsequently 
discarding unsuccessful ones, rather than risking to break the trust bond 
with the respondent. In fact, asking someone their political orientation, 
the education and, sometimes, even their age brought about diffidence, 
with the interviewees perceiving themselves more like a test subject 
in a lab than as an active agent in the scientific research process. This 
discretion in both the conduct of the interviews and in the selection of 
the participants significantly helped to delve deeper into the relevant 
topics and to approach more smoothly some sensitive issues such as 
the relationship of the partakers with candidates and elected officials. 
Moreover, most of the interviews were conducted straight after the very 
first meeting with the interviewer: hence, most of the participants were 
naturally suspicious. Only the youngest interviewees were more open 
also due to the age proximity with the interviewer. In some cases, some 
degree of reticence was necessary for the interviewee not to foresee the 
type of questions that were about to be asked and, in turn, not to hinder 
the sincerity of the answers. This approach from the interviewer, espe-
cially towards the most suspicious participants, generated a distance 
which was bridged by biding time and “breaking the ice” with more 
personal interactions at the beginning of the conversation, with no di-
rect references to the questions or the purpose of the study (having a 
coffee and a walk, or discussing about the territory). Trust was crucial 
from the start, especially to avoid evasive or listless answers. Results, 
however, have been erratic: sometimes the wall of mistrust was not 
broken, especially with people with lower levels of political sophistica-
tion. More in general, the process of building trust with the interviewe-
es was influenced by the types of contacts employed: the sample was 
created out of the suggestions of thirteen intermediaries who contacted 
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the prospective interviewees and organized them, to facilitate the inter-
viewer’s tasks.
4.4  Intermediaries and their role
 The construction of the sample, as said in the introduction, was 
a wearying task both scientifically (the process of identification of the 
participants in the different territories) and organizationally. Consi-
dering the vast reach of the area under investigation, and the need to 
differentiate between subjects coming from urban or rural contexts, it 
was necessary a collaboration and a joint effort with a network of in-
termediaries on the field. These people were a constant reference point 
for the interviewer: thanks to them, it was possible to differentiate the 
sample internally, hence avoiding biases concerning, for example, po-
litical orientation and education. Even more important, the paramount 
role these intermediaries played was to convey and transfer trust in the 
interviewer to the interviewees, thus facilitating the task of the former 
and, indeed, making the research possible. Arguably, said intermedia-
ries were not a research team, nor were they qualified to conduct social 
science research: for this reason, the interviewer did not share with them 
all the information concerning the scope, aim, and focus of the research. 
Confidentiality was, of course, more or less stringent according to spe-
cific needs: in some cases, one intermediary needed more information 
to convince a prospective participant. Hence, the process was divided 
into two phases: first, intermediaries were contacted through telephone. 
Subsequently, a draft of the interview was formulated for each territory, 
and appointments were arranged. Then, during fieldwork, the interme-
diaries either accompanied the interviewer or, in some cases, the resear-
cher made directly contact with the interviewee. After the first contact, 
the interviewer asked for other people who could be willing to partici-
pate in the research, following a “snowball sampling method” (Bryman 
2015). As said above, the presence of a direct contact on the field made 
many interviews more straightforward. Often the intermediary had i) 
a strong influence on the participant(s), which made the latter more 
relaxed and willing to speak with the interviewer. In other cases, ii) 
the intermediary and the participant were acquainted with each other 
so that the friendship tie was to some degree “transferred” from the 
intermediary to the interviewer. Lastly, iii) intermediaries have someti-
mes asked coworkers or relatives to participate, which made the study 
benefit from the informal and affective nature of family bonds and their 
effectiveness in conveying trust. Despite the constant usefulness of the 
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intermediaries, some situations did not happen to be successful, maybe 
due to a dearth in the interviewer’s handling of the interview. In other 
cases, the interviewee might have decided to participate in order not to 
disappoint the intermediary, while still preserving a skeptical attitude 
towards the interviewer. 
 Finally, and before presenting the sample of participants, it is 
worth mentioning that the intermediaries were not involved in the inter-
views themselves, even when this engendered clear disappointment in 
the intermediaries. This precaution was necessary in order not to invol-
ve interviewees in the research process too much, for fear of insincerity 
in their answer, with an overall detriment of the results.
TAB 2.3 Synthetic Scheme of the contacts on the field employed during the in-
terviewing process
 Lastly, here the synthesis of the whole sample is provided, with 
a letter and a number assigned to each interviewee that identifies them 
throughout the text. In the Appendices, moreover, the diary kept during 
the fieldwork will be provided, with considerations and reflections ta-
ken down right after the interviews. Especially when reading the tran-
scription of the interviews again, this diary has proved itself useful in 
bringing back hints and observations which are “fresh” right after a 
conversation, but which get lost in a very short span of time afterward. 
TAB 2.4 Respondents involved in research path.
PLACE INTERMEDIARIES
BENEVENTO (CAMPANIA) Antonio (C1)
REINO, CIRCELLO (BENEVENTO) Antonio (C1)
NAPLES (CAMPANIA) Antonio C. (C2), Andrea P (C3)
GIUGLIANO, FRATTAMAGGIORE (NAPLES) Antonio C. (C2), Antonietta (C4) 
BARI (APULIA) Alessandro (C5)
MASSAFRA (TARANTO, APULIA) Barbara (C6)
SIRACUSA (SICILY) Damiano (C7), Silvia (C8), Alessio (C9)
PALERMO (SICILY) Pina (C10)
LOCRI, SIDERNO, GIOISA, GIRIFALCO (CALABRIA) Rosa (C11), Vito (C12),Giuseppe (C13)
Name Area Gender Age Political 
orientation 
Education
BRUNO (I 1) SIRACUSA M 46 M5S MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
GIOVANNI I (2) SIRACUSA M 42 CS LAUREA
DONATELLO 
I (3)









LOCRI (RC) M 76 C SEMINARIO
GIANCARLO 
I (6)
BARI M 23 CD STUD. 
UNIVERS.
CHIARA I (7) BENEVENTO F 21 STUD. 
UNIVERS.
GIANNI I (8) SIRACUSA M 61 CS MEDIA 
SUPERIORE
CARMELA I (9) FRATTAMAG-
GIORE (NA)




MASSAFRA (TA) M 31 CD MEDIA 
SUPERIORE
CARLA (I 11) MASSAFRA (TA) F 65 CS LAUREA
ING SESSA I 
(12)
SIRACUSA M 73 CD LAUREA
FRANCESCO 
I (13)
GIOIOSA (RC) M 61 CS ELEMENTARI
IRENE I (14) ROCCELLA 
JONICA (RC)
F 47 CS LAUREA
FRANCESCA 
(I 15)












PALERMO F 57 CS MEDIA 
SUPERIORE
DORA I (19) ROCCELLA 
JONICA (RC)
F 71 C LAUREA
MASSIMO I (20) MASSAFRA (TA) M 42 CD LAUREA
MARIA I (21) REINO 
(BENEVENTO)
F 31 CD MEDIA 
SUPERIORE
MARISA I (22) GIOIOSA (RC) F 62 MEDIA 
INFERIORE




SIRACUSA F 64 CD MEDIA 
SUPERIORE




BENEVENTO M 62 ELEMENTARI
PATRIZIA (I 27) GIOIOSA SUPE-
RORE (RC)


















PALERMO F 53 CD LAUREA




SIRACUSA M 61 MEDIA INFE-
RIORE















F 47 MEDIA INFE-
RIORE
ANGELO (I 38) BENEVENTO M 51 C MEDIA INFE-
RIORE
ANNA (I 39) MASSAFRA (TA) F 42 LAUREA
ANTONIO (1 40) GIUGLIANO 
(NA)








BARI F 27 S LAUREA
ANNA ( I 43) NAPOLI F 23 MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
ENRICO (I 44) NAPOLI M 33 S MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE







M 51 CD MEDIA INFE-
RIORE
BRUNO (I 47) GIOIOSA (REG-
GIO C.)
M 34 MEDIA INFE-
RIOIRE






M 52 CS MEDIA
GIUSEPPE (I 50) ROCCELLA J. 
(REGGIO C.)
M 56 MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
ALBERTO (I 51) BENEVENTO M 23 STUD. UNI-
VERS.





F 27 CS LAUREA
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LUCIA (I 54) SIRACUSA F 64 D MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
GIUSEPPE (I 55) PALERMO M 61 ELEMENTARI
BEATRICE 
(I 56)
MASSAFRA (TA) F 35 CD LAUREA
MARIA LUCE 
(I 57)
SIRACUSA F 67 S LAUREA
MARIA GIOR-
GIA (I 58)
BARI F 26 S STUD. UNI-
VERS.
REMO (I 59) REINO (BENE-
VENTO)
M 52 MEDIA INFE-
RIORE






M 34 C STUD-PRECA-
RIO
TINA -62 MASSAFRA (TA) F 57 CS MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE





M 54 D MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
IVANO (I 65) MASSAFRA (TA) M 38 S MEDIA SUPE-
RIORE
4.5 The interview guide.
 Once having defined the sampling criteria, it is also important to 
determine the tools of inquiry and, hence, the strategies adopted in con-
ducting the interviews. As said above, the method utilized here was the 
semi-structured interview. As it is known, semi-structured interviews 
are characterized by a low level of standardization and the marginally 
directive nature of the questions (Bichi 2002). Said otherwise, the inter-
viewer used a scheme of open-ended questions, with some follow-ups 
to delve deeper into the matter when it is considered important. This 
project favored a “traditional” approach to semi-structured interviews, 
as the list of questions comprised three open questioned organized as a 
“funnel”: each question goes deeper than the previous into the subject 
matter. Several follow-up questions were asked between the main 
items of the interview: some of which had the aim of keeping the focus 
when the conversation went off-topic, while others have the purpose 
of stimulating the discussion. However, to justify the adoption of se-
mi-structured interviews as the prominent research method, one should 
weight up the capacity of this approach to deliver a satisfactory answer 
to the research question at hand. The interrogative which inspires this 
investigation, in fact, concerns the existence of personal vote choices, 
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among southern voters, which are driven by universalist benefits. The 
purpose of semi-structured interviews, hence, has been the one to test 
this hypothesis through open-ended questions. The low level of stan-
dardization of the semi-structured interview allowed the interviewer to 
follow logical paths during the conversation while avoiding repetition 
when the interviewee had already answered, and providing the inter-
viewer with more articulated references to other topics than the normal 
“thus,” “hence” and so forth. In some cases, interviewees were stimu-
lated, e.g. by referring to fragments of news and anecdotes connected 
to the local community and territory, such as in some towns and cities 
where local elections had just been held. This reference to narrative 
structures was used to stimulate the interviewees’ responsiveness, while 
always keeping a value-free approach to the matter, in order not to en-
gender in the interviewee a fear of judgment. These and other expedien-
ts afforded by the semi-structured interview method were employed to 
tackle diverse and variegated types of setting where the meetings took 
place. While drawing upon other types of interviews, the nature of the 
proposed question grid is a “traditional” version of the semi-structured 
interview. While remaining elastic and non-directive, the questions kept 
some degree of standardization, to make results comparable with each 
other and to provide useful insights to address the central research que-
stion. All in all, the semi-structured interview was evaluated according 
to the viewpoint of the interviewee, his/her perceptions of reality and 
the proposed topic. While still searching for clues of the existence of a 
universalist personal vote in the accounts provided by respondents, the 
interviews were never probing (such as in surveys), and they were not 
directly aimed at confirming a pre-set hypothesis. Rather, in line with 
the characteristics of the semi-structured (and non-directive) interview, 
the interviewee was free to tell his/her story, without checking the truth 
in his/her statements. Moreover, the utterances of the participants were 
not treated as a primary source of an objective reality, but rather as per-
formative elements of a subjective reality which constitute only one of 
many ways of interpreting the same phenomenon. As outlined above, 
the semi-structured interview is understood, first of all, as a knowledge 
path grounded in trust between participants and the interviewer.
Let us outline, then, the questions the interviewer asked the participan-
ts:
Question 1: “What is the function of politics, in your view? And what 
should it deal with?” 
Follow-up: Do you keep yourself informed about politics? How? 
Through which media?
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Question 2: “Which feature of a political leader does attract you? 
Which relations do you have with politics?” 
Follow-up: What inspires you? Do you have personal examples of 
your relation with politics?
Question 3: “What do you expect from politics, concerning your con-
dition and the one of your community?”
Follow-up: if elections were held now, what would you expect from, 
and ask a candidate? Do you check what has been done by represen-
tatives since the last elections? Do you have any anecdote to tell?
 The first question is generic and introductory, and it aims at 
scrutinizing the degree of political sophistication of the participant whi-
ch, as said in previous chapters, is a paramount determinant of personal 
voting and its motives. This first question and its open-ended nature, 
proved to be extremely fruitful, as many participants started long dis-
sertations from the suggestions given by the question, and they often 
answered several of the key points of the subsequent questions without 
being asked. In some respect, especially in the successful interviews, 
the first query was a sort of an “ice-breaker”, often providing partici-
pants with an excuse to let off steam and pressure and to be sincere. On 
the other side, follow-ups served the purpose to bring the conversation 
back on its original track. In other cases, due to the lack of willingness 
to talk to some participants, or due to their little political sophistication, 
follow-ups were crucial to trigger the conversation, to keep it going or 
to establish the trust bond between interviewee and interviewer.
 The second question, in line with the “funnel” structure of the 
interview, unpacks the personal and individual relation between a voter 
and a politician, weighs the intensity and the strength of it, and is asses-
ses the influence that this connection plays in determining the viewpoint 
of the interviewee. This question tried to confirm the hypothesis that 
personal voting is a widespread habit among the southern electorate. As 
we shall see in due course, there is plenty of evidence that personal vo-
ting is a peculiarly “Southern” political behavior. Especially the second 
question facilitated the distinction between different types of personali-
sm diffused among voters especially in combination with the  follow-up 
questions about personal anecdotes and examples. 
 Lastly, the third item clearly focused on discovering the exi-
stence of a personal vote driven by universalist expectations. Naturally, 
this question relies on the others, and once again the limited directive 
nature of the semi-structured interview permits to get closer and closer 
to the final question in a dialogical way. Also in this last case, follow-up 
questions were paramount in that they helped the participant to organi-
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ze their ideas and exposition. Sometimes even silence helped the free 
expression of concepts, especially since the last question, more than 
the other two, relied on the subjective narrative and discourse provi-
ded by the interviewee. Among all the questions, the third is the most 
personal in nature, since it guides the respondent towards more criti-
cal reflections on the surrounding social context but, at the same time, 
this question demands a more constructive answer, which is not always 
easy to provide. More in specific, one cannot fail to take the different 
social realities which characterize the lived experiences of each of the 
participants into account. These social realities manifest themselves 
through their answers: problems such as youth unemployment, wide-
spread wrongdoings, and lags in achieving economic development are 
but three of the many flaws of the territories under study. Asking about 
expectations towards politics and individual politicians also meant in-
quiring into ideas about the future: it is no coincidence that the answers 
differed widely depending on the individual participant, focusing on 
issues as diverse as, on the one side, a generic crave for honesty and, on 
the other, the refurbishing of the streets. 
All the questions in the interview are, to some extent, open: some are 
more open than others, and this is apparent from the answers provided. 
Indeed, if one considers the first question, the answers given to it are 
strikingly homogeneous with each other: close to all participants envi-
sion politics as a “high,” “noble,” “collective” activity.
Interviewee 3 “Politics deals with the well-being of the po-
lis”;
Interviewee 19 “Politics has to care about people…com-
mon and poor people, which are the majority”; 
Interviewee 56 “Well, if we consider its etymology, politics 
means to govern the polis, the public good”.
On the contrary, and despite similarities in which they are phrased, an-
swers to the third question are remarkably heterogeneous:
Interviewee 15 “I just wish for fewer taxes”.
Interviewee 60 “For example I pay taxes… I would like to 
have my street remade, so I don’t need to bring my car to the 
mechanic every month”.
Interviewee 45 “I would like to see vision in politicians… 
politics must be about a vision, an idea. Not just streets”.
 The sequence of questions was another factor which influenced 
the answers. For example, asking about expectations after the trust-bu-
89
ilding path paved by the previous questions helped participants to feel 
free and a part of a strong trust bond, hence allowing more freedom and 
assertiveness in the last stage, when the path of knowledge and interper-
sonal relation was set and paved. However, said path was influenced not 
only by the sequence of the questions, but also by the way the interview 
was carried out, and this event-specific variation need to be accounted 
for.
4.6 Directing the interview
 Along with the structure of the interview and the content of the 
individual questions, the way in which the interview was carried out, 
and hence the disposition of the interviewer towards it were paramount 
in establishing that connection with the participants that, as said abo-
ve, is crucial to the success of each interview. All the interviews were 
realized by the same interviewer, so all the following consideration ap-
plies to the same person. First, concerning the circumstances and the 
unfolding of the research activity, it is worth mentioning again that an 
invaluable aid has been provided by the contacts on the field who acted 
as intermediaries with the participants. Moreover, concerning the theme 
of the personal vote, the researcher had the chance to immerse himself 
in the literature and to draw upon past studies on the electoral behavior 
of electors in the South of Italy. 
The interviewer, thanks to its southern origin and his previous knowle-
dge of local social and political phenomena typical to the South of Italy, 
was able to connect with the participants, hence making the conversa-
tion easier and offering a common, equal ground for dialogue to the 
informants. These elements which determined proximity with the inter-
viewees allowed, in most of the cases, a sharing of the same social wor-
ld and, in turn, deeper and more fruitful answers. In many cases, this 
exchange assumed the form of belonging to the same categoria di situa-
zione (Bertaux 1999) because the interviewer shares not only a common 
geographical origin, but also a knowledge of the logics of action, tran-
sformative processes and social models typical to the southern society 
in Italy. This pre-knowledge has been critical to the success of the most 
delicate interviews, where the questions triggered personal reflections, 
references to real facts or to well-known local persons. Naturally, the 
sharing of a categoria di situazione requested a value-free approach by 
the interviewer, because the weight of his judgment on the reflections 
made by the participants would have hindered the achievement of pro-
found and fruitful answers, alongside with a betrayal of the trust bond 
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with the participants themselves. In some interviews the respondent felt 
free to recount close-to-illegal events when the microphone was off or 
the meeting was ending. For example, some people told of illicit ways 
in which private houses were connected to the electricity power grid, 
of local politicians (giving names and surnames) who hired workers in 
cooperative companies to employ the same workers in their campaign, 
or of long queues of people awaiting the distribution of pasta in front 
of the house of a local politician in a working-class neighborhood in 
a famous southern city. The unfolding of the interviews, however, re-
quested also to reassure the participant about the trustworthiness of the 
researcher and the rigor of the research: the allegiance to an academic 
institution encouraged the interviewees in this sense, but the greatest 
reassurance was the preservation of the anonymity of the participant. 
In many cases, in fact, several respondents asked for reassurance about 
the secret character of the research before delving deeper or providing 
more examples about sensitive topics, especially if referred to specific 
individuals. Finally, this fieldwork challenged the interviewer to face 
unforeseeable relational problems, which required immediate counter-
measures and adaptation. Some of these issues derive from the day, 
place and personal disposition of the participants. Another variable is 
the time of the day: lunchtime is not as efficient as the late afterno-
on. Moreover, organizational needs required a tight schedule of inter-
views and a high degree of flexibility on the side of the interviewer, so 
that many of the conversations took place in private offices and hou-
ses, bars, clubs, trade union headquarters or hotel rooms. Despite the 
real difficulty in carrying out the interviews in such diverse settings, 
the interviewer always adopted a set of standards and behaviors apt to 
produce successful interviews. First, the interviews were always con-
ducted without other people around, if compatible with the organizatio-
nal needs. Second, the length of the interview was never smaller than 40 
minutes. Third, when unforeseen events happened which hindered the 
connection between interviewer and participant (such as a phone call), 
the choice was always to stop and postpone the conversation. Fourth, 
whenever this was not in conflict with the intention to keep the aim 
and the purpose of the study confidential, the interviewer was always 
available and open to interactions, e.g. by using the breaks to discuss 
non-related topics, or by talking in the local dialect to facilitate the com-
munication. As so described, the conduction of the interview resembles 
an ethno-sociological interview, and in some respects this claim is true: 
the attempt of the researcher to immerse himself in the world of each 
and every interview situation, the interaction with the contacts on the 
field, and more in general the connection established with the partici-
pants during the research process are all elements which allowed to go 
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beyond stereotypes and to enrich this research with new and additional 
questions. However, it is important to bear in mind that, despite a strong 
resemblance with an ethno-sociological research, this project remains 
clearly grounded in political science, and the focus is kept on the resear-
ch question at all time throughout the research process. Arguably, many 
of the interviews prompted many reflections for additional avenues of 
research, e.g. about the paternalistic role that many voters assign to po-
litics, the influence of widespread illegality or other insights emerged 
during the interviews which might be interesting, but not central to the 
project at hand. In conclusion, the extraordinary flexibility provided 
by semi-structured interviews and the open nature of the answers un-
doubtedly facilitated the establishment of a trust bond with the partici-
pants. On the other hand, the selection of this method also influenced 
the research and its findings, and were crucial in addressing the central 
research question: “Is there a kind of personal vote which is driven by 
universalist expectations?”
4.7  Testing a prediction. 
 A qualitative method for a post-positivist, perspective
 Finally, some words are needed on the types of vote and the 
general aim of the research. This thesis focuses on the motives and 
expectations which drive and shape political behavior: for this reason, 
the question is ill-suited to be tackled through qualitative methods such 
as surveys. Qualitative methods, moreover, are not only useful to un-
pack ambiguous elements such as individual motives and expectations: 
these methods are also effective because of the interpretative appro-
ach towards social phenomena. This thesis, for example, could have 
proposed a typology of personal election behaviors, based on different 
types of vote emerged during the fieldwork (Demaziere 1997, Corbetta 
2003). However, the choice adopted in this case, despite being qualitati-
ve, presents some elements in ostensible contradiction with each other. 
Most importantly, more than constructing a new typology of personal 
vote through the results of the interview, this paper recognized different 
types of electors according to their electoral choices, and then “pla-
ced” them within the typological matrix proposed in Tab 1.8. Hence, 
this research is not a case of a qualitative research oriented towards the 
inductive construction of types. Rather, this thesis is a post-positivist 
research which aims to test, more than a full-fledged theory, and the exi-
stence of one of the types of vote identified in the theoretical discussion 




Vote orientation and expected benefits: the accounts of Southern voters.
5.1  Parties and leaders
 In the following pages, I will outline the answer to the research 
question inspiring this thesis, i.e. whether there is a type of personal 
vote, which aims to obtain universal benefits. In specific, two couples of 
variables will be cross-analyzed: on the one side, the candidate-oriented 
vs. party-oriented vote and, on the other hand, the selective vs. univer-
sal character of the expected benefits. Each of the four intersections 
between different values of the two dichotomic variables will define 
one ideal-type of voting behavior. The depth and the breadth of the 
interviews cover various facets of the system of connections between 
politicians and voters, beyond the interval between one election and the 
other. The respondents point to the nature of the public space, i.e. the 
place where individual and collective opinions take form (Habermas 
1964, Noelle-Neumann, 2002). Moreover, the transcripts of the conver-
sations told us more about hope and despair, difficulties, and ambitions 
of the collection of communities which is the Mezzogiorno, which is 
often chronically poorer that the rest of the country. This research does 
not aim to go beyond its original purpose, but it would be impossible 
to tackle the proposed research question without considering what hap-
pens around and on the background of the political phenomena under 
direct study. This social milieu keeps on emerging in the words of the 
interviewees, and it becomes a qualifying element of the research, and 
the end of the Chapter will devote some words to that. Conversely, the 
primary target now is to describe and define the types of voting strate-
gy emerged from the data collection and analysis, and their definition 
through the informants’ words and accounts. This work is made more 
straightforward by the fourfold typology of voting behavior described 
in the theoretical Chapter. This typology will be the conceptual com-
pass to navigate the research results and to make sense of them. First, 
the proposed typology differentiates among various degrees of perso-
nalization in voting. Personal vote and party vote may represent two 
poles on a conceptual continuum in which different voting behavior 
represent “shades” of both the two extremes. This section will cover the 
spectrum from party oriented vote-candidate oriented voted, and it will 
be enriched with further nuances, with references to scientific literature 
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if necessary
5.1.1  The party
 The concept of party-oriented is set apart by the farthest distan-
ce from the ideal-type of the personal vote. Here are some fragments 
which testify the existence among the sample of respondent, of party-o-
riented voters:
I 2 (M, 48, civil servant): “He (politician) should be ani-
mated not only by the purpose of representing the ones who 
supported it but also by the ambition of educating voters, 
I mean that if one receives some votes, he should not wei-
gh them, because votes can also be the result of a sense of 
belonging, then I feel I belong to the ideals of one specific 
party, a movement, etc... Voting, for me, is the outcome of 
sharing the same ideals […] the person should, more than 
anything, take his party’s heritage, and upholding it.” 
I 4 (M, 46, policeman): “What was not lacking (in the 60s) 
was the sense of belonging to a movement, a political par-
ty, in which the leaders mirrored the historical phase, they 
embodied that feeling of belonging and they provided clear 
ideas and, after that, they could rule.”
I 6 (M, 28, small entrepreneur) “In the last 40 years, how 
often did we say this? The leader is the one who matters, 
always the leader and nothing good came from that. Let’s 
go back to ideas, to the political debate, center-right and 
center-left, and let’s stop talking names, Alessandro, etc., 
etc...”
I 16 (M, 34, barman and newsvendor): “I speak honestly 
with you, no point in babbling about, at the end of the day 
nowadays you do not vote the person, it is almost impossi-
ble to me, you vote the party, the faction within that party, 
I mean in a town with 30-40 thousand inhabitants maybe 
you develop a face-to-face connection, you might end up 
trusting somebody, but if you go beyond a certain threshold 
in population, or at the national or regional level, it is im-
possible to trust someone 100%. Then you must choose the 
faction, not the person.”
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I 23 (M, 21, student): “Maybe you expect that that person 
shares your view because you belong to the same party […] 
he upholds everyone’s ideas, all in all, it does not matter as 
a person, then you only rely on him as a party member, you 
may make big mistakes if you just rely on him as a person, 
everything may turn out as it did in the European Parlia-
ment with Barbara Spinelli.” 
I 31 (F, 51, teacher): “Of course, I decided to challenge my-
self, and I did it for what is right for the party because there 
still are some values which tell parties apart, even among 
center-right parties.” 
I 40 (M, 20, student): “A politician matters in his day-to-
day institutional activity insofar as he is the expression of 
his ideas and his party’s […] the person acquires a weight 
of his own insofar as he manages to impose himself and his 
view within his party.” 
I 42 (F, 26, student): “And look, the thought is important 
to me. In the sense that sure, the person helps, but people 
come after thoughts, after the common interest.” 
I 43 (F, 31, student-worker): “Yes, at a national level I read 
the platform. First, I am more attentive to platforms and 
what … let’s say the rationality of the party, the ideas of the 
party, but this holds up at the national level, the local level 
is different.” 
I 57 (F, 62, psychologist): “It should be a means for high 
and noble aims and ideals, to transform dreams into rea-
lity, hence to have humanity at heart. […] I mean not only 
thinking about technicalities but also to go beyond, to the 
future, to younger generations, to what we give them, to the 
environment, to the world where we live.” 
I 58 (F, 26, apprentice lawyer): “When I enrolled in Com-
munist Re-foundation, I was told that the party comes first 
and that the apparatus matters, then there are the cadres 
and leaders, and then people. Sure, people like Vendola 
contributed to the Apulia Spring to a tremendous extent, 
but I believe in collective processes, hence in parties and 
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movements, not in individual processes.”  
 Respondents pointed out at least two important details: first, 
as it was foreseeable, the personal dimension, even in party-oriented 
voters, never entirely fades away, it rather seems less critical in deter-
mining electoral choices. On the other hand, the party-oriented vote 
ii) materializes through a vote to a person, who in turn plays the role 
of a “tool” for the aim of satisfying his party’s requests and proposals, 
its platform, and its ideas. The party-oriented vote, as emerged in the 
quoted conversations, is always different from the sense of belonging 
entailed by mass-membership parties typical of the XX century (Kir-
chheimer, 1966), despite some older interviewees mentioning the past 
generically, and the ideological and programmatic role of first-republic 
parties in Italy. Another paramount feature distinguishes between more 
or less “experienced” electors due to their age, and this is the constant 
reference to old ideas of political parties. Here are some examples:
I 3 (M, 53, community service): “At that time there was 
Continuous Struggle (left-wing oriented party), now I do 
not recognize politics any longer. We distributed pamphlets, 
we volunteered for ideas, and I never accepted the logic 
‘they skim money, but at least we all profit from that’, I’ve 
always been sick of that […] I only wavered when Orlando 
run for Mayor […] he was Christian Democracy, he was 
evil to me […] but I wavered.”  
I 4 (M, 46, policeman): “People matter within a system 
of ideas that represented their thoughts, and what was not 
lacking was the sense of belonging to a movement, those ye-
ars were full of passion and celebrated people, Berlinguer 
for the Communist Party, Almirante for us (the Italian So-
cial Movement, right-wing oriented party)) they were this, 
they embodied ideas.” 
 All in all, those who have memories of the XX century make con-
stant reference to lived experiences concerning the party as a structure, 
and hence the party-oriented and allegiance-oriented vote. Conversely, 
younger electors (aged 19-30), especially those more clearly oriented 
towards ideological vote, point out at something peculiar:
I 23 (M, 21, student): “Sure people count, but only concer-
ning the ideas upheld by the party … as an expression of a 
platform … Vendola, his personal use of poetry in politics, 
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what he represents, all these things come before narrowly 
leaderist elements.” 
I 44 (M, 35, unemployed): “Sure parties mattered once … 
they were places for education and personal growth, at this 
point one can do only so much, leaders are short-lived, and 
they cannot do much, they cannot put forth different ideas, 
I do not believe in the power of a single person […] De 
Magistris for example can be a sound exception because he 
did something good, he created a movement.”  
I 42 (F, 26, student): “Yes, I gave preferences among the 
candidates within the party list, but only for people who 
I knew shared my views, views which are the same as the 
party’s…parties are in a pitiful condition, Grillo is a false 
answer, Renzi’s Democratic Party is a right-leaning party 
nowadays, and even Vendola and his entourage damaged 
the left badly.”  
 What strikes the eye most openly is the almost perfect identifi-
cation between the pro-tempore leader of the party and the party itself: 
the 5 Star Movement “becomes” Grillo, Renzi “becomes” the Demo-
cratic Party, and so on. Less experienced voters, in short, seem “ide-
ally” attached to an “old” idea of parties, of which they have but indi-
rect memories, with no lived experiences, so that they collapsed parties 
with their leaders. Moreover, despite the strong “idealist” connotation 
of party-oriented voters, the individual dimension of leadership remains 
important even for more radical voters:
I 29 (F, 32, social worker): “Philosophically, I am a com-
munist, but more as a philosophy and as an ideology, mea-
ning that I am a leftist, leaning towards Berlinguer’s com-
munism; but if the party candidates an idiot I won’t vote 
for him […] and then we decided to support that guy who 
was member of the Left Democrats … because he seemed 
different … So, I’m not as big a communist as Antonella …” 
I 4 (M, 46, policeman): “To me, who represents a party has 
at least to be competent and educated, we always searched 
for candidates with these characteristics, who could be di-
stinguished because they were well-educated … sometimes 
we didn’t like them, and I did not support them, even though 
it wasn’t an easy thing to do.” 
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Once again, more ideology-oriented voters clearly show a strong sense 
of kinship with the party as a political community, but this attachment 
never disregards the role of the leader who upholds expectations when 
running for office. It is worth mentioning a seemingly marginal detail: 
the association between a system of ideas and a party is not direct but 
rather mediated by the candidate. It is the candidate who needs to live 
up to the values and ideas both when running for office and while wor-
king in representative assemblies, and the reputation of both the can-
didate and the party are closely linked (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987). 
This nuance is recounted by some transcripts, such as the following:
I 52 (M, 29, engineer and teacher): “I have clear beliefs 
…values mean everything to me, and they must be stable, 
non-negotiable values” .
I 53 (F, 30, unemployed): “Maybe we’re wrong because we 
lost track of those founding values, perhaps we want to do 
a lot of things but at the first time something stops working, 
we suddenly lose faith. We should go beyond many genera-
tions who shared this mode of thought based on compromi-
se; we should bring back some values.” 
 In summary, we could state that the idealist dimension of vo-
ting, as described in the words of southerner voters, has a cornerstone 
in the party as a synthesis of ideas and political beliefs, the party that sa-
tisfies the need for a rationality oriented towards action (Dawns 1957). 
Such ideas are more important for candidate-oriented votes who do not 
overlook the ideal and ethical dimension of voting, but who consider 
individual candidates as the appropriate answer for a synthesis. The ide-
ological, party-oriented vote sometimes entails shades of personalism, 
in line with the territorial dimension which is so massively relevant in 
the Mezzogiorno. In turn, this personalism intensifies the propensity for 
personal voting, even in the presence of institutionalized and structured 
parties (D’Amato 1964, Cartocci 2012).
5.1.2 Party and Leader.
After the almost ideal-typical case of a party-oriented ideological vote, 
it is possible to distinguish an equilibrium where personalism and ideo-
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logical basis of voting balance each other.
I 1 (M, 47, regional civil servant): “For example, I speak 
about the 5 Star Movement, many people talk about it wi-
thout knowing much, without knowing the extraordinary job 
that Grillo and his guys did, and since I read the platform 
and the internal by-laws, and since I look first-hand what 
they do, the money they invested in micro-entrepreneurship 
… all in all, they’re not bad”. 
I 9 (F, 58, community service): “D.B. I voted for him …you 
know he is in the Democratic Party, and he’s young […] 
and then, in the regional elections, who was that girl? Wait 
a moment … oh yes Teresa, a good girl, they told us that she 
was in the Democratic Party, that she was supporting De 
Luca, so I voted for her”. 
I 11 (F, 60, retired): “I have always been a socialist because 
I believed in freedom, tolerance, there was a lot of talking 
about Proudhon, and I arrived at less extreme, less Marxist 
positions … then there was Craxi who was a real leader, I 
liked it, regardless of how everything turned out”. 
I 13 (M, 61, school janitor): “So in my family we’ve always 
been communist … as my father taught us …in 1970 no less, 
we went in Reggio during the riots … because we belonged 
to that lot […] Ingrao represented equality and the rights 
and the duties, and we always followed him up to the point 
when he became President of the House, always supported 
him”. 
I 17 (M, 72, retired): “I am a Christian Democrat, of the 
Morotean (nickname used for the party members very close 
to Aldo Moro) faction and even now I like defining myself 
in this way, I had this strong faith in the youth branch of 
the Cristian Democracy, we were driven by Moro’s idea of 
reconciling ourselves with what was on our left, to the cen-
ter-left, since in the Christian Democracy Moro was un-
doubtedly more left-leaning than Fanfani.” 
I 20 (M, 43, lawyer): “Yes, in 1994 I enrolled in Forza Ita-
lia because in the territory there was a good movement, 
and Berlusconi fascinated me as a man and as he presented 
99
himself, so I fell for the Italian miracle, and just picture 
yourself that we just came out of the ashes of Tangentopoli, 
Berlusconi represented something new, I was young to tell 
that he was Craxi’s lieutenant, and yes, this, and there were 
some friends I knew in Forza Italia, and yes, in the end this 
was it.” 
I 26 (M, 67, retailer): “No, I hardly go to vote, so sick of all 
these folks, these armchairs, these politicians … maybe this 
year I will vote again, for the 5 Stars Movement, they do 
many good things, they give back money, in Benevento they 
bought the computers for the boys in the school, and that 
guy elected in Acerra, C.A. I think he’s called … he doesn’t 
keep his salary; they’re good lads and all.” 
I 31 (F, 51, teacher): “I believed and I volunteered for Fra-
telli D’Italia, especially for Giorgia Meloni, who I believe 
is competent and skilled, and she is close to my positions 
regarding platforms (…).
I 46 (M, 51, school janitor): “We in the family were always 
(Christian) Democrats, always voted for F.M. who did so 
many good things for the Plain (Gioia Tauro Valley), star-
ting from hospitals and all the wards he brought to the 
Plain… nowadays no, I would struggle to tell you which 
parties there are, maybe the leaders yes … but it’s difficult 
… compared with the past, I want to say when you went to 
the socialist and the communist sections.” 
I 53 (F, 30, unemployed) “I’ve always been to the cen-
ter-left, yes I mean Democratic Party … well but Bersani, 
I didn’t like him that much, Renzi is better … seems like 
he’s doing more things, that he’s more active for us young 
people, in fact despite being center-left, I betrayed the De-
mocratic Party, but it was Bersani’s fault, I didn’t like him 
at all.” 
Some specific elements tie all these quotes together. First, all the parti-
cipants explicitly mention parties and leaders (both national and local), 
hence showing that both the party and the person can play an equal role 
when people cast their ballots. This result is not trivial because this kind 
of symmetry between allegiance vote and personal vote is not recounted 
either among party-oriented or candidate-oriented voters, as we shall 
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see shortly. Second, the relation between a party and its elected officials 
concerns all the parties, regardless of their left-to-right positioning on 
the political spectrum. More indirectly, one can spot both a quantitative 
increase in the frequency with which the party-candidate couple appe-
ars in each fragment of an interview and the qualitative change in the 
party-candidate nexus. Manifestly, all the answers underline the mutual 
correlation between the party’s and the candidate’s reputation, so that 
one affects the other and vice versa (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987). This 
dynamic, in turn, changes shape and character through time (old and 
new parties) and space (national and local leaders). The First Republic 
is mentioned for its parties and leaders, when political parties were si-
gnificantly more influential and structured, both in the institutions and 
in society at large. Especially, those respondents who mention these po-
litical dynamics of the First Republic underscore between personal vote 
and allegiance vote is more important, accepted and desirable. Moreo-
ver, the overlapping between ideals and strong leaders able to uphold 
them recurs in many conversations. This particular group of voters be-
longs to a former political system, which is still clearly depicted in the 
experience of older electors, in which the role of the party together 
with the function of the candidate are both essential, especially during 
election season (Fenno 1978). Having said this, the party maintains a 
strong central position in the participants’ word. In other cases, the link 
between a leader and his party is weaker or bland. Thus, the head of 
the party becomes stronger compared to the political community of the 
members. In this scenario, the party appears as a direct derivation from 
the leader. For example, in one of the fragments, the Democratic Party 
is indeed depicted as two different organizations, respectively Bersani’s 
and Renzi’s varieties of the Democratic Party. Conversely, the 5 Stars 
Movement is named as “Grillo and his guys”. The narratives contained 
in the interviews show a substantial shift in the way in which indi-
vidual candidates relate to their parties, and how electors respond to 
this interaction (Mayhew 1974). As parties weaken and crumble, per-
sonalism grows stronger. More in detail, one easily notices that most of 
the mentioned leaders are national, well-known figures, whose names 
become more and more known, as these leaders become part of the 
spectacularization of politics. This process of increasing relevance of 
mass media invested Italian politics from the 1980s onwards (Barisio-
ne 2007, Mazzoleni 2012), hence making party leaders media leaders 
more than pure politicians. Lastly, let us consider the balance between 
opposite orientations of the electors, i.e. either towards a party or indi-
vidual candidates. The causal nexus between the former and the latter is 
not univocal: there is no obvious answer as to whether the candidate or 
the party are paramount in determining the final voting choice, despite 
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some respondent trying to provide a reply.
 I 37 (F, 57, lsu) “No, I won’t ever vote for a center-right 
candidate, even if he’s great, I’d rather have both my hand 
chopped off.” 
I 29 (F, 32, social worker) “But I give you an example … I 
wouldn’t vote for the right even if the candidate is comple-
tely respectable.” 
I 29 (F, 32, social worker) “sure … what do I do, do I vote 
for the first idiot just because he’s leftist? No, people mat-
ter.” 
Despite some interviewees mentioning a loose list of priorities, there is 
no apparent general “rule”. Probably the ideological dimension, even 
when combined with a central candidate, is more important than the 
rest, but the fieldwork did not confirm this claim.
5.1.3 Leader
 Personal vote attitude was significantly higher among the re-
spondents who, throughout the interview, positioned the person at the 
center of their voting choices. It is apparent that this group of indivi-
duals is the clear majority of the selected sample. On the other hand, 
southern voters always had a strong predisposition towards personal 
electoral relations and, in fact, this is the reason why the existence of 
a universalist personal vote is tested precisely among southern elec-
tors. The first feature of the respondents within this subset is related too 
electoral personalism: in fact, while most of the electors are attentive 
towards individual candidates throughout the electoral campaign, it is 
also true that this candidate-oriented vote assumes different shapes in 
different contexts, as widely showed by several transcripts. However, in 
this section the relevant distinction is the one between:
•    Personalization of competencies.
•    Personalization of leadership.
 The first group refers to the candidate according to his/her skills 
and competencies. Hence these voters consider themselves as capable 
of evaluating the specific abilities necessary to be a good policymaker. 
Personalization of competencies, hence, stands for a personal relation 
with a candidate which is grounded on the capability to achieve spe-
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cific aims and objectives, and the candidate here resembles a manager 
more than a representative: he or she will be assessed on efficiency and 
effectiveness. (Barisione 2006). Conversely, personalization of leader-
ship is different and, in some respects, opposite: voters, in this latter 
case, stress and underline charisma and leadership (Barisione 2006, 
Calise 2016) while over passing skills. The second element concerns 
where to position the two voting choices on the party-oriented/candi-
date-oriented conceptual continuum. This thesis proposes to consider 
the influence of the personalization of competencies as weaker than the 
personalization of leadership, simply because the former is more con-
cerned with results and less with communicative effects attached to the 
candidate’s image (Barisione 2006). Here are some fragments which 
represent the typical response of voters oriented towards leaders’ skills 
and capabilities.
I 4 (M, 46, policeman) “A politician must be modest and 
skilled … because you must earn the voters’ trust … so you 
politician must show that you are capable of pursuing and 
achieving results”. 
I 8 (M, 61, clerk) “(the politician) … must have competen-
cies, must be knowledgeable, must show to be able to fight 
in the council, to know the mechanisms and the institutional 
machine … maybe even then you cannot achieve anything 
… because then you know the ones around you … what they 
make you do … but as a basis, you have to be competent”. 
I 12 (M, 70, entrepreneur) “No … I look for competent peo-
ple, who stand up for their community, who know their com-
munity … who make things, someone must to show what 
he does for his neighborhood, who is concerned about the 
city’s wellbeing, and a person who knows the territory and 
its problems”. 
I 14 (F, 48, teacher) “Sure, I look at his CV, his experience, 
whether he is a politician or a manager, I’m interested to 
know what he can do, if he has already done anything … 
also self-employed, I mean it’s better not to pick an inexpe-
rienced boy who is then manipulated by someone stronger, 
someone above him” .
I 17 (M, 72, retired) “Surely the Honorable Moro, beyond 
chatter, brought ILVA to bring economic development and 
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growth, because this was a troubled region … it is not about 
talking; it is about solving problems … I laugh when I hear 
talking about closing the ILVA … in the 60s in Taranto 
there was 40% unemployment, people working in mines in 
France, in Belgium, and what did Moro do? He only solved 
the employment problem in a land on its knees, and then 
we had 40 years of welfare, and it was not predictable, my 
friend” .
I 20 (M, 41, lawyer) “Yes, I’m not ashamed of telling it, 
Berlusconi in 1994 … yeah I liked him, I thought that if he 
were a smart entrepreneur, then he would have done what 
was right for Italy, because clearly, he had skills, manage-
rial skills” .
I 24 (F, 64, clerk) “Listen, the only person who I remember 
as a decent person is the regional assessor S. … very know-
ledgeable, capable, with brilliant ideas, who created an ar-
tistic and cultural path on the value of myths, something 
fantastic, very helpful … then he was rumored, but it’s bet-
ter to have someone who is controversial but capable, then 
someone motionless and useless like Crocetta” .
I 25 (M, 51, tourist operator) “Sure I want to know what he 
did … and then you see if he has failed in his mandate if he 
didn’t do anything for his constituency, who didn’t give any 
meaningful contribution and, all in all, if he showed to be, 
or be not capable of doing anything” .
I 29 (F, 32, social worker) “For example, a person who 
was available … To tell some crap, someone who goes into 
a bar and lends a hand to those in need … someone who 
sees the problem and tries to sort it out; in short someone 
grounded, who lives in reality” . 
I 35 (F, 27, student) “I choose the less of two evils … but 
in short I prefer the most grounded, concrete one, the one 
I know is not bullshitting me and can deliver on his promi-
se, they taught me this in general, that the capable people, 
those who are competent do not just shout promises … that 
then you cannot check if they delivered or not” .
I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) “No, sure people mat-
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ter … but I like to judge them on what they do and for the 
staff they hire…with time I figured that this is imperative, 
I mean I used to be carried away by emotions, yes by the 
person but someone advised me, and I learnt to look at who 
the politician hires to run his campaign and his office, and 
based on that…yes you can understand a lot of things from 
staff” .
I 41 (M, 44, unemployed) “[the candidate] should be able 
to be grounded in reality … understand and sort out the 
problems of citizens’ everyday life, [candidates] should li-
sten to these guys who have ideas, be attentive to them, be 
competent about their problems, giving them hints, I don’t 
know like ‘what you’re saying makes no sense’ or ‘this is a 
good idea’ … but because you have the skills to do it, yes 
to tell it” .;
I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur) “No no, no doubt the person 
who I think is capable, I evaluate all his life as far as I 
know about it, I don’t choose the party, because I want first 
and foremost a moderate and parties not always do these 
choices, I don’t have problems in naming the people who 
helped R.” .
I 54 (F, 36, unemployed) “To be able to solve … I mean of 
living in reality and being capable of solving problems, they 
should perceive themselves as part of a community, more 
than senators, deputies of an institution called Parliament 
and then make laws for the common interest … solving or-
dinary people’s problems” .
 The common elements in the provided answers all center on 
the theme of one candidate’s efficiency at problem-solving. Arguably, 
charisma and fascination in the leader’s persona leave room for more 
objective evaluations of a candidate’s skills as a problem solver (at least 
in the interviewees’ accounts, but we shall see in due course that there 
is quite a gap between words and deeds). The candidates described in 
the responses resemble managers with post-ideological features becau-
se problem-solving, and the capability to get things done ignore the 
ideological affiliation of one specific candidate (Barisione 2006, 114-
117). Personalization of skills is, hence, focused on the qualities which 
are necessary for a candidate in performing his function, since he will 
be held accountable more for what he has done than for what he is. Mo-
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reover, even when the applicant’s personality matters, this is because 
of the personal history and biography of the candidate work as proofs 
of the necessary skills, or the lack thereof. The functional approach in 
choosing a candidate seems to derive from by a resent towards a politi-
cal class which for many southerner voters, failed first and foremost as 
a ruling class, thereby producing a lag in economic development which, 
in some parts of the Mezzogiorno, looks unbridgeable. Older people 
tend to choose on the basis of the competences of an individual leader 
as a need for keeping candidates accountable, and as a response to a po-
litical system seems old and distant. In some respects, this phenomenon 
concurs in a broader process of “unfreezing” of electoral blocks whi-
ch were typical of the First and Second Republic (D’Alimonte 2013). 
However, leafing through the interviews, one can also recognize the 
way in which younger voters assess capabilities, especially when well 
educated. In this case, the search for competent leaders seems to be 
more a general inclination than a consequence of the perceived inef-
ficiency of the political system. While it is problematic to extrapolate 
general motives which orient votes according to the competencies of a 
candidate, the next chapter will delve deep into the expectations which 
accompany the act of voting. However, all the interviews show a shared 
need for capable leaders, to face up to a troublesome economic phase 
and a recent past of misgovernment. Moreover, voters who are more at-
tentive to skills and competencies lack the desire for sympathy with the 
candidates, to find common ground with them, in short, to find shared 
values and beliefs such as justice, equality or honesty. The biggest dif-
ference between this latter group of respondents and the ones oriented 
by the personalization of leadership might be this: trust, humanity, and 
charisma are precisely the defining features of an appealing leader.
I 1 (M, 47, public employee in the Region) “I mean Rita 
(Borsellino) made many mistakes but she never compromi-
sed herself, but she is left aside …Salvo climbed higher, but 
for me, it’s a disappointment, I mean surely I’ll always be 
grateful to him for what he’s done, but …(Crocetta) no …he 
is just wrong; he was not consistent” 
I 4 (M, 46, policeman) “One that we voted for eagerly, and 
who is no longer with us, we supported him …a good boy 
M.T., a person with bright ideas … strong personality, he 
was too the child of an old manager of the Italian Social 
Movement, sadly a disgrace deprived us of his presence, 
but as long as he has been alive, we supported him” .
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I 9 (F, 58, LSU) “We got to know her in the Union, and they 
introduced this girl to us …sincerely I did not know anyone, 
and I said ‘OK, no problem’ and I voted for her frankly …
you know a very well-behaved girl, she made an excellent 
impression” .
I 11 (F, 60, retired) “Yes, all in all …has to be a decent 
person, one you can trust, an honest, clean person, which is 
not very common in politics now, a clean person who then 
should administer a local community so, for example the 
healthcare assessor has to manage, I mean everyone has 
his role to play” .
I 12 (M 70, entrepreneur) “I remember Lombardi … a 
young leader … at the student dormitory he was able to 
impress, to inspire … to exalt masses, I liked him, he gave 
speeches, back then there was also Emma Bonino, and she 
too was appreciated when I was a boy” .
I 13 (M, 61, janitor) “He was a good mayor and a good 
teacher … I have wonderful memories of an outgoing per-
son…as far as I remember, the mayor was not paid for his 
job back then, he did it for the good of the town, so he used 
to be a teacher in the morning and working in city hall in 
the afternoon, for example” .
I 14 (F, 48, teacher) “Craxi…they got rid of him … because 
maybe he wanted to move too many things… but he was a 
leader, a strong leader, I liked him as a person, his ideas, I 
mean he was … he left an impression on me, maybe because 
I was younger, so that was what I thought about the most” .
I 15 (F 46, doctor) “I repeat it, what takes me in is the 
contact, the direct knowledge of the person, I want to see 
whether he has a strong personality … you might take me 
for a silly person, but for example, the Pope is a leader … 
yes, the Pope, but not as the chief of the church, I mean as a 
leader … in society … I mean he talks to people” .
I 19 (F 69, retired) “I remember when we went to assem-
blies, we saw them (Christian Democracy’s MPs from our 
territory) a model. They told us things that fascinated us, 
and that impersonated our desires such as having a house, 
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a family, our ideals, and we saw in them a warranty … of 
reliability, of future, that warranty that is not provided to-
day anymore” .
I 21 (F 26, teacher) “I mean especially if he is from my 
same town … also if he is in the Democratic Party … but 
let’s say that, as I told, you, he has to convey a certain idea 
of justice, of equity and that he will do good things, I don’t 
care about the party, it’s enough that you will do good thin-
gs for the people, for the area, then I don’t care about your 
color” .
I 24 (F 64, clerk) “That Di Maio …he seems pretentious, 
and the Tuscan guy who always shows off … instead, the 
President of the Republic is such a fantastic figure … I like 
him, reliable, silent, serious, he inspires me with severity 
and professionalism, for sure he is not a braggart, the op-
posite of the Tuscan who always brags about” .
I 25 (M, 51, tourist operator) “Look, first comes trust and 
honesty, a candidate has to inspire me this, and I want to 
know as much as I can on his life … because facts prove 
more that words, that he lives up to the challenge and he 
can be a guide for the community” .
I 31 (F, 51, teacher) “A leader that fascinates me … who 
can captivate me, such as Meloni, I like her because she 
has this style, frank, fresh and young, and a good commu-
nication technique and yes … the rhetoric, speaking in pu-
blic, regardless if you deliver on what your promise, that is 
another matter, but rhetoric, damn it, counts a lot” .
I 34 (M 74, retired) “Let’s put it clear, in this time leader-
ship is also important … without strong leaders, even a 
bit authoritarian, it doesn’t work … I mean you don’t go 
anywhere without it” .
I 37 (F, 57 LSU) “He has to be a simple, straightforward 
person … how can I put it … he has to move me, this is why 
I think that the old public speeches still need to be made 
nowadays, keeping contact with people, you need to look 
into their eyes, not on TV … people like Enrico (Berlin-
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guer), such a great person, he was never angry, but he tau-
ght us things CRY INTERRUPTION” .
I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) “Sure…Vendola I 
mean I understood his charisma, his linguistic style … I 
would have kept on listening to him for hours … yes I mean 
I was fascinated, I thought and I hoped that he would have 
become the leader of the Democratic Party, on the other 
side I like Renzi … yes his dynamism and his immediateness 
of his communication style” .
I 49 (M 57, unemployed) “Mmmh … how to say, a person 
has to be … how to define … has to inspire trust, meaning 
he has to be the honesty, an upright person, present in the 
territory as an active commitment no? As a duty, so consi-
stent with what he actually says” .
I 52 (M, 29 teacher) “Honesty is a fundamental first step, 
but the candidate also has to have ideas, he needs to be ca-
pable and to have some honesty and personal dignity that 
allows him to present himself, I think with my mind, and I 
see him as a person to respect but who should never crush 
voters’ dignity … and then he also needs to have some cha-
risma and knowing how to use it, a bit of sentiment, he has 
to warm hearts” .
 These fragments convey a strong predisposition towards perso-
nalism in politics, especially based on personal, character features of a 
leader’s personality. The voter considers as indispensable some emotio-
nal elements such as trust, honesty, humanity and other features which, 
in some respects, transcend the skills proper to a politician, understood 
as an administrator of the public goods or as representing the interests 
of a given constituency. However, also, in this case, it is possible to 
point out different orientations towards personalization of the leader. As 
a matter of fact, in some accounts, the relationship between the leader 
and the voter is based on the former’s capability to be a guide, an in-
fluential chief. This image of the chief is more “performing” (Barisione 
2016, 116), meaning that the leader projects a solid image in the public 
space, that he can be a guide and to attract voters who are very sensitive 
to the image of a strong leader. Moreover, the interviewees are willing 
to delegate to this type of political leaders because voters recognize 
his outstanding leadership, his capacity to move and trigger emotions 
in voters, also thanks to an extraordinary ability to use mass media to 
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convey his message. In other interviews, the leader emerges as a rather 
different figure: his role is that of providing an example, a testimony of 
his being distinct from the very community he represents (Weber 1922, 
Barisione 2006). In this case, trust, honesty, uprightness and cleanli-
ness are often referred to, and the relationship with the leader is less 
that of a super-delegation to a super-man, and more of identification 
of the voters with the leader, by finding common ground with him. In 
some respects, this kind of leadership seems to be less thought-throu-
gh and more emotional, while still searching for identification between 
the qualities, values, and beliefs of the candidate and the ones of the 
individual voter. It is important to define what one believes to be his/
her set of values and beliefs because some interviewees show a variable 
discrepancy between what said and what done.
I 26 (M, 67, retailer) “What do I want? Honesty … people 
who go there have, to be honest!!!” – “We won the alloca-
tion of a contract for the school canteen…but I only did it to 
help my brother …I know that it was screwed up…you pay 
a bribe there, a gift here and to make money out of it, we 
needed to add milk and minced bread to the hamburgers, to 
increase the weight without adding too much meat” . 
I 51 (M 25, unemployed) “Sure I mean they should be ho-
nest, come on I grew up with the myth of Borsellino” – “I 
think that M. and D.M. never created what is wrong in this 
territory…then sure what should you do? You have to cope 
with these people… and then, at most, if you make a mistake 
you’ll pay the price” .
 The purpose of this section is not to fact-check the honesty of 
the responses, but it is important to underline that the accounts unveil 
also the contradictions and discrepancies which are not surprising. 
What matters, however, is that these discrepancies between wishes and 
practices in real life, ought to be taken into consideration because they 
emerge from the very words and minds of the voters. The two sub-
groups also differentiate for the orientation towards the elections, and 
for how they behave after the elections. Those voters who prioritize 
personalization of skills, on one side, and personalization of leadership, 
on the other, are differentiated on one more aspect:
I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) “If I keep myself in-
formed after the vote? …mmmmh yes sure I follow in par-
ticular what happens to the problems…yes I mean if the 
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situation improves” .
I 54 (F, 36, unemployed) “Yes, sure I check them, especially 
on structural issues … maybe not the very next day, I mean 
complex things do not …” 
 Voters who are more attentive to skills and competencies were 
also more sensitive to the actual deeds of a representative. Hence it 
was necessary for them to fact-check their actions after the elections. 
Naturally, one cannot infer a general rule that associates the “ex-post 
control” to the competence-oriented personal vote. However, it is still 
important to notice that the latter group of participants never refers to a 
need for a check on the behavior of the leader in office, not even after 
elections. If the first cluster of interviews showed a more rational rela-
tionship between the elector and the representative and considered the 
facts, in the second one the link seems to be exhausted in the emotional 
transport and charge that the leader can exert on the constituency.
5.2  Universal and Selective Benefits in the Interviews
 In the first part of this chapter, we focused on the several diffe-
rent types of personalism. In this section, on the other side, the stress 
will be put on the nature of the benefits which are expected to come out 
from different voting choices, and which in turn orient voters towards 
one candidate or the other. While the first part of the chapter treated 
the various types of personalism as ideal-typical poles in a continuum, 
this section will take a different stance, for several reasons. First, the 
expected benefits are very diverse and vary between universal and high 
aims such as justice and equity, and much more particular objectives, 
such as a job or the remaking of a street. Second, interviews refer more 
often to universal benefits than to specific ones, and this gives a first 
tentative answer to the research question, i.e. the existence of a perso-
nal vote motivated by universal benefits. While a complete and ordered 
reply to the research question will emerge in due course, the next pages 
will focus on describing the types of benefits. This typology will en-
tail a higher degree of abstraction, especially when question solicits the 
respondent to provide more detail to their account. As said before, the 
literature classifies expected benefits according to who can profit from 
them, and how much, i.e. based on the exclusiveness and subtractability 
of the gains. However, the responses do not follow this scheme, and 
it would be difficult to classify the answers according to the typology 
presented by the available literature (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994, 
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Golden 2003). For this reason, we will proceed in a clear-cut way, by 
sharply differentiating between particular and universal benefits.
5.2.1  Particularistic Benefits
 In this first group of interviews, we can recognize some of the 
characteristic elements of clientelism and, in some respects, also the 
principal features of the object of the political bargain between a candi-
date and a voter, as expected (and, in some cases, as obtained) by some 
voters:
I 33 (M, 62, redundant non-retired) “Initially, I dealt with 
S.M., Christian Democrat, and during the worst period for 
me, because back then I used to work for a private company 
and I was in a great situation … then I lost my job, and 
he came to me to give me my outstanding job … I sear-
ched after every politician, to the left or the right. First, for 
myself, because I was unemployed and he used to say let’s 
meet in 15 days, and he used to help comrades for his ca-
reer, yes him, Christian Democrat, gave jobs to comrades, 
it is true, I can sign that! He gave jobs to comrades. Hence 
we were his electors because we went to him because we 
needed a job” . 
I 45 (M, 34, unemployed) “It is not the methods that I like, 
also because I know people who have been helped … a litt-
le help, not an open-ended job contract. I was never of-
fered this kind of job, something small after graduation if 
you want to give a consultancy for two or three months, 
something small eh, nothing significant…I know a friend of 
mine who worked a bit in the public office for mountain-ca-
re, a part-time job for 200/300 € a month eh…but no, I wa-
sn’t offered crap” .
I 51 (M, 21 student) “I’m not surprised at all that someo-
ne from Benevento comes here and asks for a job, I’m not 
upset at all…” 
R: “Really?”  
I 51 “M. just responded to need. M. did not invent clien-
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telism in this city, whenever he created it. M. responded to 
need, a necessity; he reacted to poverty, D.M. did the same, 
N. did the same, arguably with different tools and in various 
ways” .
I 52 (M, 29 engineer and teacher) “The former mayor, I did 
not ask for a job, he came to me. Now, I don’t know why he 
chose me, maybe because I supported him…I don’t know, 
but I didn’t beg for anything” .
I 30 (F, 38, janitor) “I would do it as well; I would ask if he 
can do anything for my husband …yes and then I wonder 
‘and the others?’ Because it is wrong, because my husband 
is not the only one…but meanwhile, I think … than now we 
are in the save-yourself-if-you-can mood” .
 All the fragments would deserve a deep analysis since each re-
sponse should be contextualized within their specific setting, to com-
prehend reality as depicted in each conversation. The most often recur-
ring feature seems to be jobs and income, hence not a direct, monetary, 
una tantum benefit, but rather the search for a stable career. For sure 
jobs understood as particular benefits do not rule out other expected 
benefits: in fact, it is not uncommon to retrieve, in the words of the 
participants, lucid accounts of electoral bargains based on gasoline or 
pasta. Jobs, however, remains central because even in those voters who 
are motivated by universal benefits, jobs are central. When it comes to 
the individual career of one specific voter, two elements are crucial. 
First, the mechanism which connects a politician to a job opportunity 
is widely acknowledged and accepted by voters. What might change 
is the level of awareness of this connection so that, for example, I 33 
has always had a clientelist relation, while for I 34 the need for a job 
derives from a protracted situation of unemployment, dating back from 
graduation. Second, jobs represent an answer to a no-way-out situation, 
and they are the last hope for many voters. It is very complex to convey 
the expressions, pauses, emphasis and all who comes into play in an 
interview. However, it is easy to spot how economic unrest, precarious 
life conditions and frustrated expectations for the future emerged, not 
always in an expressed way, throughout the interview, such as with in-
formants 30, 45 and 33. Especially this last consideration might lead 
this research astray: it is the nature of particular benefits that is of inte-
rest here, and not the specific situations in which these needs emerge. 
However, it is impossible not to account for the specific, fine-grained 
differences between each interview situation. In many cases, the eco-
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nomic hardship which is typical for many areas of the Mezzogiorno 
is called forth by interviewees, with some digressions about Equita-
lia, mortgages, and other everyday-life financial problems. The internal 
dynamics of the realities experienced by voters are beyond the scope 
of this research, yet it is impossible not to describe the context within 
which these phenomena unravel. The desperate search for a stable job 
precisely answers to the chronic lack of opportunities and to the severe 
economic conditions which characterized entire generations of southern 
voters.
 5.2.2 Universal Benefits
 As outlined above, universal benefits are the protagonist of elec-
toral expectations of the clear majority of voters. Among the 64 inter-
views, at least 44 respondents provided universalist motives for their 
electoral choices. Also, in this case, we will concentrate on the nature 
of the universal benefits while leaving to the next chapter the consi-
derations on the existence of a personal vote motivated by universal 
expected benefits. However, it is important to provide some premises to 
clarify the forthcoming concepts. First, the abundance of electors who 
seems to be motivated by universal aims might be artificially inflated by 
the social desirability of answering the questions for universal benefits 
(Corbetta 2003, Bryman 2008). In other words, some contradictions 
emerged in some interviews, yet for now we can only say that despite 
the potential social desirability bias in the answers, they seem to be 
mostly consistent and non-contrived. It is no coincidence, then, that 
jobs are a common theme for electors sensitive to particular and uni-
versal benefits alike. The second element concerns the classification of 
the different types of universal benefits, as described in the interviews 
or, as it would be more correct to say, the lack of said classification. 
In the next pages, it will become apparent that any definition of the 
benefits, e.g. based on a qualitative criterion – such as more or less 
universal benefits. For this reason, this work does not provide a sub-set 
of categories within the umbrella term of universal benefit. Instead, to 
facilitate the interpretation of the interviews, an analytical distinction 
will be proposed between programmatic universal benefits and ideal 
universal benefits, to distinguish between more concrete requests such 
as jobs (for everyone, for the youth, and so forth), and more idealist and 
value-charged expectations.
I 1(M, 47, clerk in the regional administration) “For a start, 
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a politician has to bring jobs, because I got interested in the 
study of the labor market, processes of globalization which 
concern everyone, to make a fridge…today they are made 
by robots” .
I 2 (M, 48, civil servant) “Tourism, I would like that poli-
ticians of S. invested in tourism, also as an opportunity for 
cultural and educational exchanges. If we think about the 
Silicon Valley in the US, who’s there? People from all over 
the world, the globalization of culture” .
I 3 (M 53, LSU) “Bringing back labor rights, those rights 
that have been canceled, reinvesting in education that is 
now crumbling, from 2008 onwards, but it got even worse 
since Renzi is the President…that was worse, he destroyed 
everything in the few years he has been in office” .
I 4 (M, 46, policeman) “Considering that in the country, 
in this region, in this city the biggest problem is work, this 
being said the priority is to create jobs, even though I rea-
lize it’s hard, because here in Sicily there is this ‘permanent 
job’ culture, and this is something that penalized us a lot …
and then healthcare, because this is also a very sensitive 
topic, because my father in law was in Padova and was 
treated, and there is an abyss between their standards and 
the Sicilian standards” . 
I 5 (M, 73 priest) “I would expect that (he) knew how to 
involve all the creative and active energies, such as uni-
versities, technical and scientific institutions, to write down 
the zone project, I mean now we are talking again about 
typicality, how do I figure out which are the starting points 
for new wealth if there is no one that tells me ‘this is the 
way’?” .
I 6 (M, 28, small entrepreneur) “An expediting of bureau-
cracy is needed, and all in all Apulia is the region in Italy 
that, in some respects, favored and caused the crisis, becau-
se in some way we fooled ourselves” .
I 11 (F, 60, retired) “First thing for me is jobs, then he-
althcare. Hospitals that work, the right to a healthy life, 
regardless of the latitude where you live and where you get 
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sick” .
I 13 (M, 61, school janitor) “First, creating jobs for young 
people, who do not know what to cling on to, and it isn’t 
right that our children, my children included, went away, 
with three kids I don’t have even one close to my house” .
I 14 (F, 48, teacher) “(Bringing back) services to the terri-
tory, that do not work anymore jobs for the youth, because 
otherwise all the negative things follow, such as crime and 
so on” .
I 15 (F, 46, doctor) “I’m interested in infrastructure; to 
make us all work better, that would already be an excellent 
aim. Without going into detail, I’m not talking about rubbi-
sh, we could make a lot of examples, but trying to change 
the image of the city. I say ok with creating jobs, but I think 
that we also have to invent jobs” .
I 17 (M, 72, retired) “Any initiative which favors employ-
ment, any initiative which creates jobs, any at all because 
the South and Taranto are dying because of this…maybe the 
excessive propensity towards industrial development of Ta-
ranto has to be thought again, made compatible with other 
needs, but it’s not possible to see that every day someone 
arrives and makes up a new idea” .
I 18 (F, 56, retail representative) “It can be trivial, but jobs 
can give hope to young people, for example, I firmly believe 
in young people, young people who are starting again to 
love agriculture but with machinery and technology, so hel-
ping these youngsters who believe in organic agriculture” .
I 19 (F, 69, retired) “I would like that politicians were more 
attentive to the territory, because it looks very neglected, 
and there are no jobs, and those few jobs are so temporary 
and precarious that they don’t help society in living better, 
so there is a lot of crime because there are no jobs … but 
tourism … I mean at least a train that goes to Milan and 
to Turin and to Rome …we’re cut out from the rest of the 
world” .
I 20 (M, 43, lawyer) “Yes, a different politics and to start 
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now … looking a bit to my job, considering the fiscal sy-
stem, it has to be thrown away because the policy of raising 
the fiscal pressure is suicidal. We cannot fight against tax 
evasion I mean no shit, sorry for my French, if you increase 
fiscal pressure it’s obvious” .
I 22 (F, 59, small retailer) “They should do more practical 
things and help entrepreneurs, let’s say in the construction 
industry because this sector is now stuck and there are too 
many taxes to pay, even for people who construct buildings 
for a living, there is the need for these people to get back 
to work” .
I 23 (M, 21, student) “I believe that the battle to fight should 
be the one for a universal basic income, but not of the kind 
proposed by Emiliano, which is a familist, insufficient poli-
cy, I mean a truly universal income” .
I 24 (F 64, clerk) “They should cut useless expenditures. 
They must get rid of them. Expenditures … but this anyo-
ne can say it, any reasonable person, I’m just saying what 
everyone says” . 
I 26 (M, 67, retailer) “The labor market has to work, jobs 
who are not nepotistic or based on connections, because of 
all the people with connections they just sit down and don’t 
do shit. They just go there and waste their time … streets 
are dirty, trash is not collected, they don’t do anything be-
cause they avoid job. Order, reliability, professionalism, it’s 
like family: if the head of the household does not provide a 
positive example, the whole family falls apart” .
 I 29 (F, 32, social worker) “If we think about the Region I 
would like to be more vigilant about European Funds, whi-
ch are divided among the regions and then invested, and 
Calabria did not participate because the MPs or the Regio-
nal Councilors …for example if someone deals with social 
issues, for instance, social policy, has to look into it and see 
whether there is a fund for that, I mean really caring about 
the territory, about the region and the only thing I expect 
from any party is to think about citizens, using anything we 
have, instead of putting money in your pocket” .
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I 31(F, 51, teacher) “First, prioritizing young people, so I 
think employment is a real plague, a new financial policy 
to provide new jobs because I think society depends on the 
jobs young people do” .
I 35 (F, 27 student) “Jobs are the top priority because it’s 
normal that when I, from Naples, I cannot find a job but I 
have to provide for my family. I will make do with the worst 
things (crimes), also because there are those who say I’d 
rather scrape by than surrender myself to dodgy things … 
and then the quality of life, now I talk to you about Naples 
because I know it, and I assure you that going out at night 
… it isn’t nice to go out at night and to see the military pa-
trolling in front of the squares” .
I 36 (M 52, doctor) “The first thing that politicians have to 
do is to cut taxes, because of the fiscal pressure they say it’s 
at the same level, but inflation ate it up … this is something 
that back in the 80s … how did they call it? Oh yes, depre-
ciation” .
I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) “I would like more 
attention towards the territory since our land is currently 
suffering from environmental problems, both at the local 
and the district level, because the town I live in, I mean now 
there is this issue to sort out (ILVA)” .
I 40 (M, 20, student) “For a start, I’d ask the Prime Mini-
ster to raise public expenditure. First and foremost, educa-
tion, healthcare, infrastructure, since our country is lag-
ging behind, especially in some areas like Calabria, Apulia, 
Sicily, the railroad for example” .
I 41 (M, 44, unemployed) “Things to do? For example, let’s 
get real …on a hot issue, don’t go in circles, and the hot 
issue is always the same because people have to provide 
for their family, bring bread to the table, and the rest gets 
sorted out slowly, one step at a time … when people work 
and provide, they also start to smile” .
I 42 (F, 26, student) “From my own experience, let’s say that 
culture is at the center of everything, let’s say in particular 
in this territory, and then culture as all-encompassing, so 
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also thought as education, as access to culture events like 
movies, theaters, books and so on, for example in Barletta 
they have a good experiment on an education basic inco-
me” .
I 43 (F, 31, student-worker) “From the top of my head…
more incentives for youngsters, anything that helps me de-
fining my life project, so opening a business, inventing so-
mething, producing something, and that they give me the 
opportunity of using public spaces, I mean like in Naples 
something I’d like is to have a list of the public areas at 
disposal and that the city hall makes them available” .
I 44 (M, 35, unemployed) “For example, I appreciated De 
Magistris because he improved tourism in Naples, and that 
was a huge improvement…there are friends of mine who 
settled down thanks to Airbnb” .
I 46 (M, 51, school janitor) “Top priorities are improving 
people’s quality of life, so sport, stadiums, bike lanes, pede-
strian zones, parks and this kind of stuff” .
I 47 (M 35, school janitor) “In a civil country, there should 
be services, first thing…Streets, hospitals, schools and so. 
Then after that other things like the football stadium, as a 
stupid example, can wait” .
I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur) “Two facilities…since there is an 
evolution of the environment, and Roccella obtained a lot of 
mentions for the investment on environment what? There is 
a purification facility? There is waste recycling, we do not 
have to throw away wet waste” .
I 53 (F 30, unemployed) “Maybe even a few connections 
with the city, we have very few connections, only a coach 
which passes by and makes a long journey, one is forced to 
use cars like to go to Naples because a two hours’ bus ride 
is huge …politicians should focus on this” .
I 55 (M 57, clochard) “Having a better future…for a start, 
are you from Palermo? Ok then start doing things for Pa-
lermo, if he has this mentality, then he can do good things 
for these people” .
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I 56 (F 36, dentist) “The other day I was talking to two 
friends of mine, both lesbian, about a problem I mean that 
now it is a national issue we were talking about the fact 
that they want a baby …indeed politicians should sort these 
problems out …because heterosexual people think this does 
not concern me, what do I care, but many suffer for this, 
and this is not fair” .
I 57 (F, 62, psychologist) “You politician have to tell me, 
before ‘I want to do this’, great dreams, great utopias, but 
then they organize the practice to achieve that aim, then 
they cannot think about the here and now, the emergency, 
not watch at anything else, because then you lose all the 
passion, politics becomes crisis, money, the mayor becomes 
a mere administrator …and that’s not good” .
I 60 (F 23, student) “OK, for example, the first thing of the 
reallocation of seized Mafia properties or unused buildin-
gs, which in Bari are quite frequent, to give them to people 
who use them for habitation, but also to associations, coo-
peratives, institutions which can put them to the benefit of 
everyone” .
 What stands out from these quotes, as already said at the begin-
ning of this section, is the heterogeneous nature of the expected uni-
versal benefits. Healthcare, jobs, cuts on taxes, and services like public 
transportation, hygiene, recreational, cultural centers: they all are the 
protagonists of the interviews, since they represent examples of com-
mon resources and public goods  (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994). Mo-
reover the interviews  revolve around two macro-themes: on the one 
side, the omnipresent theme of labor, which characterizes much of the 
responses and, on the other hand, the need for public services. Before 
going deeper into these topics, it is necessary to contextualize the an-
swers. Jobs and services are the problems of the Mezzogiorno, and this 
should not surprise us very much, also considering the data presented 
in several studies on the South of Italy, which shed light on the chronic 
unemployment, especially the growing youth lack of occupation, as de-
scribed by the latest official statistics.
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5.2.3  Labor
 Both universal and particular benefits revolve around the cen-
tral role played by jobs and employment. The main difference is that 
labor understood as a public policy is considered, in general, hence not 
targeted on a specific person or family, which, conversely, was the case 
for the voters interested in achieving particular benefits. This distin-
ction is paramount because it draws a line between reaching personal 
satisfaction, on one side and achieving common benefits on the other. 
This differentiation is even more necessary for employment, which is 
defined either as irreplaceable to avoid social marginalization, or as the 
principal way to conduct a decent life. Obviously, the request for jobs 
addressed at politicians takes different forms and shades. Jobs can be 
understood either as easy and quick to fulfill, or as more vague expecta-
tions of labor known as the consequence of a set of suitable conditions 
for employment. In this latter case, politicians are but one set of actors 
out of many which can ease the unemployment choke. Moreover, many 
interviews spend some time in defining priorities and pointing out in-
dustrial sectors (culture, green economy and so on), which should form 
the priorities for active policies for employment.
 Last, it is important to define labor as the object of a political 
bargain between voters and candidates. We will take up this topic again 
in the last chapter but, for now, it is important to mention that labor 
and employment are considered, by the clear majority of interviewe-
es, as only possible thanks to the conduct and choices of politicians. 
This inherently disempowering view concerning job creation reveals 
the complex nature of universal benefits which, in some cases might 
assume a parasitic nature, and in none of the transcriptions one gets the 
willingness to create a job or an opportunity without waiting for some 
help from above.
5.2.4  Services and Healthcare
 Another set of themes revolves around the territory in which the 
services which insist. First and foremost, healthcare and the difficul-
ty in accessing medications are often-recurring topics. More important 
still, the inadequate healthcare, or its lack altogether, are always put 
in comparison with the situation in the Center-North of Italy, where 
better services are in place, or at least this is conveyed by the accounts 
provided in the interviews. Besides the healthcare theme, many uni-
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versal benefits expected by southerner voters concern transportation, 
specifically for those who live in the outskirts or the countryside around 
the major cities. Conversely, in big conurbations, the emphasis is often 
placed upon solid waste and its disposal, the lack of recreational spaces, 
especially for the youth. Many other cases explicitly mention territo-
rial and environmental care, especially in some specific communities. 
For example, in Taranto, the ILVA theme recurs very often not only in 
the interviewees’ words, but also as an omnipresent issue in the city. 
The alarming pollution indexes, tumors and cancers diffusion, and the 
dramatic sanitary conditions make the local population very sensitive 
to environmental complications since they form an integral part of the 
everyday life. All participants share the willingness to enjoy services 
on a collective basis, i.e. they are understood as universal rights and not 
exclusive privileges. Hence, politicians are requested to take charge of 
their management also because all citizens are also taxpayers. Also in 
the case of public transportation and services to individuals, there is a 
clear nexus between the lack of said services and the consequent need 
for them. In fact, even without a mention of the data concerning the 
infrastructural lag of the South, this is an all too well known issue for 
those who live in this part of Italy. Also in this case, different voters are 
endowed with different orientations on the matter: if elder voters trust 
politicians completely, meaning that they uncritically delegate to politi-
cians the responsibility for success or failure of infrastructures such as a 
street or a highway, among younger electors there is a stronger need for 
proposing specific project, often connected to European funds (such as 
the FAS funds), which are seen as a particular opportunity which law-
makers should consider, and which they too often do not. In substance, 
the universal character of the expected benefits is connoted by some 
key elements which deeply shape the very universality of the benefit: 
first, jobs and services are primary needs in modern society, which in 
turn determine the degree of legitimacy of any democratic order. Ar-
guably, constituents who are more sensitive to rights than to privileges 
tend to focus on personal realization (jobs) and wellbeing (services), 
and they ask for this when deciding which politician, understood as a 
policy maker, they will vote for. Moreover, universality of benefits is 
strongly linked to a sense of redemption from the subordinate position 
of the South vis-à-vis the North of Italy. The request for better services, 
notably healthcare, is strongly linked with a sense of “envy” towards 
northern regions. Many interviews stress the unacceptable discrepancy 
between the efficient hospitals in Veneto, Tuscany and Piedmont and 
the decrepit, useless and obsolete of the South. The underlying question 
is often “Why there and not here?” “Why are we not in Italy?” This 
aspect is paramount because it tells us about the need, perceived by 
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this set of participants, for a leap in the quality of life in the South as a 
whole, to produce a collective, universal emancipation.
 Lastly, the universal character of some of the expected benefits 
assumes a more abstract nature. What is often asked, in fact, is an ab-
stract sense of vision and strategy, the capacity of leading the way and 
not just the response to everyday material needs. These benefits, which 
we can define as idealist universal benefits, are considered as irreplace-
able to solve the enormous problems of the southern territories, because 
the social context is often considered as irreparably corrupted, hence not 
amendable with limited and aimed interventions. In these cases, values 
such as legality and honesty are often referred to. In some respects, the 
voter-candidate relation is not grounded on tangible goods such as jobs 
and services, but rather on a narrative, an idea which can improve the 
conditions of an entire community, rather than its individual members. 
It is important to underline this feature of universal benefits because it 
outlines the diverse nature that universal benefits can assume. To expect 
a politician to be an efficient and effective problem solver, in fact, it is 
strikingly different from wanting an all-encompassing redemption of 
one’s community and describing it as arid and lifeless.
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chapter Vi
In their own words: three types of voters, and… 
6.1 Clientelism
 The former chapter unpacked the two dimensions outli-
ned in Table (NUMBER)’s typology of voting behavior in 
relation to universal vs. particular benefits and ideological 
vs. personal vote. The interviewees’ words corroborated 
said typology, in they described different degrees of per-
sonalism and the peculiarities of the several different types 
of personalism. Then, the chapter proceeded to analyze the 
nature of the expected benefits and to describe either their 
particularist or universalist nature. In this chapter, conver-
sely, the aim will be to analyze the interviews through the 
above said typology. The words of the participants, hence, 
will be interpreted and pigeon-holed in accordance with 
the four types of voting behavior. In so doing, I will try to 
address the research question by showing the presence of 
a universalist personal vote. While a direct answer to the 
research question will emerge in the seventh chapter, in this 
part of the dissertation I will describe the other three types 
of votes, i.e. clientelism, party-oriented vote, and patrona-
ge. The first group under scrutiny regards voters in quadrant 
a) of the table. Among this group of the electorate, one or 
more sets of choices attached to voting were undoubtedly 
endowed with typical features of the clientelist bargain, as 
abundantly described in the literature (Caciagli 2006, Piat-
toni 2007, Golden 2003). Hence, personal relations are the 
cornerstone of the political bargain, whereby the client gi-
ves a vote in exchange for a particular and immediate bene-
fit from the patron. However, each interview and interview 
situation comprehended unique features which deserve de-
eper unpacking.
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6.1.1  Clientelism as a system
 The following interview outlines a systemic clientelism, deeply 
embedded in the social context and, especially, with the labor market. 
From the words of the interviewee, it emerges a full consent to the 
universe of practices and behaviors in the social context, hence to the 
clientelist system as a useful instrument for both voters and candidates.
I 33 (M, 62, income-deprived early retiree): “I dealt with, 
can I say the name?”
R: “Sure.”
I 33: With S.M., Christian Democrat, elected president of 
Sicily, then charged for a dodgy deal over the industrial 
district, and in all my dark period, because I was fired. […] 
I was working for a private company, and I was doing just 
fine, and he came for the famous position, and I saw how he 
thought, a rightist, then I also got to know other people to 
the left, and the last one to the right was once our assessor, 
F.G., who maybe was one to the left of the right so to say, 
because he did something always with his personal interest 
in mind.”
R: “Meaning?”
I 33: “Meaning, I don’t know, that he provided me some 
public funding for tourist structures, but then he indirectly 
imposed me the people I needed to hire. I am aware that this 
is a strong accusation.”
R: “What did you not like?”
I 33: “This discourse of imposing people in my company, it 
sounded like ‘I provided you with money, but now you have 
to give me a job.’ It’s a vicious circle, self-funding so to spe-
ak. I give money to you; you give them back to me. I don’t 
know; there was another politician I was on friendly terms 
with, because I am friend with everyone here, and everyone 
called him ‘Mr. 5%’.”
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R: “Why?”
I 33: “Because he kept for himself 5% of every funding he 
provided.”
 The scenario which emerges from these words, is clearly a com-
plex relational universe, which seems to work in a very natural and 
spontaneous way. The elements which deserve attention are several, but 
the clientelist nature of the electoral bargain is the most important one. 
The implicit bargain is between support from the client in exchange for 
job opportunities from the politician. Especially striking is the natu-
ralness of said mechanism, which transforms the individual clientelist 
relationship into a systemic dynamic. Second, clientelism appears as 
systemic because of its closed nature, a “vicious circle,” as described 
by the interviewee, whereby the voter, after having secured the funding, 
has to share it with the other clients of the same politician. In other 
words, the interviewee does not describe a simple one-to-one relation 
between the voter and the candidate, but rather a multifold, multilayered 
system of connections where clients are forced to interact and divide a 
selective benefit, hence particularist in nature. In short, the clientelist 
system appears to be extraordinarily rooted, recognized and socially 
accepted from the interviewee: apart from some isolated passages of the 
interview, there are not critical remarks towards this system and, when 
they emerge, they are more connected to the wrong way of functioning 
of the system.
I 33 “I chased after various politicians, left and right, for 
a job for me because I was unemployed. He would mock 
me and tell me ‘we’ll see each other in 15 days’, and for 
his career helped comrades, yes he, Christian Democrat, 
gave jobs to comrades, it is all true I can testify it, he gave 
jobs to comrades, but us, his electors so to speak, no […] 
he thought these people with the hope of a job they’ll vote 
me, the others no.”
 Once again, the critique of this system is more concerned with 
the lousy way the system works. The evaluation of politicians is nega-
tive only regarding how jobs are distributed, where some choices are 
deemed to be unjust and unfair. This account, hence, strongly resembles 
the one testified by several studies on clientelism, and it shows how 
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such a system, when deeply rooted, becomes a long-term condition and 
not only connected to elections.
6.1.2 Clientelism as authority over a territory
 The following interview is striking for two reasons: first, the 
clientelist phenomenon is widely acknowledged by the interviewee. 
Moreover, this phenomenon is not just merely accepted, but rather there 
is a more comprehensive positive evaluation of clientelism as a useful 
tool for governing a territory. In this interview, several elements are 
worth emphasis, but maybe the most proper comparison can be made 
with De Filippo’s play “The Mayor of Rione Sanità.”
I 51 “I make an example from theatre plays because I see 
these people, there is this play by Eduardo De Filippo cal-
led “The Mayor of Rione Sanità,” there is this guy in the 
neighborhood, Rione Sanità, who as a child committed 
some petty crimes […] then one day he kills the chief who 
would always humiliate him, and through false witnesses 
manages to save himself, despite having killed in response 
to an injustice, and after that moment he keeps sorting out 
the problems in his neighborhood. What does this “Mayor” 
do? His home works as the stadium of a psychologist, a 
lawyer, a politician: he welcomes those in need, the victims 
of shark creditors, and thanks to his power he can sort out 
their problems. One needs to analyze this better, I see D.M., 
M. in my view is like the Mayor of Rione Sanità. I mean they 
are part of a corrupt system, even wrong, but thanks to their 
corrupt and wicked system, problems are solved.”
 These last extracts describe clientelism as authority over a ter-
ritory because they synthetically depict the fundamental of this com-
plex relational universe. First, the patrons, hence the politicians, as the 
Mayor of Rione Sanità, ground their power on non-legal basis and this 
is acknowledged and accepted (Weber) first and foremost because this 
system allows regulating everyday life, solve problems and distribute 
wealth: all in all, the clientelist politician substitute himself to the Sta-
te, while still representing it in his functions of an elected officer. This 
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system, while not based on a legal or legitimate basis, still seems to be 
working somehow, i.e. to answer to demands and expectations of the 
community, and it even appears to be following some meritocratic cri-
teria.
I 51: “They answered to need.”
R:  “need.”
I 51: “They gave answers to a district which was starving. 
I mean a southern city which suffers, always shadowed by 
Naples, by Avellino, by Salerno, which for all these years 
remained a peaceful oasis because of the simple fact that no 
one considered us, but at the same time, they were always 
peeking. They gave answers to need, I mean it’s normal that 
a father, who has not a job, the head of the family, it’s nor-
mal that he expresses this concern to a politician.”
R: “Jobs are a sensitive issue, what does one do in these 
cases?”
I 51: “The state is very different from the private sector … 
because in the first instance, you are an intermediary, in the 
second instance you’re an entrepreneur …I mean I call my 
friend in Ferrari and tell ‘there’s this engineer, do you want 
him?’  I know perfectly well that he’s a badass entrepreneur, 
he doesn’t hire unworthy people … they asked me a profes-
sional figure, and I individuated him, you knew him, and 
I said this is yours if you like, otherwise nothing, no hard 
feelings … do you get what I mean?”
 In substance, the capability of providing jobs is the instrument 
through which a clientelist system becomes active. Hence, the patron 
needs deliver on the promises of jobs; to be attentive to the needs of 
the highest possible number of clients, not only those – politically or 
personally – closer to the candidate. It is highly unlikely that such a sy-
stem will be meritocratic because, no matter the moral considerations, 
the judgment of a politician on the skills and experiences of a person 
may always be faulty, even when inspired by noble aims. This power of 
the politician to choose who to hire, more than promoting meritocracy, 
seems to be a stratagem to justify a profoundly rooted system. This 
system seems to be the sole way to govern processes, as it is repeated 
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more than once throughout the interview, in particular when comparing 
different situations.
 I 51: “I mean, politics as an instrument to augment one’s 
professional power is wrong. Doing politics for these rea-
sons is also wrong, but doing it to promote the wellbeing of 
your community is right. I don’t know what they’re doing, 
if they did it right or wrong, I only know that they influen-
ced the processes, and this made Avellino stronger than us. 
They had a Prime Minister and a good local ruling class 
and everyone felt involved and empowered.”
 
 This competition with Avellino, who had in Ciriaco De Mita a 
strong local and national leader. In these abstracts, clientelism is a tool 
for the care of the territory and, hence, of the constituents who live in 
it. A detailed account of De Mita’s influence and authority in the Avel-
linese territory, and of the relative weakness of Sannio are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, this interviewee seems very impressed 
by the results obtained in Avellino, and he regrets not the system itself, 
but rather the fact that his district never had such vigorous and capable 
leaders. In some respects, the interviewee ascribes to clientelism not 
only illegal behaviors but also a beneficial care for the territory and its 
community, which would be missing if clientelism weren’t in place. 
Marginal areas like Sannio, where clientelism is not diffused, tend to 
become even more peripheral, to the advantage of more sizable com-
munities like Naples or Salerno. Clientelism, hence, is here characteri-
zed as a systematic political structure which, despite not being based on 
traditional patterns of democratic legitimacy and legitimation, is still 
able to make the public administration work for a territory, protect it, 
especially in contexts where the state seems to be missing. As in De 
Filippo’s comedy, various local leaders are like many Mayors of Rione 
Sanità, and they are evaluated and appreciated for their capacity to de-
liver advantages and benefits to the territory and the people who work 
there.
I 51: “I don’t know if De Mita stole anything if the money 
was flowing in Camorra’s direction … I just know …think 
about the highway Naples-Bari, which passes by Avellino 
through the mountains of Parteggio; going from Benevento 
to Naples, you used to spend half an hour doing that, now 
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it’s one hour and a half … this means determining proces-
ses, meaning that you create two gateways in Avellino – 
East and West Avellino, between Tirreno and Adriatico seas 
– and then you buy gasoline in Avellino, you pay fees in 
Avellino, you give jobs to people in Avellino, and so on.”
 The absence of a universal vision by a politician, in this inter-
view, seems to be a genuinely alternative system. The local politician 
manages in a clientelist way the relationships with its constituency; 
then he tries to deliver benefits at the national level for his territory, by 
summing up two particularisms. First, voters are particularist in they do 
not aim for universal benefits, but rather they want to maximize their 
utility. On the other hand, politicians also seek for results, because they 
will bargain with the national government to favor their constituencies, 
even though this implies a disadvantage to the rest of the country. The-
se two aspects reinforce clientelism in they legitimize it, and make it 
even preferable to other forms of authority over the territory. Moreover, 
voters have a direct connection with a candidate, and they can evaluate 
policy outcome in a very simple way.
 Finally, some considerations on the age and features of the interviewee 
are necessary. In the case of systemic clientelism outlined above, the 
participant had a rather low level of education (middle school) and 
experimented clientelism for a long time (he was 68). Conversely, the 
second interviewee (and the next one) was 24, with only little political 
experience, and enrolled in a study program which forced him to be 
away from Sannio for long periods. This difference is significant be-
cause the legitimacy of clientelism is deeply diffused, even in people 
who experienced it only rarely and for short periods of time. Moreover, 
clientelism does not seem to be fought against by young people.
6.1.3 “Desperate” Clientelism
 The last interview outlined here – which describe the presence 
of clientelist behavior – is somehow the most difficult to unpack. The 
interviewee is 34, a former student in a big city outside the region of 
provenience, and he is not very satisfied with having come back in the 
province of Benevento. The main difficulty in the interpretation of the 
interview is that clientelism was absent in most of the conversation. Ra-
ther, it seemed that the participant was deeply concerned with legality, 
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the formal correctness of political processes and, more in general, with 
a stress on justice as essential for the redemption of society.
I 45 (M, 34, unemployed): “I think that … for the communi-
ty there is the need to do …in some sense a connection with 
the other mayors in the area, with the several Councils, in 
order to create something which can be useful to our com-
munities, like typical products, IGT, preserving the environ-
ment, for there is nothing here  so…making oil refineries 
now they want to drill here in Sannio, searching for oil, and 
this kind of stuff damage and bring no benefit.”
R: “Is this an important theme for you?”
I 45: “Sure is. I give you an example: here in the area, but 
I think that also about the national government, one only 
thinks about contracts, infrastructure and that’s it, nothing 
more, there isn’t any different idea of progress, ecologic, in-
vesting in culture and arts. And then the consortia for olive 
tree and grapevine cultivation should be publicized, becau-
se our oil is just as good as the one produced in Tuscany, 
for example.”
The most recurring theme is, hence, a need for a “clean society,” in 
strong opposition with the past, and the outline of an alternative model, 
something new that should be brought to the territory to make develop-
ment sustainable and constant through time. Conversely, the methods 
used in the past are judged as flawed, especially concerning the en-
vironmental outcomes, which are an imperative theme for this inter-
viewee. But the critique goes further than that.
I 45: “I mean in Italy there has always been the push.”
R: “What?”
I: “The push, the little help, to place people in different 
jobs. Here, to have a job, one need a push, I know that this 
is dialect, but here we say it in this way.”
R: “And what do you think about it, sincerely?”
I 45: “Absolutely nothing. For sure there are many worthy 
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people who have been placed in important places and they 
do their job well and all, but there are also a lot of indivi-
duals who do not deserve anything, and maybe a worthier 
person is unemployed. Then if there are individuals who 
need help and are in real distress … if there are two jobs 
in the forest police and the mayor must choose, it’s normal 
that the position goes to the one with two children, it’s nor-
mal.”
 
 Here, shady practices are condemned since they damaged the 
territory and did not reward talent and merit. However, there is an indi-
rect admission of politics as a response to those more in need, and from 
this moment on, the interview assumes an entirely different tone. It se-
ems as if social desirability, which apparently informed the first part of 
the interview and influenced the first responses, fades away and gives 
room to personal condition and more serious answers. As abundantly 
said before, in many interviews the discussion delved deep until they 
reached the strictly personal history of the interviewee. In this case, it is 
the tale of a 34-year-old man who is not finding a job and has little hope 
of finding one, both because of an unappealing degree (Sociology) and 
because of his age. All in all, after a very clear – almost too bright – first 
part of the interview, which focused on the public dimension of politics, 
the second part revolved around the personal relationship of the inter-
viewee with politics.
I 45: “Yes it’s true, it’s not the method I dislike, also because 
I know a lot of people who have been helped…a little help, 
not a permanent job. I was never offered, not even a two or 
three-month consultancy after my graduation; I don’t mean 
something huge…I know a friend of mine who worked a bit 
in the Mountain Community, part-time, for 200/300 euro a 
month. I was never offered that opportunity.”
R: “And this upset you.”
I 45: “Yes because why them and not me? Then this made 
me realize that apparently if the others obtained that it’s be-
cause at the next election you want the vote of those people. 
I instead I already told you, I’m entitled to nothing.”
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The distance between what said and what felt is rather blatant. It is not 
incoherence because this distance between sincere principles and every-
day life recurred many times throughout the interview. The subject re-
cognizes the distortion inherent to the clientelist system; he perceives 
its limits, and he condemns it. Then, he has to face a difficult personal 
and professional situation: personal evaluations have the best over prin-
ciples and a part-time job at 200/300 euro per month for some months 
is an excellent opportunity or at least something better than unemploy-
ment. In comparison with the other two examples, where clientelism 
was inherent to the interviewees’ lives from birth, or a way of perfor-
ming authority over a territory, “desperate” clientelism reveals itself a 
controversial mechanism. The subject never fully endorses clientelism, 
but still, it is sometimes acknowledged as the only available path to 
escape, even for a few months, from an objectively static condition.
I 45: “I have never had anything, and I don’t want anything 
because I want to be a free man.”
R: “What do you mean?”
I 45: “A free man…meaning that what I do is the product 
of my job and I don’t have to thank anyone for my results.”
The interview is a sort of self-analysis for the interviewee: as he speaks, 
he also speaks to himself to express the conflict, the tension between the 
possible and what ought to be. This clientelism is desperate, meaning 
that there is no true allegiance of the subject to the clientelist system, 
which is conversely despised and discharged. However, despite this di-
smissive approach, the participant recognizes the power of politics to 
generate and distribute jobs. In this context, a personal “push” in a par-
ticular position could be desirable.
 Some considerations are now due. First, the purpose of this part 
was not to produce a new typology of clientelism, because the outlined 
case cannot be understood as ideal-types of some clientelist networks. 
Rather, this part wanted to highlight differences within cases that fall 
within the same category, to distinguish nuances and minor variation 
which diversify the different types of clientelism from one another. It is 
evident that in the first case clientelism was almost a lifestyle, influen-
cing one’s career and, therefore, the social relations in which a person is 
embedded. Clientelism as a system, hence, lives because its legitimacy 
is taken for granted. On the other hand, the second (and partially the 
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third) case, are conditioned by the young age of the participant, and this 
influences the answers. Let us consider, for example, the positive ex-
post evaluation of politicians like De Mita and Mastella, and of clien-
telism overall as a resource for the territory, while considering that the 
interviewee has not experienced the historical period he talks about. On 
top of a general appreciation of local leaders who are “very attentive” 
to the territory and its needs, it emerges also a need for justice, not only 
of the South vis-à-vis the North, but also of the peripheral areas of the 
South versus the central ones, like Sannio versus Naples.
 Lastly, the third interview is harder to situate, in that it summarizes 
contradictory tendencies. Most of the interview condemns clientelism 
through moral and ethical judgment, but the assessment changes as 
soon as the private life of the interviewee is concerned. The subject, in 
fact, gives in to the desire for a little help to earn some money, even for 
a few months and going out of unemployment. Desperate clientelism, 
hence, represents the simplest form of clientelism, and it involves even 
young, well-educated people who share a common precarious working 
condition – or of outright unemployment – and a scarce trust in future. 
Clientelism understood in this way, hence becomes a forced choice, 
regardless of education and political conviction, and precisely this “ge-
neric” form deserves more attention because it denotes clientelism as a 
forced more than a chosen condition.
6.2 Party oriented vote
 The second type of vote emerged throughout the empirical re-
search was the party-oriented vote, i.e. those electors who align their 
choices towards the party and identify themselves with the political 
and ideal platform of a party and aiming for universal benefits. In this 
chapter, there will not be any classification of the different sub-types of 
the party-oriented vote, unlike what done for clientelism. This mainly 
because the empirical material did not show the same degree of internal 
variety which may have allowed for such an internal classification. The 
first example of the party-oriented vote comes from a young student 
who, from the very beginning, tried to identify his political orientation 
as first and foremost connected to a party.
 
I 23 (M, 21, student): “Well, I’m not a utopist, I mean I 
don’t expect that the platform that is spread out is reali-
zed; but I search a convergence in some crucial point which 
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characterizes my needs, my ideas. For example, if someone 
comes and speaks about universal basic income and I see 
that effectively there is a project, that he wants to deliver 
on that promise, it’s normal that I will give him attention, to 
this candidate and to that party, so yes I watch at platfor-
ms, if platforms mean anything anymore …but it’s normal 
that in the program or at least the general orientation of 
the program, yes I mean one could say that left and right 
are outdated distinctions, I’m not of that idea because sadly 
this idea that has been given to us has allowed narrowing 
more and more the difference between the center-left and 
the center-right and the birth of different forms of populism, 
which are actually void; I think that the program or the ide-
as in it have still a weight, meaning that one has to choose 
realistically and without illusions, but still with an eye on 
platforms and the campaign.”
R: “And one thing that you expect, that you want?”
I 23: “I think that a campaign to be upheld is the universal 
basic income, I mean truly universal and not the one with 
so many flaws proposed by Emiliano, which is all in all a 
familist, insufficient policy, which can actually enhance the 
informal economy, I mean within 12 months, in order to 
have the income renewed, you are in a blackmail because 
you are given 130/140 euros per person in a family of 5 
people, and to have it confirmed you have basically to walk 
around and do nothing, and with that sum of money you 
cannot afford anything, but you can’t work otherwise you 
lose the benefit. Even the word dignity is humiliated, you 
are at risk of working in the informal economy, with com-
munity service, some administrative bargain so that if you 
don’t pay a bill, the consequences are paid by your child 
who won’t be able to eat in the school’s canteen. In this 
way you just throw away the article of the Constitution whi-
ch says that the state has the duty to remove the barriers, 
I think that the primary battle is on income, a genuinely 
inclusive and non-paternalistic income, that can give that 
extra oomph, reduce problems, reduce parasitism, which is 
the problem they tell you about, maybe by accompanying it 
with real employment projects, not just apprenticeships or 
other forms of legalized exploitation, in exchange for job 
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offers which are truly worthy.”
In these two moments within the interview, one can easily spot two de-
fining elements of the party-oriented vote: i) a big importance attached 
to ideal and programmatic elements, which in turn orients and characte-
rizes voting choices, and ii) a strong expectation of universal benefi-
ts. There are blatant contradictions, such as the ones outlined in the V 
Chapter, because the conformity between what is wanted and what is 
practiced is never fully achieved. For example, the interviewee regu-
larly cites Grillo, Vendola, and Renzi without naming their respective 
parties, hence implicitly reinforcing a strong personalization of politi-
cs, which has characterized Italy in the last decades. However, as said 
before, the interviewee’s words do not describe an objective reality: 
rather, they show a piece of reality as experienced and interpreted by 
the respondent. Therefore, the voter’s perception is crucial through his 
account: in this case, this perception is focused on types of party, col-
lective dynamics, and universal aims, such as welfare state policies and 
the universal basic income. The following informant was also a young 
student, very sensitive to politics, and strongly informed by party alle-
giance in making his voting choices.
R: “And what should he do?”
I 40 (M, 20, student): “For me a politician should bring 
the country forward, in one way or another, the collective 
together with his party, of which he’s an emanation, and 
which represents a part of the country that voted, in a par-
liamentary democracy […] but now people of my age are 
much more disillusioned, unlike people of the same age in 
the 70s and 80s, when all of them mobilized as one to try 
and transform the status quo radically, so there was a spi-
rit of community and of coming together, starting from the 
universities.”
As in the former example, there is a strong belief that politics is a col-
lective moment, which is necessarily performed in groups. In this de-
scription of an “ancient” world, community and collective actions are 
the defining traits, and this despite the interviewee not being old enough 
to have experienced the “ancient world” he talks about. Naturally, also, 
in this case, such an idealized and programmatic vision of politics is 
firmly connected to the expectation for universal benefits.
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R: “Which kind of political measures?”
I 40 (M, 20, Student): “So for once I would ask for a pu-
blic spending expansion: first, education, healthcare, infra-
structure, since our country is lagging behind especially in 
some regions like Calabria, Apulia, Sicily, for example in 
the railway system. I would ask to adopt some radical po-
licies of debt cutting and renegotiating its conditions […] 
then I would want a revision of the international treaties we 
signed, I mean we should oppose all the interference from 
other states which condition us profoundly, for example on 
the military.”
Once again, we retrieve an active ideal-programmatic approach to po-
litics, which goes together with a universalist vision of the benefits that 
politics must provide. The imagination that feeds this conception of po-
litics, once again, is connected to the past that none of the interviewees 
experienced directly. In other words, these voters have rather clear ide-
as about what politics ought to be, yet they lack real examples because 
the model they are inspired by is relegated to the past. This represents 
a fundamental cleavage between these interviews and the last two tran-
scripts which, no wonder, come from people who received their “politi-
cal education” in other years.
 The following interview comes from a policeman who has a 
rather detailed knowledge of politics, especially in his local community.
I 4 (M, 46, policeman): “As far as I’m concerned, we come 
from 50-60 of mismanagement and bad government, but 
back then, as compared with today, I think we didn’t lack 
a sense of belonging to a movement, to a party. Leaders 
mirrored this phase, which had its distinct mentality, they 
reflected this feeling of belonging with bright ideas, then 
you govern […] For what I can remember, if a politician 
belonged to a faction within a party, there was no reason 
why he should have moved his position across factions and 
parties […] today one goes out of a party only to enroll in 
another and keep his seat, so they give up on their ideas and 
concepts, they don’t exist anymore.”
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R: “Did you have personal experiences on this?”
I 4: “I followed the historic ‘Fiuggi Turn’ of the Italian So-
cial Movement, which then transformed into National Al-
liance. Gianfranco Fini at that moment showed continuity 
with tradition, but then he got lost as well.”
The passion and attraction of the voter towards a party (and towards 
the ideas embodied by that party) are evident and rooted in the histori-
cal reality and the everyday life of the interviewee, as compared with 
the other testimonies. Reference to values and ideas represented by the 
Italian Social Movement are not abstract, but salient elements of a real 
universe, materially experienced by the participant. Moreover, other 
fragments account for the personal passage from the age of commit-
ment to the disenchantment. Hence, the informant turned from an idea 
of parties as formative places in which to spend time, to a more cynical 
“taking note” of what happens in parties, without attention or zeal. Na-
turally, also this example shows a clear nexus between the party-orien-
ted vote and universal benefits.
I 4: “Let me start by saying that the fundamental problem 
of this country, this region, this city is labor. The priority is 
to create jobs, even though I realize it might be extremely 
hard because you see also here in Sicily there’s this idea 
of the permanent job, and this is something that penalizes 
us dearly […] and then healthcare, this is a sore spot too. 
My father-in-law went to Padua for medical reasons; there 
is an abyss between their benchmarks and ours. […] And 
then the environment, cleanliness […] it still happens now, 
in 2016, something that for me is outside civilization, I still 
meet people who at some point open their car’s window, 
and they throw their rubbish from there onto the road. This, 
at a municipal level, is one of the worst things because it 
means you don’t give a damn.”
Once again, with extraordinary efficacy, the interviewee lists universal 
benefits as the ones expected from politics. These universal benefits are 
always concrete in nature. What emerges is a complete idea of society, 
which was plainly formed in a moment in which parties were central.
 The last interview cited here was a 62-year-old woman, very 
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involved in politics, and very attentive to the local political dynamics. 
As for interviewee 4, also in this case the accounts are grounded in the 
real life of the participant.
R “So you didn’t find yourself at home there?”
I 57 (F, 62, psychologist): “The Olive (party before Demo-
cratic Party) was already an error; I did not vote for it be-
cause we cannot go together with the Christian Democracy, 
we struggled a lifetime against the Christian Democracy, 
and then we went together. This has destroyed the left, secu-
lar values: the Christian Democracy, the Pope, the Vatican 
try to keep everyone quiet, and this is not good […] I re-
member the times of Continuous Struggle, so the meetings 
we had, the demonstration, feminism, the fight for women’s 
rights, I remember mostly this.”
 
In an elegant way, this fragment shows the salience of parties in the life 
of the participant (and more in general, of the collective dimension of 
politics.) As in the case of subject 4, it is disenchantment which defines 
the member’s current view of politics and parties, with the acknowle-
dgment that the current political system is very different from the one 
in place during the 60s and 70s.
I 57: “Politics must serve the realization of high ideal 
projects, make it possible for ideals and utopias to become 
a reality, hence to have at heart the good of humanity, it 
shouldn’t be self-referential […] But already after the 70s, 
politics changed face: before it was dream and utopia, the 
youth was protagonist, while today they are just spectators 
of their lives.” 
Obviously, also in this case, and maybe here more than elsewhere, 
expectations are idealized, while the previous interview had a more 
concrete undertone. 
I 57 “First; one should tell me ‘I want to realize this,’ big 
dreams, great utopias. Then, I organize the practice to get 
that objective done … one cannot think only about emergen-
cy and money, let’s say because a roof fell and the mayor 
becomes the administrator and nothing changes in the city; 
we only think about cases of emergency.”
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R “Anything else?”
I 57: “Yes, sure, then create jobs, because it’s vital. The 
unease that one feels in the family is profoundly enhanced 
by the lack of employment…the children suffer a lot…politi-
cians who beat themselves over family and values, and then 
they ignore the obvious, they’re just ridiculous …Families 
who are hungry.” 
 In conclusion, the last two interviews depict lived experiences 
very close to the party, understood not only as a symbol but as a practi-
cal community in which politics is performed in ways that had to be 
attentive to the collective right. Naturally, the age of the interviewees 
matters: despite their membership of two “extreme” parties on the op-
posite sides of politics such as the Italian Social Movement and Conti-
nuous Struggle, their reciprocal distance is smaller than the one separa-
ting them together from the first couple of younger participants. This, 
probably, is determined by the young age of the first two informants: 
the political education of respondents n° 23 and 40 are not rooted in 
any concrete and lived experience of active and organized parties. A 
celebration of parties unites all the four accounts but, while the first two 
fragments are inspired by an indirect and idealized idea, the two latter 
informants base their views on real experiences.
6.3 Patronage: The Missing Type
 Following the fourfold typology, and before examining consti-
tuency service as the last manifestation of personal voting, we should 
spend some time here defining patronage. As one might guess from the 
title of this section, the empirical research showed a lack of accounts 
of votes given to a specific party, but which is driven by particularist 
expectations. Hence, patronage cannot be tackled in the same way as 
the other types of voting behavior. Traditionally, patronage is depicted 
as an organizational resource, since patronage understood as an electo-
ral asset is very close to clientelism (Kopecký, Mair, Spirova, 2012). 
The distinction between the different functions of patronage has been 
described in Chapters II and III, hence here it will suffice to recall that 
patronage as an electoral resource, and the defining feature of the po-
litical bargain is represented by the voter’s allegiance – understood as 
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loyalty, i.e. long-lasting devotion. In exchange, patronage secures the 
appointment of loyal people in government, bureaucracy, and civil ser-
vice positions, at both national and local levels. Conversely, patronage 
as an organizational resource unfolds within administrations. It is based 
on fidelity of the bureaucratic personnel towards the elected officials, 
who need “collaborative” public bureaucracies to implement public po-
licies, especially if they need to distribute resources for particular aims 
(for example, obtaining consensus through clientelist policies.) Lastly, 
patronage can manifest as either an electoral or as an organizational 
resource about the different stages of its development. For example, a 
party in its first experience in elected offices will make use of patronage 
as an electoral resource in the first phase and, subsequently, will use pa-
tronage as an organizational resource to secure itself as party-in-gover-
nment, maybe through such tools as spoil systems in civil service. In so 
doing, this party will ensure a more efficient distribution of clientelist 
benefits within a given constituency and, in the long run, it can guaran-
tee its permanence in power.
 The reasons why patronage does not emerge from the inter-
viewees can be different. First: the scarce organizational sophistication 
of parties in the constituencies under investigation, which is something 
that has always denoted southern Italian politics. Even during the First 
Republic, despite the presence of mass parties like the Christian Demo-
cracy and the Communist Party, in southern regions, the electoral mani-
festation of patronage has always been preponderant over the organiza-
tional one, also in determining parties’ internal vicissitudes. Thus, local 
parties and politicians leveraged their personal support within their par-
ties in the inter-faction struggle, which was defining of the First Repu-
blic (Lotti, 1997). Naturally, it is easy to hypothesize that parties that 
were continuously in government, such as the Christian Democracy, pa-
tronage as an organizational resource was abundantly used, to position 
loyal people in the branches of the State. The interviews, however, did 
not reveal the presence of this phenomenon but, through interpretation, 
one can retrieve some elements of patronage, even though disconnected 
from the participants’ concrete experiences.




I 63: “Meaning, first of all, that at my boss’s wedding there 
were V. and G., and at my wedding I think they wouldn’t 
have come …then one has to understand what ‘recommen-
dation’ means: if I am kicked out because E. decided to sub-
stitute 40 people with 40 of his men, I think it is an injustice, 
even though you can do it in the public sector, unlike the 
private one.”
This short fragment picture a situation which is very close to patronage 
as an organizational resource, even though the context of the interview 
should be specified further. The informant has a job in the regional de-
partment in one of the Regions under investigation, and she describes 
the transition between the incumbent and the newly elected Presidents 
and the movements and the flows of people from one office to another, 
which in fact precede the reshuffle in the Regional government. This 
description is corroborated by passages of another interview, which was 
discarded as it was not successful.
I 68 (M, 42, educator): “I don’t think he was the owner of a 
logo and for me it’s wrong.”
 
R: “So he disappointed you?”
I 68: “Yes, he disappointed me and other people in my zone 
because … I mean, N., in the regional offices, in the new 
offices created by him such as the Tourist Promotion Office, 
he placed only his people, those from his territory and in 
the area, and N.F. was his reference …many in this area, 
after having supported him and helped with his campaign, 
many were left outside after the election”
R “Left out of what?”
I 68: “Out of the place in the administration, out of the 
connected offices …all in all, especially after the first term 
in office he wasn’t bad, V. had to guarantee and his folks, 
the most loyal ones, starting from N.F. all came from that 
territory, and this engendered a lot of discontent in our pro-
vince.”
Even though these fragments do not depict a full-fledged example of 
patronage vote, the management of the administration seems inspired 
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by patronage as an organizational resource, i.e. as a way of arranging 
public jobs once elected in office. There is no mention, for example, of 
political exchanges grounded on pre-electoral phases, thus ascribable 
to proper clientelist phenomena. Rather, spoil system is used by elected 
officers to change (or confirm) trusted figures in the major positions 
within the administration, and this is a consolidated and well-known 
practice, at least by informants. It is worth mentioning, however, that in 
both the interviews, when a party is cited as a “container” within which 
patronage unfolds, the meaning is twofold. The informant n°68 recoun-
ts the climb of a well-known local politician to power, who performed 
his agenda through a network of acquaintances, committees, and acti-
vists in support of his candidacy, hence without the formal support of a 
formal partisan structure. Conversely, interview n° 63 mentions after-e-
lection dynamics whereby a structured and well-networked party (both 
in the local and in the national political arena) in support of an already 
strong candidacy. This difference, though apparently trivial, is not a mi-
nor one, because it allows to shed light on one of the paramount traits of 
patronage, i.e. the role of the party, and this influences the division and 
distribution of departmental offices and other administrative positions.
 
 Lastly, patronage as a management strategy in the hands of the 
leader or leaders of one party; which answers to territorial dynamics 
with the twofold aim of i) maintaining an electoral connection which 
secures re-election, and, at the same time, ii) relying on trust of loyal 
people in managing national dynamics within the party or the gover-
nment (either national or local). The following interview reveals the 
inner workings of patronage. The informant comes from an entirely dif-
ferent territory from the one subjects n° 63 and 68 belong to. Moreover, 
within the interview, there is a similitude between the various ways of 
interpreting patronage in De Mita, De Luca, and Renzi.
I 51 (M, 25, student): “Avellino is now trying to create a 
territorial brand, a public image and to take care of it and 
defend it, and they had quite a political class besides De 
Mita.”
R “What do you mean?”
I 51: “I say that our Irpinian cousins are one step ahead 
of us, probably thanks to that ruling class, since they had 
a Prime Minister, great entrepreneurs, and probably, by 
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being protagonists, every one of them felt like another De 
Mita. And it’s as simple as that: Avellino was for Italy, in 
De Mita’s time, what Florence is now for Italy with Renzi.”
 
R “What do you mean?”
I 51: “Because Renzi, do you see? All the important peo-
ple appointed in offices come from Tuscany; De Luca and 
his heads of departments, they all come from Salerno and 
nearby. In Irpinia the Christian Democracy delivered a lot 
to Irpinia from the national government, and that’s right 
…I mean I find it perfectly reasonable, natural that what is 
geographically closer … one like De Luca I mean, appoints 
people who come from Salerno because I think that those 
nominations are connected to trust, because if I have been 
the mayor of Salerno, I worked with executives, assessors 
who were in Salerno, and hence I consider them as capable, 
I bring them with me in office …like what happens in Flo-
rence and Tuscany.”
In substance, from these words, which were already mentioned in the 
section about clientelism, the capability of a leader in nominating and 
appointing trusted people within institutions is considered as natural, 
legitimate and, to some extent, unavoidable. In the De Mita example, 
Irpinia is mentioned as a territory represented by a famous politician 
from Avellino within the power system of Christian Democracy whi-
ch served, for half a century, the quintessential example of party-state 
power. Moreover, this interview mentions examples of patronage also 
in two contemporary politicians like Renzi and the President of Cam-
pania De Luca. In both the cases, though to a different extent, De Luca 
and Renzi are cited for their capability of appointing trusted people in 
central positions, Palazzo Chigi in the latter case, and in the Regional 
Government in the former. Hence, it is possible to detect two elements 
which, in the story told by the interviewee, are paramount in understan-
ding the functioning of patronage, i.e. territoriality, whereby a candi-
date has a firm anchorage in the local community and harnesses it for 
achieving local or national objectives. Second, trust is fundamental to a 
way of selecting staff member and close collaborators.
 However, as said in the introduction, patronage does not emerge as a 
diffused type of voting behavior in the sample of informants. Hence, it 
is not possible to draw general conclusions from this investigation, for 
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at least two reasons: i) first, because of the small number of interviews 
in which patronage is mentioned, and ii) second, because, on those rare 
occasions in which patronage is mentioned, the references are almost 
always indirect, put in more general discourses, if not in parenthesis 
and deviations from the actual question list of the interview. Probably, 
most of the difficulty in investigating this type of voting choices stems 
from the close relationship between patronage and clientelism which 
we have already dealt with at length in Chapters II and III. In more 
practical terms, the biggest challenge during the fieldwork was con-
nected to the particular features of politics as experienced in the South. 
In fact, patronage as an instrument for assessing the power of faction 
leaders is mostly well known and practiced, especially by elder voters. 
Unlike these, younger voters lack the idea of a party as a collective in-
strument, as a container and, hence, one of the paramount differences 
between clientelism and patronage is missing. While in party-oriented 
voters it was hard for young voters to identify ideas with specific parties 
(hence falling back to the leader as the physical representation of a par-
ty), at the same time younger voter who are more sensitive to particular 
benefits it seems impossible to separate the role of a candidate from the 
one of the parties, because the latter does not exist at least in the infor-
mants’ accounts.
 To summarize, in these last pages the analysis lingered over 
three types of voting behavior, as well as over the ostensive lack of cle-
ar examples of patronage. However, the most interesting and well-de-
fined form of balloting was clientelism which, as it is possible to see 
the interviews, is diffused and rooted among some polled voters. Clien-
telism, hence, will be the starting point for the next chapter, because 
the personal vote represents the “another half” of the personal vote. 
In the following interviews, it will become apparent how universalist 
expectations can direct the personal vote. Hence, we will report plenty 
of testimonies by voters who are very sensitive to the personal vote, 
while, at the same time, witnessing how, unlike the previous examples 
of clientelism, expectations are directed towards universal benefits. In 
the following pages, we will try to answer the research question, i.e. the 
existence of a personal/universal vote.   
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chapter Vii
The fourth type exists. Evidence of Constituency Service in the South.
 
7.1 Different types of universal benefits
 In this last chapter, we will deal with the most important of the 
four voting behavior patterns presented in the typology we constructed 
by cross-analyzing the two dichotomous variable universal vs. particu-
lar benefits, on one side, and personal vs. party-oriented vote. The type 
described in this chapter will be a kind of personal vote aligned with 
universal expectations. Chapter V provided oriented towards universal 
benefits, especially by privileging some virtues of the candidates. From 
here onwards, the focus will be on the type of vote defined as personal/
universal, which will be labeled as constituency service. Before delving 
into the analysis of the responses given to the questions on this matter, a 
possible interference in the soundness of results must be made explicit. 
In fact, the enormous amount of answers which reveal an expectation 
for universal benefit is by no means a guarantee of the respondents’ 
sincerity, even when in the presence of a strong orientation towards 
voting for individual candidates. Many responses thus can be deeply 
biased by social desirability, which is inherent to the interview pro-
cess. During the conversations, naturally, the attempt was to control this 
pitfall through control questions and by analyzing the transcriptions, 
to assess the overall consistency and sincerity of the interviewee’s ac-
count. However, a complete and sound assessment is impossible regar-
ding vis-à-vis the external reality. Rather, this attempt must focus on 
the status of the words of the interviewees (Bichi 2012). This research 
was never aimed to achieve a rigorous knowledge of some objective, 
external reality, but rather to produce a sound analysis of the informan-
ts’ subjective realities. The interviews provided in this last part are less 
in number, and the analysis is limited to the successful ones, i.e. the 
clearer and more consistent ones (which are nonetheless copious.) Be-
fore giving the floor to the interviewees, one last premise is due: in the 
previous chapter, we underlined the presence of rather vague, idealized 
universal expectations, which are detached from reality (values, ideas 
and so forth.) In other occasions, conversely, universal benefits assume 
a more concrete form by touching upon material conditions such as em-
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ployment or services. In presenting this part, hence, we will follow the 
above-mentioned typology.
7.1.1 Idealized universal benefits
 Among the most detailed accounts, we can start this discussion 
of the results by focusing on those participants who stressed a universa-
list orientation by enunciating principles and values, rather than practi-
cal aspirations. One of these interviews concerns a priest in a small 
parish with several chronic problems such as unemployment, poverty, 
as well as a widespread presence of mafia. This respondent provides a 
significant account of the level of abstraction that many electors project 
in forming universal expectations when casting a ballot.
R: “So you’re telling me that the backwardness of this area 
is not a matter of money?”
I 5 (M, 73, parish priest): “Absolutely not … of course back 
in time, despite its limits, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno cre-
ated some opportunities for development, but also a lot of 
stealing of public money. But development is a more gene-
ral condition … a condition of the place.”
R: “A condition of the place?”
I 5: “Indeed … if the whole level is slow, then we are all 
driven to familist behaviors. If there were employment for 
everyone, there wouldn’t be intercession and nepotism. If 
there were a mentality of service, I wouldn’t need to call 
my friend every time I go to the hospital to be admitted or 
to book a place, like when I have a right I always must call 
someone to do me a favor for it to be respected. Rather, we 
must do away with this logic, starting from the educational 
agencies such as school and family, which should be places 
of personal growth … otherwise, the cultural poverty which 
is born of economic poverty is not stopped. I want to say, we 
… we are so ignorant that we don’t know our specificities 
… a person from Trentino had to come and explain them to 
us.”
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R: “Someone from Trentino?”
I 5: “Yes, the Bishop B., the one that was here before … 
I heard him, from Trentino, speaking about specificity. We 
don’t know our unique traits, we don’t appreciate and pro-
mote them, and we don’t even know what they are, while he 
understood them.”
R: “And who candidates here, which expectations do you 
have in him? What should he do?”
 
I 5: “I’d expect that he could involve all the active forces, 
like University, institutions, technical and scientific insti-
tutions which can contribute to projects … Now, let’s go 
back to specificities, how can I understand how to promote 
certain assets if there isn’t someone who tells me ‘this is the 
way’ … someone with a vision, an idea of where to go and 
where to conduct this community.”
In this conversation, which is also compelling for the role that the priest 
plays in his community, there is a plenty of references to universal 
expectations. First, there is no mention of spiritual elements such as 
“Providence,” rather the words of the parish priest are replete with refe-
rences to concrete actions, aimed to enhance the value of local products 
and to create jobs. However, also these practical elements are left aside 
for a more general view, which is succinctly expressed in the sentence 
“someone should point a direction,” concerning the expectation that the 
informant place on the candidate. Everything comes from bitter con-
siderations about the territory, the underdevelopment and the solid tie 
between economic and cultural poverty, on the backdrop of a universa-
lism inspired by the need for a general vision, a complex project, and its 
practical implementation. The interviewee says time and again that the 
personal vote is “the most democratic form of voting.” Furthermore, he 
ascribes to politicians not only the role of problem-solvers, but rather 
the most general one of guides, capable of tracing an idea of sustainable 
development for an area which, in his words, seems to be doomed. 
 On the same wavelength of the priest is a student in Architecture 
in Naples, 31 years old, who expresses herself in concrete terms regar-
ding some universal benefits, while she changes register when talking 
about her generation. 
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R: “So what would you like from a candidate, which 
expectations?”
I 43 (F, student, and worker, 31): “So let’s speak freely: I’d 
start with the youth and their condition… I’d want more 
incentives for who has ideas, like hubs or something that 
favors a project, for example, if I want to start a business … 
maybe finding some physical spaces … mapping the empty 
spaces that the Council has, even if they don’t even know 
which spaces are available (giggles). So, all this, plus a bit 
of support for those with talent.” 
R: “Some help for young people, so.”
I 43: “No, I don’t believe so, I think that help is a bad word, 
something patronizing and paternalistic, something Catho-
lic, I don’t like it. Help is something … that you give me 
and you don’t have anything in exchange, investing is more 
suitable, investing in youth.”
 
R: “In which sense?”
I 43: “Investing is different: investing in something is diffe-
rent from helping because it’s a gamble, and you don’t know 
if you will be successful or not; while helping is something 
that finishes. Investments have a return for the investor and 
for those who produce something, it’s exchanged, and I 
think we need that. A politician has to believe in innovation 
and invest in it.”
R: “And who does politics, should he take care of this? 
Should he…” 
I 43: “Yes, which is what I said should be realized everywhe-
re, and I think this is the task of politics, of those who practi-
ce it: asking oneself where this Country will look like in 
twenty years, beyond the length of a term in office. This is 
something I’ve always hated in politics: not having a long-
term vision. I mean, you program some stuff that is not just 
immediate, but is projected in the future. I think that this is 
the responsibility of politics and politicians, thinking long-
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term and beyond consensus, because the most visible things 
create support in the present, but they are all smoke and 
mirrors.” 
 A 31-year-old, who has still a great deal to see and to do, but 
who already knows her community and area quite well, has quite si-
milar expectations to the parish priest encountered before. There is a 
clear vision of the future, the youth and of the capability to trust young 
people. Those are not vague principles: from the whole interview, there 
is a pressing urgency of change, not only regarding what to ask politi-
cians but rather regarding what to expect from politics. First, there is 
a need for a long-term strategy and of the need for consensus-oriented 
policies, to create an encompassing horizon of what one want to see in 
the Country “in twenty years.” The informant, who reveals a good de-
gree of political sophistication, do not rule out the social value of small 
projects such as calls for interests for youth employment. However, she 
focuses more on the need to systematize these projects to create a uni-
versal and collective action which can transform the material conditions 
of ordinary people. Each social policy in isolation is insufficient and, 
for this reason, she claims for a more comprehensive intervention of 
politics on society, and politics is expected to be informed by long-
term visions, not bound to here-and-here-and-know restraints regarding 
consensus, but rather capable of creating longer-lasting conditions of 
development. In both the interviews, the standard feature is the antici-
pation of universal benefits and goods, not only as concrete measures, 
but also, and most importantly, as long-term projects, comprehensive 
visions and time-consuming plans, and politicians, and politics more 
in general, ought to be able to deliver. It would appear as though the 
approach towards universal goods is top-down, i.e. which starts with a 
vision from above, within which to collocate the proper concrete solu-
tions to isolated problems such as employment, services and so on. In 
both cases, the informants are rather well-educated, with a good degree 
of political sophistication, yet it is striking to notice that, despite the age 
gap and the difference between their territorial backgrounds, there is a 
shared need for forward-looking politicians, able to deliver comprehen-
sive, rather than piecemeal answers to the problems.
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7.1.2 Material and universal benefits
In a similar vein, but more focused on material and universal features 
is the second group of respondents underlined in the next paragraph. 
In the next answers, it is possible to recognize a strong attention for 
universal benefits by the voters, but expected universal benefits are less 
general and more related to health and public services.
R “And what would you be impressed to see on a platform 
of a candidate?”
I 7 (F, 19, student): “Personally, innovative ideas, original 
ones. I mean, I am a girl, so I speak for my age, something 
that can be appealing to young, like courses, something to 
promote education, some connection between University 
and the labor market, something that can captivate you, not 
the usual things you say in a campaign … then again, it 
depends if I’m voting for the mayor.”
R: “For example?”
I 7: “Something concerning the environment. I think that 
Italy has a stunning cultural heritage, which is undervalued 
and there is a lot of dirt … even recycling doesn’t work, so 
something that can improve the environment and can draw 
young people nearer to the environment, something that 
will make them understand that the environment has to be 
taken care of, and then something on the connection betwe-
en University and the labor market.”
R: “Anything else?”
I 7: “In Benevento, we have the Arco di Traiano, the church 
of Santa Sofia, and many other monuments which are com-
pletely ignored by tourism. I would like to see something 
that can improve tourism in Benevento, also because it’s 
absurd that we don’t know how to promote what we have. 
And then securing the city, after the last flood we under-
stood that we are not safe, there were damages, of course, 
because the things were not done in the proper time when 
they should have been done.”
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R: “So what would you expect?”
I 11 (F, 60, retired): “The priorities, for the south, are jobs 
and health care. Functioning hospitals. The right to health 
regardless of the latitude where you live and of the place 
where you fall ill; we tend to die more often in the south 
also because we don’t have the right hospitals, you arrive 
at the Emergency Unit, and you don’t know where you’ll 
be brought because here it’s full, there it’s full. The right to 
health, the right to work, the right to study, because here 
people must go to Florence or Milan to study, why shouldn’t 
they have an opportunity here, and why do they have to go 
out to study? Infrastructures, the south and jobs. This is the 
list for me.”
R: “And what would you want from a candidate?”
I 12 (M, 70, entrepreneur): “Well…solving the problem of 
youth unemployment, because I think that we are not giving 
any hope in the future to younger generations, so we have 
to provide them with a perspective. Let’s all do something, 
giving jobs to 2-3000 people, and the people behind them, 
families…we must improve schools: education is not pro-
vided in the same way as before. Nowadays, school is also 
made by teachers who are afraid of the students, of being 
bullied by them, of crime. Back then, these things didn’t 
exist; when I used to go to school, we stood up when the 
teacher entered the room, not nowadays, no. I mean: one 
must motivate young people, spur them, and let them know 
that no one gives you anything for free and that you must 
compete at a global level, and then you need to roll up your 
sleeves and start working.”
R: “So the problem is education, right?” 
I 12: “Yes, because we must create the preconditions, in-
tegrate young people into the labor force, I mean crea-
ting connections between the school and the labor market. 
Nowadays these two worlds are completely disconnected, 
so you get people at job interviews who don’t understand 
a damn. I would create this synergy with the professional 
schools, not humanist or scientific high school; I mean 
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the professional ones. Create a direct connection between 
school and labor, to make them understand what they will 
find after education, while now there is a cleavage, what 
they teach you is useless for real life, you must add more 
training, whereas the school itself might provide this trai-
ning in the first place. This should be the task of politics and 
politicians!!!”
 
R: “And you, what would you like? What do you need?”
 
I 28 (M, 21, student): “I believe in universal basic income 
which, in my view, would solve a lot of problems. This be-
cause if you give me 80 euros a week, and I received 600 
euros without working, then I would refuse to work for you 
for 80 euros a week, so you must raise your salary to a 
living wage. And this is the way to cultivate professional 
dignity and to defeat the kind of illegal jobs which are a 
real problem.”
R: “Meaning?”
I 28: “Meaning that a boy who works ten hours a day for 
five days a week does that to make ends meet, and he do-
esn’t have the possibility to choose, and how should you 
intervene in these cases? By offering people the chance to 
refuse and reject this kind of exploitation, and who offers 
you something adequate, so you fight it in this way. And 
then the basic income contributes to placement.”
R: “What do you mean?”
I 28: “I say that if I were the state, I wouldn’t like to spend 
these 600 euros a month, so I will be incentivized to find a 
job for you so that I don’t have to give you money. It’s as 
simple as that.”
R: “What do you expect? What should the candidate do?”
 
I 32 (F, 46, caregiver): “Well, dealing with Benevento’s pro-
blems …unemployment, health, laws against gender violen-
ce, yeah maybe I’m biased on this because I’m a woman 
(giggles).”
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R: “What do you mean?”
I 32: “No no, I mean that I am outraged when I think about 
all those women who are not considered even by the people 
who swear to love them, and the state doesn’t do anything, 
and then we see the data … how many of them are killed 
… I mean there should be the strength to counteract in this 
situation...”
R “Is this an important thing for you?”
I 32: “Yes, I think that. I know that there are several cases 
like this one in Benevento. Maybe it’s not talked about very 
often, but assistance should also be provided in rural towns 
… I mean I would like for us to fight for this …and then … 
Well the environment, for sure the environment. Of cour-
se, there still are a lot of uncivilized people who throw the 
garbage on the street. Hence, we must teach people how to 
behave … this is their home, and they should respect it. I 
know that it’s not simple to do it when you candidate, but I 
would like to remind you that they decided to run for office 
(laughs).”
R “So if there were elections, what would you expect from a 
candidate? Which priorities?” 
I 34 (M, 74, retired): “It is a tough question … because in 
Italy is very difficult for citizens to individuate responsibi-
lities … it is hard to understand who is in charge for some 
situations, so … for example, in Syracuse, there is this crisis 
of garbage right? And people search for politics …If I were 
to think about justice I would start by thinking about the 
last ones, so to speak, I mean those who, while not having 
any voice, are not able to make themselves heard by those 
in charge because this voice does not have many arms to 
collect signatures and vote. Is it clear? But there are di-
sabled people in this city, a lot of them. Those who live in 
heavy housing conditions.” 
R: “Clear.”
I 34: “Then, on a more general level, you receive educa-
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tion in Italy, but what does it prepare you for? It prepares 
everybody to be a philosopher … these are cumbersome 
mechanisms, on which one should intervene quickly, and 
then a plan that touches everyone, and in which we all have 
a responsibility, which is the quality of our democracy, be-
cause now in which there isn’t participation, there is no de-
mocracy, and now this is a serious problem for Italy.”
R “And what would you like it to do?”
I 47 (M, 35, school janitor): “In a civilized country there 
should be services, they are the first thing. When there are 
services there is development, because without services de-
velopment never comes; and then if they did something like 
it, then we could talk about priorities. School, streets, ho-
spitals, this kind of stuff. Then, all can I give you an exam-
ple? Just a little thing: a football field, that one, can come 
later.” 
R “So services.”
I 47: “Yes, I experienced it first-hand, I have been there 
(Bergamo) without a car; I didn’t have preoccupations, I 
used to take the train to the station, the bus which went 
wherever the fuck I wanted to go, and I didn’t feel like going 
back here because as soon as you arrive in Lamezia you 
are dead. Either you have someone who picks you up or 
nothing … and if tourists come, what do you tell them? Ei-
ther you rent a car or if you have some relative who picks 
you up…you realize why I am annoyed by this.”
R: “So what would you want from the next mayor?”
I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur): “Listen, besides improving 
recycling, maybe using wet waste to make compost … I 
would say tourism. I think about a Roccella Slowfood with 
a headquarter in the Castle and tasting paths …the di-
scourse though is that you need to know the local products 
and make them known to a wider audience, citrus, seafood, 
oregano, and it’s all interrelated. It’s important to build a 
network because nowadays tourism goes in that direction, 
people want to have a different vacation.”
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R “And what would you like from this candidate? What do 
you expect?”
 
I 53 (F, 30, unemployed) “Theater (laughs)”
R “(laughs) Sure, the theater, and then?”
I 53: “I mean seriously … I don’t know priorities for youn-
ger people. There are also these things that the State provi-
des, small jobs, voluntary community service, which maybe 
are stupid things, but for 20-year-old people are without 
anything to do here, because there is no job, and maybe 
they find some opportunities from these projects, even in-
termittent jobs. And then there are other things missing, 
like connections with bigger cities, we have very few links, 
there’s just one coach that drives around and one is forced 
to use the car to go to Naples, and you waste two hours in 
that journey by bus because the trip is enormous just to get 
there.”
R “And what would expect from candidates? Which 
expectations?”
 
I 62 (F, 51, civil servant): “Well if we talk priorities, there 
are the needs of the citizens. I mean not just of the Citizen 
in general, like jobs which cannot be given by a candidate, 
but I would ask a mayor, for example, a cleaner town, I’m 
not shocked by papers on the street, but one should promote 
a better environmental culture, give attention to the youth.” 
R “What do you mean?”
I 62: “Young people, in the clear majority of cases, they 
spend their time in the pub, and it’s right to be so in some 
respects, but maybe you should give them more opportuni-
ties, like free sports facilities, bike lanes. I mean I don’t say 
that because I want to be a health freak, but just because 
many people would like to do sport, but they can’t afford 
it. Also, one should promote what we have, like the sports 
palace, which cost a bit and which is currently not used. I 
would intervene in these things because the administrators 
have more means to change this than to create jobs, for 
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example.”
R “What do you think it’s important, and what do you 
expect?”
I 20 (M, 43, lawyer): “Yes, looking at it, in my profession, 
one should secure the certainty of punishment. In Italy, we 
have this widespread sense of impunity. Now it’s almost 
common-sense to think that no one goes to jail, so you must 
revise the current criminal law …reduce all the alternative 
measures other than prison. Being under house arrest is not 
enough, it’s a matter of justice for a community.”
R “And now what do you ask for to a candidate? What do 
you expect?”
I 19 (F, 67, former teacher): “Maximum priority to justice, 
starting from tax evasion, I mean this is not sustainable.” 
R “What do you mean?”
I 19: “I mean that, for example, I bought this house by ma-
king a lot of sacrifices and I don’t like that I am taxed all the 
time for this goddam house. I paid for it, it wasn’t gifted. I 
paid my taxes when I bought it; I continue to pay taxes, and 
I’m never reassured that this house is actually mine, then 
what’s the difference between owning and renting?”
R “And then?”
I 19: “Then a better attention to the territory, starting from 
tourism. For example, I would like to have a train towards 
Milan and one towards Turin, which works. Railways are 
abandoned, then we speak about tourism, and we don’t 
have a touristic vocation, there simply aren’t the proper 
structures. I come here from afar, but how much does the 
highway cost? So, we are discouraging tourists, who come 
here and they don’t find a place to go out dancing, there is 
nothing, not a leisure activity. So, when we say that we have 
a touristic vocation, we are just saying this, nothing more.”
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R “And you? What do you want from politics?”
I 39 (F, 38, veterinarian): “At a national or at a local le-
vel?”
R “As you prefer.”
I 39: “More attention for the territory, which at this moment 
is suffering from environmental problems, both at the local 
and at the provincial level. One must stop building new wa-
ste burners. Then, more attention to tourism, because the 
revamp of this territory comes from tourism, but if you think 
that we are close to Lecce, which has no big industry but 
has a very high average income, higher, that ours, and we 
have industries. The matter is that one should do entrepre-
neurship in all sectors, especially agriculture and tourism.”
R “What would you put on the plate?”
I 52 (M, 29, engineer and teacher): “On a local level I would 
give a clear direction to the development of the community, 
so choosing an economic sector to invest in …one has to 
understand the territory, what it has to offer regarding na-
tural and human resources, what it can sell and so on. It’s 
important to be good at selling what the territory can pro-
duce. Then, at the national scale, one should act on the ju-
diciary and on the laws of the state to tidy up the legislative 
chaos, which stops the free initiative of the citizens. Second, 
reduce taxes for all, but especially for those who produce 
wealth and don’t evade taxes. Third, paying attention to the 
youth, not as a paternalistic measure, I would like the idea 
that any young person with an idea might become a Zucker-
berg even in Italy, I mean that he can expand on an original 
idea.”
 In the answers of these southern electors, there is an apparent 
trace of universalist expectations, which is the most striking common 
element of all the previous testimonies. Alongside with specific atten-
tion to universal benefits, i.e. those who are addressed to all the citi-
zens and to those most in need, voters are primarily concerned with 
policies that have a high impact on their everyday reality and material 
condition. Hence, the transcripts are replete with references to jobs as 
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the long-standing disease of all the areas under investigation: jobs, as 
we shall see later, is considered the universal benefit par excellence. 
Participants provide a variety of other needs which should be addres-
sed by elected officials and which are invariably overlooked. First, 
health and the chronic shortcoming of decent treatments in southern 
regions. Then, the problem with public transportation is conceived as 
essential to a balanced and sustainable development. Third, school as 
an instrument to provide opportunities to young people. Finally, there 
is a widespread concern with the overall standards of services (espe-
cially for local officials) such as sport, leisure, and cultural services. 
Besides these essential needs, which are the necessary condition for 
attaining full citizenship, in the respondents’ words, there is an element 
of a more generalized attention towards development-oriented policies. 
Hence, there is no lack of proposals concerning the environment and 
culture, understood as pillars for a long-awaited development and, in 
turn, capable of providing a high return on employment rates. On the 
one side, thus, these interviews depict services as missed rights, which 
are necessary to bridge the gap with the industrialized and developed 
Centre-North of Italy. On the other side, there is a more positive di-
mension in these descriptions, where universal benefits originate from 
a savvy harnessing on the resources of the territory. In this second case, 
politicians are interrogated about their projects and strategies, or lack 
thereof: they are expected to have long-term visions and future-orien-
ted solutions to current problems. Lastly, even though sometimes the 
interviewer had to provide some stimuli, in all the informants in this 
section, there was a genuine attentiveness towards the problems of their 
communities and a capacity to read the complexity of the issues. Espe-
cially on environment and culture, there seems to be a shared awareness 
of clearly identified paths and strategies. But, as said, jobs are the most 
widespread need in almost all the interviews.
7.1.3 The biggest of all benefits: a job
But, as said, jobs are the most widespread need in almost all the inter-
views. It is a crucial aspect of the research path in due to fundamental 
role of a job place in every life of the electors involved in the research. 
The different and various aspects related to a job place are well-highli-
ghted in the words of the informants.
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R “So what do you expect? I mean from the politician?” 
I 59 (M, 58, carpenter craftsman): “Jobs first, I mean not 
for myself, for all. Who is already in the labor market, who 
needs to get in, it’s as simple as that. Then one must figure 
out how to create jobs, it’s not easy or something you do 
overnight. Then I would work to make people stay, because 
now all the towns are depopulating, not only the small vil-
lages. This is the sign that people leave because there are 
no job opportunities.” 
R “And what are your expectations?”
I 4 (M, 46, policeman): “Let’s start by saying that the fun-
damental problem in this country is jobs. The first thing is 
to create jobs, even though I realize that today it is hard, be-
cause here in Sicily there is still this culture of the open-en-
ded contract, and this is something that penalized this area 
a lot, for different reasons. First, at the national level there 
was a possibility of retiring after nineteen years, six months 
and one day: now the retirement age we don’t even know 
where it is or where it’s going. This culture of permanent 
jobs in councils, regions, state branches has produced that 
the turnover happens after a lot of years, it’s a dog chasing 
its tail because there are many people, especially young, 
who decide to emigrate because other countries offer dif-
ferent opportunities. But we could talk about that for ages 
without reaching a solution.”
R “And you, what would you want? What would you 
expect?”
 
I 13 (M, 61, school janitor): “First, at each level of go-
vernment, the priority should be to create jobs, especially 
for these young people. For example, those who don’t know 
where to hold on to, and it’s not fair that our youth, my chil-
dren included, have already left. With three children, I can-
not have even one at home, because in their own country 
they couldn’t bring bread to the table. This is what politics 
should be about, not chatter.”
R “So, jobs.”
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I 13: “Yes, employment in all sectors … because if agricul-
ture is neglected, it’s our rulers’ fault, because if you fund 
agriculture … my son went to the north because he didn’t 
find anything … for me jobs are the main issue, because 
when there’s job, everything is possible.”
R: “And what would you ask your candidate?”
I 18 (F, 56, salesperson): “The priorities are, well jobs are 
banal, also to give some hope to our young people: for 
example, I believe very much in the fact that young people 
are going back to agriculture, not as it was made in the 
old days, but with new machinery, a primary sector which 
can help these people because the first thing is to help them 
to realize their dreams. Otherwise, they stop dreaming, or 
they leave altogether.”
 
R: “What do you expect in a “sensitive” candidate, as you 
say?”
 
I 31(F, 51, teacher): “From the top of my head, two things. 
The first is for your young people: I think that unemploy-
ment is the final social plague, so I would go for a light 
policy to provide jobs for young people because I believe 
that society depends on the work the youth, you are the fu-
ture. To work means to build a family and, in this way, the 
all economy starts to work, it’s not a job that makes a diffe-
rence: personal realization means that I studied and I want 
to realize myself through my job. All this is good, but for 
me, work means invest resources and make money circula-
te, this is the first thing, and do that through light and fast 
policies.”
R “Yes, sure… so what do you expect?”
I 41(M, 44, unemployed): “Our politicians, our rulers, 
should get closer to us and listen to us, and for me, work is 
the most important part, I don’t accept replies to the idea 
that ‘work is dignity,’ it’s what it is, full stop. No bullshit, 
work is dignity and a person who does not have a job, espe-
cially if you have a mortgage and hardship situations, I 
don’t dare to imagine the situation they live in. When there 
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aren’t jobs, there’s no dignity because in whichever way you 
present yourself, and you don’t know who you are … You 
don’t know in which condition you are in this world.”
R “Getting closer, sure. In which way?”
I 41: “Let’s put aside abstract stuff and fashionable elucu-
brations: let’s have weekly meetings on the hottest topic, 
which is always the same because people have to bring 
bread to the table. The rest of the problems will be settled 
after this, as it gets settled when and if people start working 
because they start smiling and believing in their dreams, 
which don’t stay closed in the drawer anymore.”
R: “So what would you expect?”
I 49 (M 57, community service): “At a political level, we 
should be stronger and guaranteeing more job opportuni-
ties through state policies.” 
R “What do you mean?”
I 49: “For example, the State used to intervene and actively 
create jobs through funding of, for instance, infrastructural 
jobs, street construction, and you employed people…practi-
cally, they called these measures incentives. Now, what do 
we have? European regulation say that the State cannot get 
involved in this way, the State cannot oppose the European 
Community, and hence it leaves private enterprises alone.”
R “And what should be done in your opinion? What do you 
expect?”
I 35 (F, 27, student): “Jobs. Here, the first problem, I tell 
you because I had difficulties myself, I have a good CV, but 
30 years, you are too old, they prefer hiring boys around 
18-19, three-month contracts, interns without experience, 
they prefer that, and they don’t like you. Then it’s not that 
I don’t stay afloat, but there are people, families with chil-
dren who really can’t arrive at the end of the week. People 
in Naples know this because many of them live in the city 
center and have other problems such as garbage, but em-
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ployment is still the first issue. If you don’t have a job, what 
do you do? You go and rob, what can you do?”
R “And despite this, what do you want? What do you 
expect?”
 
I 3 (M, 51, precarious civil servant): “Listen, if we talk 
about the polis and the public good, we should start again 
giving rights to workers, which have been cancelled, a re-
vamp of school and healthcare, but first and foremost work, 
workers’ rights and this guy (Renzi) is going on cancelling, 
he’s doing the opposite of what he said at the beginning.”
I 27(F, 53, teacher): “I would like to see honesty from 
everyone, respect for rules because without that kind of re-
spect there’s no democracy, everyone takes a club and does 
what he wants.”
 
R “Sure. And what else?”
I 27(F, 53, teacher) “And then labor, working harder to cre-
ate job opportunities …to go back to the point of mayors 
who don’t do anything, I’ve seen structures abandoned for 
55 years, these structures could have been used to create 
jobs, and this is not a joke, it’s not. And then it would be so 
simple to provide the chance for all to be better off: in the 
Ionic coast, we have a Greek-Roman settlement, so people 
who prefer to go to Sharm el Sheik could come here inste-
ad and fill their heart of marvelous things. Then I tell you, 
I’ve been in Vicenza to have surgery, all the doctors were 
southerners. I mean why you must go away if you want to 
work? Yeah, now you choose Europe, it’s an entirely diffe-
rent vision, and it’s good. But it isn’t fair that I must leave 
my son, or that my son must leave, or I must leave my land 
because I don’t have the opportunity to do the same job that 
in Australia is remunerated ten times as much? Also, this is 
unfair, I think.” 
R “Yes, the lack of merit. But what would you ask today?”
 
I 65 (F, 45, shop clerk): “Hmmm, difficult question. Listen, 
if I could ask anything to a local or even national leader, 
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I’d ask one thing: to make possible for people to work in 
tranquility, starting from small entrepreneurs.”
 
R “What do you mean?”
I 65: “What I mean? I mean that small entrepreneurs such 
as the owner of the shop I work in, they’re oppressed by re-
strictions and quibbles. What can I say…not only tax limits, 
the ones we know very well … but also more bureaucratic 
curbs. For example, the other day two traffic wardens went 
in my owner’s shop and told her that the sign was not regu-
lar, after 25 years they say that, since it’s in the historical 
center, some signs are not suitable …I mean you get it …do 
you get what I’m saying?”
 
R “If you had a candidate that you trust, which expecta-
tions would you have for him?”
 
I 29 (F, 32, social worker): “(the territory) is not valorized, 
I would expect that our things, where there are opportuni-
ties to harness them. We have a resource; we could create 
beautiful things, try to make the best out of what we have. In 
the summer, we have Montecovello, it’s very nice, and they 
organized the Covello Summer Fest, it was fantastic. The 
Council helped the people as it could, and the result was a 
good thing, so you understand that that could be a source 
of income for the town, and if tourists come, you bring nice 
bands. Then you call people from Cosenza, because there 
is an abandoned camping area, and they can get it up and 
running again, so that when the tourist comes, instead of 
giving him camping for free, you can have a professional 
camping, so that you can have a return on your investment 
and plan other stuff.”
 In these interviews, there is almost an obsessive request for jobs, 
understood as the highest and most “universal” of the universal benefits 
that are claimed here. Naturally, in the words of the interviewees, the 
correlation between the need for jobs and the capacity of the leader to 
deliver a universal answer is incredibly complex to untangle. Hence, 
we will come back to this point in the closure of the chapter: what is 
striking from the first reading of these transcriptions are the multifold 
meanings ascribed by the informants to work. Work as a universal be-
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nefit, in fact, is not connected to income and, hence, to the satisfaction 
of a logic material need. Delving deeper, and leaving participants free 
to speak without stimuli, it emerged a socially inclusive value ascribed 
to work. Besides the concept of dignity, in many cases, work is under-
stood as capable of providing economic security and, hence, a degree 
of stability apt to create strong social ties and deal with the future with 
more serenity and confidence.
 
 Moreover, most informants share a strong preoccupation for the 
lack of jobs for young people, and hence a concern with the future. The 
conversations are replete with references to the need to create opportu-
nities, so that young people can find jobs. Especially when informants 
are mothers, grandmothers or fathers, the accounts are charged with a 
profound sense of anguish connected to the future of younger genera-
tions. Precisely when facing this dimension of work as a warranty for 
future generations, work itself trespasses a merely economic dimension 
as a source of income, and it becomes something more. It becomes an 
opportunity for social redemption from disadvantaged social and eco-
nomic conditions, or as the way to give continuity to the path traced by 
fathers and ancestors. Work, hence, becomes the tool to realize dreams, 
or the necessary condition to experience a full, active and responsible 
citizenship. In other words, work becomes a social glue, which crea-
tes trust in the community and hope for the future. In this, not strictly 
material nuance, work becomes an entirely universal benefit because, 
while still concerning the individual, it has immediate effects and re-
percussions on the collectivity. These effects are, first, economic ones, 
because it secures the livelihood of persons and households. There is 
also less material, yet as important effects, such as the social accep-
tability of a worker as an active member of a community. Apparently, 
work and youth entangle with other issues such as the relinquishing of 
land, emigration, and depopulation, deriving from the definitive exodus 
of younger people and the correspondent lower natality of those who 
remain. Despite the description of work as a universal benefit might 
be fascinating and worth deeper scrutiny, it is unavoidable to focus on 
other, less immediate elements, which are still very significant for the 
research.
 The first element is the haziness of the ways in which a politician 
is supposed to tackle the problem of unemployment. In the parts of the 
interviews which are more inspired by universal benefits understood as 
services (roads, schools, hospitals) informants often provide concrete 
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and detailed solutions. Conversely, jobs are hardly ever associated with 
practical examples. In many interviews, in fact, the sources themselves 
point out at the difficulties that every politician face when trying to 
deliver more jobs. In synthesis, the central elements of these interviews 
are i) the vagueness of the propositions connected with work, unlike the 
very detailed solutions described for infrastructures and services. At the 
same time, ii) the objective difficulty facing politicians who want to cre-
ate jobs is acknowledged.  Lastly, there is a third implicit and unspoken 
element in all the listed interviews. All the informants, in fact, recogni-
ze public intervention as the sole driver for more employment and de-
velopment. There is no call to the private sector as an engine of wealth 
and income, let alone to the market. Everything seems to pass through 
the hands of politics and individual, often local politicians. This aspect 
is important because also in past research on the theme (Wolf 1966, 
Tarrow 1972, Putnam 1985) the accent has been placed on the adverse 
effects of the missed development of capitalism in the south of Italy in 
determining detrimental political practices such as clientelism. Maybe, 
the less intense relevance of the private sector and the lack of an eco-
nomical fabric produced, in time, a political consciousness in southern 
Italian voters, which is inspired by the idea that there is no job besides 
what is provided by politics. Or, more simply, many voters are aware 
of living in an economic system which even in the presence of private 
economic initiatives, cannot survive without the constant support of po-
litical leaders (both national and local), so that they must be relied upon 
when searching for opportunities of employment and development. It 
cannot be assessed without a doubt which one of the two dimensions is 
preponderant in the words of the informants. However, despite frequent 
claims to the lack of trust in politics and politicians, there seem to be no 
envisioned alternative to political leaders as “creators” of jobs. In this 
sense, the mandate given to politicians seems to be absolute and total. 
Moreover, regardless of the policy (lowering taxes on firms which hire 
young people, raising salaries to create aggregated demand, etc.), this 
mandate compels elected officials to find fast and satisfying solutions 
for as many people as possible.
7.2 Answering the research question: a personal vote, expecting 
universal benefits
 Summarizing what written so far, the research has indeed shown 
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the existence of a personal vote oriented towards universal benefits. 
However, as depicted in the last pages, the kind of universalism that 
this voting behavior assumes different shapes which make it difficult 
to classify it per neat and precise criteria and schemes. Trying to syn-
thesize the different accounts emerged in the interviews, the Personal/
Universal vote seems to be concerned with:
• A Personal/Universal vote understood as an ideal approach 
to policy themes, and as an expectation of universal benefits 
grounded on projects, ideas and capabilities of politicians 
and their ideas about the future.
• A Personal/Universal vote which derives from clear and 
real needs, especially the constant request for services and 
both material and immaterial infrastructures. This approach 
stems from a desire to overcome the divide with the Cen-
ter-North of the country, hence taking the form of a territo-
rial claim. Unlike the first type of Personal/Universal vote, 
however, this claim aims to obtain actual improvements 
such as communications and connections, regional projects 
for tourism, and so forth.
• The third type of Personal/Universal vote identifies work 
as the most critical of universal benefits and, as said in the 
analysis of the interviews, acknowledges work as going 
beyond income, to encompass identity, social integration 
and, in the end, the very wellbeing of an individual.
 Even though these approaches assume different forms, these 
three types of personal/universal vote represent, in various ways, the af-
firmative answer to the research question inspiring this thesis. However, 
despite the universalist orientation shared by the informants, there are 
remarkable differences between the different approaches and, hence, in 
the levels of expected universalism. In the first two cases, it is possible 
to distinguish two approaches about the degree of abstraction of the 
desired benefits. Conversely, work requires a supplement of reflection 
and sophistication. In fact, the expectations associated with the types 
as mentioned earlier of personal/universal vote already provide a sati-
sfactory answer to the research question. However, it is also true that 
work assumes a more profound significance, which emerges from the 
intensity of the accounts given by those southern voters who are more 
attentive to this theme. The overall sincerity of the informants seems 
to be confirmed by the fact that most of them are searching jobs, either 
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for themselves, for their children or their loved ones. In many cases, the 
very act of speaking meant uncovering difficulties angsts for an uncer-
tain future. In these interview settings, the tensions have been strong, 
and not rarely has it been necessary to have breaks to avoid a complete 
failure of the whole discussion. Intensity seems to provide a reliable 
measure of the sincerity of the informants, who speak about work as an 
asset which can multiply the total amount of available universal bene-
fit. This because it guarantees stability, confidence towards the future 
and, more in general, it allows for a person to have a clear role within 
society. Overall, if the three types of vote just described confirm the 
existence of a Personal/Universal vote, it is also true that the content of 
the interviews points out to the fact that not all the universal benefits are 
equal. There are some, such as work, which are “more universal” in na-
ture since they do not revolve around individual elements of everyday 
life, such as services and goods do. Rather, they influence the very life 
and well-being of the citizens-voters.
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conclusIons
The End of a Journey and a More Informed Approach to the Study of 
the Personal Vote.
Let us summarize the logical path that informed this research, its purpo-
se, methods and results. This study aimed to address the question: does 
it exist a type of personal vote, among the southern Italian voters, that 
seeks to achieve universal benefits?
As outlined in the first chapter, this research question emerged from 
the literature on the personal vote in the South, since most of the stu-
dies show a negative evaluation of personal vote as clientelism, in turn, 
associated with corruption and Mafia. Subsequently, the second chap-
ter deployed a conceptual framework from a close reading of available 
scholarship: voting behaviors were divided into four types based on 
expectations (particular/universal) and orientation (parties/candidates.) 
Moreover, the protagonists were defined according to their rational stra-
tegies and their degree of political sophistication. The third chapter, in 
turn, was devoted to the analysis of the four types of vote: party (ideo-
logical) oriented, clientelism, patronage and constituency service. The 
third chapter provided a review of the existing scholarship on clienteli-
sm, focusing on the culturalist and structuralist approaches. Moreover, 
it had to grapple with separating the concepts of patronage and clien-
telism from each other. The fourth chapter outlined the methodological 
framework; it justified the choice of semi-structured interviews as a 
suitable method; it described the selected sample of informants, and it 
described the structure of the interviews. 
 This first part of the thesis, the literature review provided the 
reader with a comprehensive picture of what has been said and writ-
ten so far about the personal vote. However, the interviews themselves 
represented the most important part of the research: since the project 
adopted a post-positivist epistemological stance, its aim was less to test 
a set of hypotheses than to retrieve a new type of personal vote from 
the empirical material, i.e. a type of personal vote animated by univer-
sal expectations. The exposition of the results gave space also to the 
other types of voting, by analyzing the interviews first according to the 
degree of personalism, and then to the kind of expected benefits. The 
sixth chapter compared the account of the respondents with the types of 
voting behaviors emerged from the literature, i.e. party-oriented voting, 
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patronage, and clientelism. While the first and the last cases appeared 
several times in the interviews, patronage in its organizational was no-
table for its absence. Lastly, the final chapter addressed the research 
question itself by recounting several examples of personal voting stra-
tegies aimed at achieving universal benefits.
 Overall, the research has confirmed the existence of a relation-
ship between candidates and voters grounded on the exchange of bene-
fits which does not directly involve people who are politically close to 
the candidate (patronage), or who belong to his or her personal network 
(clientelism). Rather, these exchanges involved the community as a 
whole. However, an affirmative answer to the question is not enough, 
without elaborating on that answer in further detail. First, universal be-
nefits needed to be divided and grouped according to their nature, such 
as public services and public transportation vis-à-vis labor and jobs. 
Regarding the first category of benefits, a certain degree of need for 
public utilities was already expected before undertaking empirical re-
search: many parts of the South, regarding public services, belong to a 
different country from Centre-North examples. Rather, the surprising 
result was that high expectations were placed on local candidates, ra-
ther than on the state more in general.
 The lack of adequate healthcare, infrastructure, and transporta-
tion emerged not only in the many examples provided by the informants 
but in the experience in the field itself, i.e. in the very research activity 
conducted in the communities under investigation. In Naples, for exam-
ple, one interviewee showed the existence of unauthorized buses, whi-
ch provide an overlapping and informal transportation service, thereby 
filling the gaps in the public transit network. In another example, from 
a small town in the Calabrian countryside, one informant was eager to 
make a phone call during an interview to show how it was possible to 
be admitted to the local hospital only if one had the right network inside 
the healthcare service. For the others, the only option was the hospital 
in Catanzaro, two hours away. Without expressing ethical evaluations 
of these and other examples, it is all too clear that the lack of services, 
and the need thereof, is a shared need, besides those who already pos-
sess the necessary wealth to make use of private services and facilities.
 However, labor is the expected benefit with the highest degree of uni-
versality, among those emerged from the words of the interviewees. In 
fact, the informants concurred in thinking of labor as much more as a 
commodity, exchanged between a candidate and his or her voters, and 
this for two essential features of labor itself. First, it represents a source 
of income that enables and empowers people through a highly desired 
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but hardly achieved economic independence. “Living on one’s work,” 
as often said by elder informants, is the best cure against Mafia and 
mischief because it deprives the criminal organizations of the economic 
leverage against ordinary people. Second, labor is paramount to put an 
end to young emigration. This new wave of departures from Italy is 
considered worrying by the participants because it is based on the idea 
of “no return,” while previous emigrants used to maintain a strong con-
nection with the place of origin, e.g. through remittances or by coming 
back after a while. 
However, labor is depicted as much more than a material resource: it 
is such an essential element that it can compete with other rights and 
principles such as health. For example, Taranto’s ILVA steel factory is 
proved to be harmful, but it remains central. In the words of an infor-
mant: “Ilva allowed many people to buy a house, to provide education 
for their children, but most importantly it allowed us to stop working 
in the fields barefoot, at 4 in the morning, being paid piecework. We 
became working class, with shoes, a wage, and a dignity.” Hence, labor 
is the most important vantage point from which to judge voters’ univer-
salism or particularism: both among clientelist electors (a minority) and 
among universalist ones, labor is the bargaining chip with politics and 
candidates. While the hardship of the South makes work a crucial poli-
tical issue, labor understood as economic development is connected, in 
particular among respondents with relatively high levels of education, 
with the capacity of candidates to lead and bring change to their com-
munities in a more comprehensive way. Respondents with high levels 
of either political sophistication, education, or both, provided a cau-
sal narrative that connects tangible benefits such as services and infra-
structure with labor and, more in general, with the need for candidates 
with sophisticated and comprehensive visions for their communities. 
It is problematic to synthesize hours of dialogues, but one recurring 
theme was politics understood as care for the polis. Functioning roads, 
services, and jobs as sources of welfare, are nothing but a complete 
idea of society oriented towards collective and individual wellbeing. 
Candidates are very often asked to deliver on this aspiration, despite 
the disenchantment and the intense anti-establishment feeling which 
pervades almost all the interviews.
 Hence, the articulated structure of the response to the research 
question makes the results of this research compelling. The variety of 
expected universal benefits gives vigor to the idea that there is a type of 
personal vote animated by universal expectations:
• First, the diversity of anticipated benefits derives from the high le-
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vel of articulation in the accounts provided by the respondents, and 
the different perceptions of the social context and its needs. This 
high degree of dynamism proves interviewees’ sincerity and posi-
tivity. Not only do they provide brief and summary answers: when 
solicited, they replied in a sincere way, based on his or her subjecti-
ve perception of reality. It is not a coincidence, for example, that 
roads and transport connections are more relevant for people in the 
countryside and less salient for voters living in cities.
• Moreover, especially in longer and in-depth interviews, the list of 
expected benefits follows a clear order of priorities. Not all the uni-
versal benefits are equally desired because, in some cases, the need 
for a road might be more urgent than lowering taxes, or vice versa. 
Overall, the interviews did not provide a cold a rational definition 
of what is needed. Rather, they listed priorities, as if the responses 
were a proper ready-made party platform, to be offered to a candi-
date. This attention from the interviewees to the specific interven-
tions confirms the good faith of the informants and the validity of 
the results.
 Many questions remain unanswered, and there is room for fur-
ther confirmation of the results. For example, it would be important 
to unpack the relationship between power and citizens, and the role 
candidates play in mediating between the two. Especially elder voters, 
in fact, often express the need for personal connections with the candi-
dates, mainly to feel less detached from politics, and at the same time 
to be heard by decision makers. Proximity to the power that local lea-
ders represent is often the only remedy to indifference and populism, 
especially in elder voters with lower levels of education. Moreover, this 
attachment to a candidate cuts across the right-left divide, as it seems 
to encompass conservative and progressive voters alike, alongside with 
“apolitical” or independent ones. The causes of the centrality of terri-
tory in the relationship with politics might be diverse, such as the lack 
of mass parties in the South, the widespread presence of local notables 
in southern politics, and so forth. 
 Second, it remains to be studied in further detail the demographic 
variations of political behaviors: younger voters show an overall refu-
sal of clientelist practices, which are judged disastrous on a functional 
and ethical ground. Especially people under 35 with higher levels of 
political sophistication are more oriented towards universal benefits as 
an antidote to clientelism. Many young voters deploy a functional cri-
tique of clientelism in an accurate and history-sensitive way, and they 
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sharply judge clientelist systems as utterly inefficient. Many informants 
cite as an example the fictitious nature of the benefits that clientelist 
politics brings to the local community, which prioritizes short-sighted 
projects over collective improvements. Besides this practical and ethi-
cal judgment, many informants are worried to be forever associated 
with a collective appraisal of the South as inherently clientelist, hence 
unproductive and parasitic. Young entrepreneurs share an intolerance of 
political habits which were common back in the days, which are sought 
to be eradicated as hinders to development and modernization. While 
proposing a causal explanation for this inter-generational cleavage is 
impossible, the differences towards clientelism in elder and younger 
voters are clear, and a fragment can easily synthesize them: 
“Politicians like De Mita filled local state companies of 
friends, who bankrupted them and destroyed even the few 
jobs that there were here. Now, who is my age and favors 
people like De Mita needs to know that the job he doesn’t 
have is not there because of De Mita, because he destroyed 
jobs with senseless policies and clientelist appointments, 
aimed at keeping power.” 
In conclusion, this research answered positively to the research que-
stion and justified in detail this response: a type of personal vote which 
is oriented towards universal benefits exists. This finding makes two 
contributions. First, methodologically, this result suggests a less cynical 
and critical stance towards personal relations between candidates and 
voters. A decision to cast a ballot based on elements of the individual 
candidate represents one of many possible cognitive shortcuts used by 
citizens to structure electoral behaviors. Personal vote, hence, deserves 
the same analytical dignity as a research object as the other possible 
voting strategies. In the South, personalism and personal vote have old 
roots that require in-depth and value-free analyses. Second, normati-
vely, this research argues for a more informed appraisal of the potential 
beneficial role that the personal vote might play in bridging the gap 
between citizens and institutions. In a time of crisis in political partici-
pation and widespread anti-politics, this proposed type of universalist 
personal vote might be a fertile ground on which to experiment good 
practices in political participation. Of course, the findings of this project 
are more nuanced and ambivalent, and more studies are needed before 
one can claim that a form of constituency service can develop in the 
South. However, political science commands to deal with these and fur-
ther possibilities in genuinely analytical terms, especially with regards 
of the institutional milieu. Hence, it will be necessary to consider the 
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possible degenerations of the personal vote, firstly clientelism, under 
the light of the possible exogenous causes which prevents undesirable 
practices from spreading. Limitations in public expenditure imposed by 
law, international control, the significant development of the Internet, 
and mass communication more in general, are but a limited number that 
limit the “gray area” where corrupt politicians, at a national and local 
level, can generate benefits for the few and costs for the many.
 Overall, the important processes of social and political transfor-
mation which traversed Italy from the transition between the First and 
the Second Republic until today, require a revision of the analytical pa-
radigm concerning the personal vote. A personal vote animated by the 
expectation of universal benefits may not only exist, as this research has 
shown: it also can represent a virtuous reinvention of the relationship 





I 2 (M,48, impiegato pubblico) “Dovrebbe essere animato solo dal pro-
posito di non solo rappresentare chi lo vota ma di tendere ad educare 
anche chi lo vota, cioè  se riceve dei voti non è che li deve pesare, non 
li deve pesare perché il voto può essere appunto il frutto di una corri-
spondenza a un senso si appartenenza,allora io mi sento di appartenere 
di condividere degli ideali di un tal partito piuttosto di un tal movimento 
ecc.ecc. il voto per me è il frutto di una corrispondenza di ideali (…) 
la persona deve più che altro raccogliere l’eredità del partito e portarlo 
avanti”; 
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “quello che non mancava (negli anni 60) era il 
senso di appartenenza ad un movimento, un partito politico i leader 
rispecchiavano quel momento storico, incarnavano il senso di apparte-
nenza forte con delle idee chiare e poi si poteva governare”
 I 6 (M, 28, piccolo imprenditore) “negli ultimi 40 anni quante volte 
abbiamo detto sta cosa? E il leader quello che conta il leader e poi non 
è mai venuto niente di buono, torniamo alle idee, ritorniamo al dibattito 
politico centro destra e centro sinistra e basta parlare di nomi, di Ales-
sandro ecc.ecc”
I 16 (M, 34, barista-giornalista) “ti parlo sinceramente è inutile girarci 
intorno, oggi fondamentalmente non voti la persona, dal mio punto di 
vista è quasi impossibile voti il partito, la corrente cioè voglio dire un 
paese fino a 30-40 mila abitanti magari fai a tempo a costruirti un rap-
porto personale e magari è anche possibile fidarsi, ma già se superi un 
tot di abitanti e poi a livello nazionale e regionale diventa impossibile 
fidarsi al 100% e ti affidi allora alla corrente politica di cui fa parte”; 
I 23 (M, 21, studente) “perché magari ti aspetti che con quella persona 
ci sia una comunità di vedute perché state nello stesso partito.... porta 
avanti le idee di tutte, in sostanza non conta come persona e ti affidi sol-
tanto in quanto esponente di un partito, si fanno gravi errori affidandosi 
soltanto alla persona, che poi succede come la Spinelli al parlamento 
europeo”; 
I 31(F, 51, insegnante) “...certo a volte ho deciso di mettermi in gioco e 
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l’ho fatto per il bene del partito perché ancora esistono alcuni valori che 
distinguono i partiti anche nel centro-destra”;
I 40 (M 20, studente)  “il politico conta nella sua attività quotidiana 
istituzionale politica per l’appunto nella misura in cui è espressione di-
retta delle sue idee e di quelle del partito” - “la persona acquisisce un 
suo peso nelle misura in cui riesce ad imporre la sua volontà all’interno 
del partito”; 
I 42 (F, 26, studentessa) “ e guarda per me è importante il pensiero. Nel 
senso certo la persona aiuta, ma vengono al secondo posto rispetto al 
pensiero, rispetto al bene comune insomma”
I 43 (F, 31 studentessa-lavoratrice) “.... si a livello nazionale leggo il 
programma sono più attenta a quello che è il programma e quello che 
..diciamo la logica del partito, le idee del partito, ma questo vale molto 
a livello nazionale ovviamente, a livello locale è diverso”
I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “dovrebbe servire a realizzare veramente grandi 
scopi, ideali far si che quelli che sono ideali utopie diventano veramente 
realtà quindi avere a cuore il bene dell’umanità......Cioè non pensare 
soltanto alle cose tecniche strumentali ma riuscire a proiettarsi oltre, 
al futuro, le giovani generazioni, quello che diamo loro, l’ambiente, il 
mondo dove viviamo”; 
I 58 (F, 26 praticante avvocato) “A me è stato insegnato, quando sono 
entrata in rifondazione comunista che prima da subito c’è il partito e 
la struttura ha rilievo, poi vengono i dirigenti e quindi le persone, cer-
to persone come Vendola hanno contribuito alla primavera pugliese in 
maniera straordinaria, ma io credo nei processi collettivi e quindi nei 
partiti e non nei processi individuali.
I 3 (M 53, lavoratore socialmente utili) “all’epoca c’era Lotta Continua 
ora la politica non la riconosco più, noi .facevamo volantinaggio e ci si 
spendeva per delle idee e mai ho accettato la logica mangiano loro ma 
almeno mangiamo tutti,mai mi ha sempre fatto schifo” - “Ho vacillato 
soltanto quando si è presentato Orlando...era della Democrazia Cristia-
na, per me il male...però ho vacillato”; 
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “la persona conta all’interno di idee ben definite 
che ne rispecchiavano le idee e quello che non mancava mai era il senso 
di appartenenza ad un movimento, quegli anni erano pieni di passione 
e personggai illustri, Berlinguer per il Pci e Almirante per noi (MSI) 
erano questo, impersonavano idee”. 
 In sostanza, rispetto agli intervistati che hanno memoria dei par-
titi del ‘900, i riferimenti all’idea di partito e di conseguenza al voto 
orientato in primo luogo da una scelta di appartenenza sono chiari e 
riferiti a fatti realmente accaduti e vissuti dagli intervistati. Se invece si 
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analizzano le risposte degli intervistati più giovani (19-30 anni) e mag-
giormente orientati al voto ideologico, notiamo qualcosa di particolare: 
I 23 (M, 21, studente) “Certo le persone contano, ma in relazione alle 
idee del partito... come espressione di una piattaforma... Vendola, il suo 
percorso l’uso della poesia in politica, quello che rappresenta, vengono 
prima degli aspetti strettamente leaderistici”; 
I 44 (M,35 disoccupato) “certo i partiti contavano un tempo...luoghi di 
formazione e crescita ormai si può fare poco i leader durano poco e non 
risolvono se un partito riuscisse a promuovere idee diverse, portarle 
avanti, io non credo onestamente nel potere della singola persona”-”De 
Magistris ad esempio può essere un eccezione virtuosa perché ha fatto 
qualcosa di buono ha creato un movimento di persone...”
I 42  (F, 26, studentessa) “Si ho dato delle preferenze, dentro il partito, 
ma solo per persone che sapevo avere le mie idee che poi sono quelle 
del partito...i partiti sono in uno stato pietoso, Grillo che è una finta 
risposta, il PD di Renzi ormai un partito di destra e anche Vendola e il 
suo entourage hanno fatto danni a sinistra”
 I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “Io sono filosoficamente comunista ma 
più come corrente filosofica diciamo una ideologia di vita nel senso che 
sono di sinistra a livello di comunismo di Berlinguer, ma se il partito mi 
propone un cretino non lo voto”- “...e poi abbiamo deciso di appoggia-
re quel ragazzo anche se era dei DS …. perché ci sembrava diverso...
insomma io non sono comunistona come Antonella...”; 
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Per me chi rappresenta il partito deve essere al-
meno competente e istruito e noi abbiamo cercato sempre candidati così 
che sapessero distinguersi perché istruiti, colti....a volte non ci sono pia-
ciuti questi candidati e non li ho votati, anche se non è stato semplice”. 
Ancora una volta, dalle parole degli elettori più ideologizzati si ricava 
un forte senso di appartenenza ad una comunità politica (il partito) che 
però non prescinde mai  totalmente dal ruolo della persona che poi ef-
fettivamente si fa carico delle aspettative del partito candidandosi. In 
tal senso occorre quindi considerare un aspetto apparentemente margi-
nale, ma che risulta interessante per comprendere la complessità delle 
scelte di voto, che a volte caratterizzano gli elettori meridionali. Molto 
brevemente consideriamo alcuni passaggi di interviste che potremmo 
definire candidate oriented :
I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “Io ho un’idea abbastanza chiara...i 
valori per me sono tutto e devono esser valori fissi, non trattabili”; 
I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “Forse sbagliamo perché abbiamo perso un 
pochino quegli ideali iniziali che magari uno dice può fare tante cose 
ma poi non funziona e perdiamo subito fiducia. Dovremmo superare 
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nuove generazioni questo modo di pensare fondato sul compromesso, 
dovremmo recupera un pochino di ideali”. 
5.1.2 Party and Leader
I 1(M, 47, impiegato regionale) “..parlo ad esempio del Movimento 5 
Stelle che molti ne parlano senza contezza senza sapere il lavoro stra-
ordinario che hanno fatto Grillo e i ragazzi del movimento e siccome 
mi sono letto il programma e il regolamento interno e siccome vado 
a vedere di persona cosa fanno, i soldi che hanno investito nella mi-
cro-impresa..insomma non sono male”
I 9 (F, 58 lavoratore socialmente utili) “D.B. Ho votato lui...che sai che 
lui è PD e poi è giovane”- “E poi...per le regionali chi era quella ragaz-
za? Aspe’ non ricordo..ah sì Teresa,brava ragazza, ci dissero che stava 
nel Pd che portava de Luca insomma  e la votai”.
I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “...sempre stata socialista perché credevo nel-
la libertà, nella tolleranza si parlava tanto di Proudhon e quindi sono 
anche approdata a posizioni meno estremistiche meno marxiste..e poi 
c’era Craxi che era un leader vero, mi piaceva tanto al di là di com’è 
andata finire; 
I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “Allora noi in famiglia sempre stati comu-
nisti..come insegnava mio padre...niente meno che nel 70 siamo andati 
a Reggio durante la rivolta..perché eravamo di quella gente lì”- “Ingrao 
perché rappresentava  l’uguaglianza i diritti e i doveri e l’abbiamo sem-
pre seguito fino a quando è diventato presidente della Camera, sempre 
seguito”; 
I 17 (M 72, pensionato)“io sono democristiano moroteo e ancora oggi 
mi sento di definirmi così, ho avuto questa grande fiducia nel movi-
mento giovanile della democrazia cristiana spinti dall’idea di Moro di 
raccordarci di più verso sinistra, verso il centro sinistra visto che nella 
Dc sicuramente Moro era più orientato a sinistra rispetto a Fanfani”; 
I 20 (M, 43 avvocato) “... Sì nel 94 aderì a Forza Italia perché sul terri-
torio c’era un bel movimento e perché Berlusconi mi affascinava come 
uomo per come di presentava quindi io ho creduto al miracolo italiano, 
poi figurati venivano fuori dalle ceneri di tangentopoli ti rappresentava 
un’ipotesi di novità, ero piccolo per sapere che lui era il delfino di Craxi 
e quindi si sostanzialmente questo e poi c’erano degli amici che stavano 
in Forza Italia e quindi insomma questo”; 
I 26 (M, 67 commerciante) “No guarda a votare non ci vado quasi più 
troppo schifo tutta sta gente ste poltrone sti politici...quest’anno forse 
torno a votare il Movimento 5 Stelle che fanno molte cose buone re-
stituiscono i soldi e a Benevento hanno fatto accattà i computer per i 
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ragazzi della scuola e quel ragazzo eletto ad Acerra, C.A. penso si chia-
ma...non prende lo stipendio so bravi insomma”; 
I 31 (F, 51, insegnante) “Credo e mi sono spesa in Fratelli D’Italia, 
specialmente con Giorgia Meloni che ritengo preparata e molto vicina 
alle mie posizioni per quello che riguarda i programmi, ripeto poi biso-
gna vedere se gra il processo di negoziazione che cosa io prospetto che 
cosa dico e la realizzazione di quanto promesso poi andiamo è un altro 
discorso quello insomma si può anche parlare essere affascinanti essere 
poi però in realtà poco”;
I 46 (M, 51 personale Ata) “Noi in famiglia sempre stati democratici 
(democristiani) e sempre votato per F.M. Che ha fatto tanto per la Piana 
a partire dagli ospedali e da tutti i reparti che ha portato nella Piana...
oggi invece no, farei fatica a dirti quali partiti ci sono, magari i leader 
quelli sì...insomma è difficile..rispetto al passato voglio dire quando an-
davi alla sezione dei socialisti e poi anche dei comunisti”; 
I 53 (F,30, disoccupata)  “Sempre stata di centro-sinistra si insomma 
Pd..ma Bersani non mi stava molto simpatico Renzi è meglio....sembra 
che fa più cose, che è più attivo per noi giovani e infatti nonostante sia 
di centro sinistra ho tradito il Pd, ma per colpa di Bersani non mi pia-
ceva proprio”.
5.1.3 Leader
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto)  “un politico deve avere la modestia e la capaci-
tà...perché tu devi conquistarti la fiducia degli elettori ...quindi tu poli-
tico devi mostrarti capace di perseguire e raggiungere degli obiettivi”; 
I 8 (M 61, impiegato) “(il politico) ...deve avere le competenze, deve 
essere competente deve dimostrarmi di sapersi battere in consiglio, di 
conoscere i meccanismi e la macchina istituzionale...poi magari non 
riesci a fare niente...perché poi sai quelli che hai intorno..quello che ti 
fanno fare... però di base devi essere competente”; 
I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “ No..io la persona guardo e cerco gente 
competente che si attiva per il territorio che lo conosce...che fa cose, 
una persona si deve mettere in vista per quello che fa proprio a livello 
di quartietre, che si interessa al bene della città e poi una persona che 
conosca il territorio e i suoi problemi”;
 I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Certo guardo il su excursus personale la sua 
esperienza sia che si tratta di un politico o se si tratta di un manager, mi 
interessa sapere quello che sa fare, se ha già fatto altro quindi sì...ecco 
anche liberi professionisti, dico cioè non prendere un ragazzo senza 
esperienza che poi viene manovrato, da quello superiore, da quello più 
in alto.”; 
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I 17 (M 72, pensionato) “Certo l’onorevole Moro, al di là delle chiac-
chiere, ha portato l’Ilva per portare Sviluppo perché queste era una zona 
poverissima..non si tratta solo di saper parlare vuol dire saper risolvere 
le cose...a me viene da ridere quando sento parlare questi di chiudere 
l’Ilva..negli anni 60 a Taranto c’era il 40% di disoccupazione gente che 
lavorava nelle miniere in Francia, in Belgio e Moro che ha fatto? Ha 
semplicemente risolto il problema occupazionale di un terra che era di-
sgraziatissima e allora a quel punto abbiamo avuto 40 anni di benessere 
e non era scontato caro mio”; 
I 20 (M, 41 avvocato) “Eh sì non mi vergogno a dirlo per me Berlusconi 
nel 94...eh a me piaceva pensavo che se ha fatto bene l’imprenditore 
farà bene anche all’Italia perché avrà senza dubbio delle capacità, delle 
doti da manager”;
I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “Guarda l’unica persona che ricordo con piacere 
è l’assessore regionale S. …. persona colta, capace e con idee brillanti 
aveva creato un percorso artistico-culturale sul valore del mito una cosa 
meravigliosa, bella bella...poi era tanto chiacchierato, ma meglio chiac-
chierato ma capace che pulito ma immobile e inutile come Crocetta”; 
I 25 (M, 51 operatore turistico) “Certo mi interessa sapere che ha fatto.. 
e poi vedi se ha fallito nel suo mandato se non ha realizzato nulla per il 
proprio territorio non ha dato un apporto che si possa chiamare apporto 
e quindi in generale quello che hai dimostrato di saper fare o non saper 
fare”;
I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “per dire una persona che si metteva a 
disposizione...per dire una cazzata che entrava in un bar e cercava di 
aiutare chi ne aveva bisogno..che vedeva il problema e cercava di risol-
verlo;, insomma gente che sta con i piedi per terra, che vive la realtà.
I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Scelgo il meno peggio.... però fondamental-
mente scelgo quello più concreto, che so che mi prende meno per il culo 
e ha programmi realizzabili, mi hanno insegnato questo in generale, che 
le persone capace, quelle serie e competenti non sparano cose...che poi 
vallo a vedè se lo fanno ”; 
I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “No certo le persone contano...ma a me piace 
giudicarli per quello che fanno e per i collaboratori che si scelgono...nel 
tempo ho capito che conta tanto, cioè prima mi lasciavo molto trascina-
re fagli aspetti emotivi, si insomma dalla persona poi però, su consiglio 
di qualcuno ho imparato a guardare chi si sceglie il politico come colla-
boratori e in base a chi sceglie...si ecco da quello si può capire molto”; 
I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) “Deve sapersi (il candidato) calarsi nella real-
tà...capire e risolvere i problemi delle realtà dei cittadini devono ascol-
tare questi ragazzi che hanno delle idee, dargli ascolto da competenti da 
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persone che possono dargli delle dritte  che ne so dirgli stai dicendo una 
cosa che non ha né capo né coda oppure no questa è una buona idea..ma 
perché hai le competenze per farlo sì per dirlo.”; 
I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “ No no senza dubbio la persona che reputo 
sia capace e quindi tutta la sua storia per quanto  di mia conoscenza  e 
non scelgo il partito perché io voglio prima di tutto un moderato e non 
sempre i partiti fanno queste scelte, io non ho problemi neanche a no-
minare le persone che reputo..abbiano fatto bene a R. ”; 
I 54 (F, 36 disoccupata) “Essere in grado di risolvere...si insomma di 
vivere nella realtà e avere la capacità di risolvere i problemi dovrebbero 
sentirsi più uomini parte di una comunità più che senatori e deputati di 
un istituto chiamato Parlamento e poi legiferare per il bene di tutti...
risolvere i problemi della gente comune”. 
I 1 (M, 47, impiegato regionale) “Cioè Rita (Borsellino) ha fatto tanti 
sbagli ma non è mai scesa a compromessi però è messa da parte.....
Salvo è arrivato più in alto però per me è una delusione nel senso che 
ovviamente sarò grato in eterno a lui per quello che ha fatto però.. (Cro-
cetta) no.. ha sbagliato, non si è dimostrato coerente” 
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “ Uno che abbiamo votato con piacere e oggi non 
c’è più, l’abbiamo sostenuto.... un ragazzo in gamba M.T. persona con 
idee chiare...forte personalità anche lui figlio di un veccho dirigente 
del movimento sociale, purtroppo una disgrazia ci ha privato della sua 
presenza, ma finché era in vita l’abbiamo seguito.” 
I 9  (F, 58 LSU) “L’abbiamo conosciuta al sindacato, ci fecero conosce-
re questa ragazza.... io sinceramente non conoscevo nessuno e dissi va 
bene, non ci stanno problemi e l’ho votata convintamente..poi sai una 
ragazza molto educata mi ha dato un bell’impatto”.
I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “ Certo, fondamentale... e deve essere prima di 
tutto una persona di cui mi possa fidare, una persona pulita, una perso-
na corretta, pulita, il che oggi non è facile ecco trovare in politica, una 
persona pulita che poi deve amministrare a livello locale quindi che ne 
so l’assessore alla sanità deve amministrare insomma ognuno ha il suo 
ruolo.
I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Mi ricordo Lombardi...un  grande leader...
alla casa dello studente uno in grado di esaltare...di esaltare le folle, mi 
piaceva faceva gli interventi, allora c’era anche Emma Bonino e anche 
lei sempre apprezzata la conosco da quando ero ragazzo!”.
I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “ E’ stato un grande sindaco e un bravo 
maestro...conservo un bellissimo ricordo una persona prima di tutto dal 
calore umano forte...che ti trasmetteva allora il sindaco chi io sappia 
non era retribuito era gratuito e lo faceva per il bene del paese e allora 
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prendere questo incarico alla mattina faceva il maestro e poi il sindaco 
un esempio”
I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Craxi...poi l’hanno fatto fuori...perché forse 
voleva muovere troppo...ma lui era un capo, un leader forte, mi piaceva 
come uomo, come idee insomma veramente era... mi è rimasto impres-
so ecco quello si forse perché ero più giovane  quindi quello che mi 
veniva di più”.
I 15 (F 46, medico) “Ripeto quello che mi convince è il contatto, la co-
noscenza voglio sapere se è una persona d’animo..ora mi penderai per 
stupida ma per esempio il Papa è un leader...sì il Papa, ma non come 
capo della chiesa ma come leader...nella società....cioè che parla alla 
persone.” 
I 19 (F 69, pensionata) “Io mi ricordo quando andavamo a sentire i co-
mizi, noi vedevamo in loro (parlamentari DC del territorio) un modello, 
ci dicevano cose che ci affascinavano che interpretavano i nostri desi-
deri avere una casa, la famiglia, i nostri ideali e in loro vedevamo che 
c’era una certa garanzia, sì ecco garanzia....anche di serietà, di futuro, 
quella garanzia che oggi non c’è più.” 
I 21 (F 26, insegnante) “Vabbè sopratutto se è del paese mio...anche 
se è del Pd...diciamo però come ti dicevo deve trasmettermi una certa 
giustizia un certo senso di equità e poi che faccia cose buone, non mi 
interessa di che partito sei basta che fai cose buone per la popolazione, 
per la zona e allora non mi interessa il colore che hai” 
I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “Quel Di Maio...mi sembra presuntuosetto e l’a-
mico toscano che fa lo smargiasso.... invece che bella figura che è il 
Presidente della Repubblica, che bella persona... mi piace serio, silen-
zioso, greve mi ispira severità, serietà, certo non è uno sbruffone, uno 
smargiasso; al contrario dell’amico toscano che fa sempre il bullo, si 
atteggia da smargiasso” . 
I 25  (M, 51 operatore turistico) “Guarda al primo posto viene fiducia 
e onestà, il candidato è questo che mi deve ispirare e voglio sapere 
quello che posso sulla sua vita...che poi i fatti testimoniano più delle 
chiacchiere, dimostrarsi all’altezza ed essere un guida per la comunità”; 
I 31 (F, 51, insegnante) “ Un leader che affascini...che riesca a coin-
volgere, ecco la Meloni mi piace perché ha questo stile, franco, fresco 
e giovane e un buona tecnica di comunicazione poi certo...l’abilità re-
torica, saper parlare, a prescindere se poi mantieni, quello è un altro 
discorso, ma l’abilità oratoria accidenti anche quella conta moltissimo” 
I 34 (M 74, pensionato) “ Intendiamoci, in questo tempo, ci vuole anche 
una cosa importante che è la leadership...senza leadership forti, anche 
un po’ autoritaria non si va...si insomma voglio dire non si va da nes-
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suna parte”; 
I 37 (F, 57 LSU) “Deve essere una persona semplice....come ti devo 
dire..mi deve emozionare per questo io penso che i vecchi comizi vanno 
fatti ancora, devi avere contatto con la gente, devi guardare  negli oc-
chi non in televisione..personaggi come Enrico (Berlinguer) che grande 
persona, non si arrabbiava mai, ci spiegava le cose INTERRUZIONE 
PIANTO”; 
I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “ Certo..Vendola vabbè l’ho anche conosciuto il 
suo carisma, il suo registro linguistico..sarei stata ore e ore ad ascoltar-
lo...sì insomma era abbastanza affascinata tant’è che credevo e speravo 
che presto diventasse leader del Pd, mentre Renzi mi piace... ecco il suo 
dinamismo e per la sua immediatezza nella comunicazione”; 
I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) “ Senza dubbio la fiducia...un politico deve 
alzare il culo dalla sedia ascoltare le persone e guadagnarsi la fiducia 
altrimenti che fai..e no che vieni a dirmi delle cose che poi già si capi-
scono che non farai nulla, no devi trasmettermi fiducia ”; 
I 49 (M 57, disoccupato) “mmh..come dire deve essere una persona 
innanzitutto come...come definirlo...ti deve ispirare fiducia nel senso 
che deve essere l’onestà deve essere una persona molto retta e molto 
cioè presente sul territorio come impegno effettivo no? come impegno 
attivo quindi coerente con quello che lui....con le sue idee e quindi come 
impegno attivo quindi coerente con quello che lui effettivamente dice“ 
I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “l’onestà del politico è un presuppo-
sto fondamentale però deve avere anche idee, capace  e avere sempre 
una sorta di onestà e di dignità personale che gli consenta di potersi 
presentare io ragiono molto con la mia testa e lo vedo come un persona 
da rispettare ma che non deve mai calpestare la dignità degli elettori.... 
e poi dovrebbe avere anche un pochino di carisma e quindi essere in 
grado di usarlo, un po’ sentimentale, dovrebbe riscaldare i cuori”. 
I 26 (M, 67 commerciante)  “ Cosa voglio? L’onestà...la gente che va 
là ha da essere onesta!!!”- “Prendemmo l’appalto mensa alla scuola...
ma io solo per aiutare mio fratello..che lo sapevo che era na nculata..
paghi na mazzetta là, un regalo qua e per farci uscire i soldi dovevamo 
aggiungere latte e pangrattato negli hamburger per aumentare il peso 
senza mettere troppa carne”
I 51 (M 25, disoccupato) “Certo per carità devono essere persone oneste 
figurati, io sono cresciuto con il mito di Borsellino” - “Io credo che M. 
e D.M. non abbiano creato il male sul nostro territorio...poi certo che 
devi fare devi averci a che fare con sta gente..poi al massimo se sbagli 
è giusto essere punito”.
I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “Se mi informo dopo il voto?...mhh si certo 
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seguo sopratutto quello che succede rispetto ai problemi..si insomma se 
migliora qualcosa davvero”
I 54 (F, 36 disoccupata) “ Certo che li controllo, specialmente sui pro-
blemi strutturali...magari non il giorno dopo..ecco cose complicate non 
è che...”.
5.2.1 Particularistic Benefits
I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “Io all’inizio ho avuto a che fare con S.M. demo-
cristiano e tutto nel periodo più nero per me perché io al tempo lavoravo 
per un’azienda privata e stavo magnificamente bene....poi persi il lavo-
ro e venne lui per darmi il famoso posto”-”Sono andata dietro tutti i vari 
politici di destra di sinistra prima per il posto per me ero disoccupato e 
mi prendeva sempre per i fondelli diceva ci vediamo tra 15 giorni e lui 
per la sua carriere aiutava i compagni, sì lui democristiano faceva lavo-
rare i compagni, ma vero dico, posso sottoscrivere !! Faceva lavorare 
i compagni sicché noi diciamo suoi elettori che per bisogno andavamo 
dietro a lui con la speranza di un posto.
I 45 (M, 34 disoccupato) “Non è il metodo che mi piace, anche perché 
conosco delle persone che sono state aiutate...un aiutino così non per un 
lavoro a tempo indeterminato fisso. A me non me m’hai stato offerto, 
giusto non so una cosa dopo la laurea se mi vuoi dare per due o tre mesi 
una consulenza per una cosa piccola eh, non una cosa grande... cono-
sco un mio amico che è stato un po’ alla comunità montana, part time 
200/300 euro al mese eh... a me n’cazzo no m’è mai stato offerto.
I 51 (M, 21 studente) “A me non fa strano che uno della provincia di 
Benevento venga a chiedere un posto di lavoro, non mi fa assolutamen-
te strano...
R “Ah no?”
I 51 “ M. ha solo riposto ad una esigenza. M. non ha creato il cliente-
lismo in città, qualora l’avesse creato. M ha risposto ad una esigenza, 
ha risposto alla povertà, D.M. Ha fatto lo stesso, N ha fatto lo stesso, 
logicamente con mezzi e strumenti diversi.
I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “... l’ex sindaco non sono andato io 
a chiedere lavoro lui è venuto da me.  Ora il motivo per cui lui 
abbia scelto me non lo so, forse perché l’ho sostenuto..non lo so ma io 
non sono andata ad implorare niente.
I 30 (F, 38 donna delle pulizie) “Io anche lo farei, chiederei se può fare 
qualcosa per mio marito...certo poi ci penso e gli altri? Perché è sbaglia-
to perché non c’è solo mio marito....ma intanto penso...che qua ormai 
siamo al si salvi chi può. 
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5.2.2 Universal Benefits
I 1(M, 47, impiegato regionale) “Intanto devono essere determinanti (i 
politici) nel creare lavoro perché oggi mi rendo conto, anche perché mi 
sono interessato allo studio del mercato del lavoro, i processi di globa-
lizzazione coinvolgono tutti, per fare un frigorifero... oggi lo fanno i 
robot.
I 2 (M,48, impiegato pubblico) “Il turismo, vorrei che i politici di S. 
puntassero di più sul turismo anche per occasione di scambio culturale 
e quindi educativo. Se noi pensiamo alla Silicon Valley negli stati uniti, 
andiamo a vedere chi c’è, chi c’è? Tutto il mondo, c’è la globalizzazio-
ne della cultura”.
I 3 (M 53, LSU) “riprendere insomma a dare i diritti ai lavoratori che 
sono stati cancellati, un rilancio della scuola che la sto vedendo allo 
sbando ho visto dal 2008 in poi, ma il peggio, l’ho visto da quando 
c’è l’attuale Renzi....quello è stato il peggio, nell’arco dei pochi anni 
distrugge la qualsiasi”.
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Premettendo il fatto che il problema fondamen-
tale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, pre-
mettendo questa cosa innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se oggi 
mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in Sici-
lia vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha penalizzato 
moltissimo....”-” e poi la sanità perché anche qui tocchiamo un tasto 
difficile, perché mio suocero è stato a Padova a curarsi e c’è un abisso 
tra i loro standard e gli standard siciliani.
I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Mi aspetterei che sappia coinvolgere tutte le forze 
vere e vive e comprese le università, compresi le varie istituzioni che 
possono dare in contributo anche tecnico e scientifico per un progetto 
di zona e cioè io mo’ torniamo alla tipicità, come faccio a capire quali 
sono gli sblocchi per determinare ricchezze che ci sono in un territorio 
se non c’è qualcuno che sappia dire “questa è la via”.”
I 6 (M, 28, piccolo imprenditore) “Serve uno sveltimento della burocra-
zia in primis e anche qui per quanto tutto sommato io dico che la puglia 
è stata la regione in Italia forse da un certo punto di vista che ha favorito 
la crisi perché ci eravamo illusi.
I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “La prima cosa secondo me è il lavoro, poi la 
sanità. Ospedali che funzionino, il diritto alla salute che prescinda dalla 
latitudine in cui si vive e in cui ci si ammala.
I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “ prima di ogni cosa creare posti di lavoro 
per sti giovani che non sanno dove aggrapparsi e non è giusto che i no-
stri figli compresi i miei figli che sono andati via, con tre figli non posso 
averne uno a casa”.
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I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Servizi al territorio che non ci sono più, lavoro 
per i giovani che altrimenti subentrano tutte quelle cose negative, giu-
stamente, anche delinquenza e via dicendo.
I 15 (F 46, medico) “a me interessano le infrastrutture, farci funzionare 
tutti meglio, già questo sarebbe un bellissimo obiettivo, senza entrare 
nel dettaglio non ti sto parlando della spazzatura potremmo fare tan-
tissimi esempi però cercare di cambiare veste alla città. Io dico creare 
lavoro ok però il lavoro dobbiamo anche inventarcelo.
I 17 (M 72, pensionato) “Qualsiasi iniziativa che vada incontro a uno 
sviluppo dell’occupazione, qualsiasi iniziativa che crei lavoro, qualsi-
asi perché il Sud e Taranto sta morendo per questo....forse l’eccessiva 
propensione allo sviluppo industriale di Taranto va ripensata, va com-
patibilizzata con altri però non si può fare che ogni giorno viene uno e 
se ne inventa una”.
I 18 (F, 56 rappresentante commerciale) “Vabbè è banale il lavoro, so-
pratutto per dare una speranza ai ragazzi che vogliono fare per esempio 
io credo molto vedo molti giovani che stanno tornando ad amare l’agri-
coltura non come veniva fatta un tempo, ma con i macchinari e quindi 
aiutare questi giovani che credono nell’agricoltura biologica”.
I 19 (F 69, pensionata) “Vorrei che i politici avessero una maggiore at-
tenzione per il territorio perché vedo molto abbandono e non si creano 
posti di lavoro e quei pochi posti sono così provvisori che non aiutano la 
società a vivere meglio quindi c’è tanta pure delinquenza perché manca 
lavoro.... poi il turismo..voglio dire io vorrei almeno un treno che va a 
Milano e uno che va Torino e uno per Roma..siamo tagliati dal mondo”
I 20 (M, 43 avvocato) “Sì una politica fiscale diversa e farla subito...
guardando un attimo al mio mestiere e si prende l’attuale sistema fisca-
le e lo si butta via perché è una politica suicida quella di continuare ad 
aumentare la pressione fiscale, non riusciamo a combattere l’evasione 
ma grazie al cazzo, scusa il francesismo, se tu mi aumenti la pressione 
fiscale”.
I 22 (F, 59 piccola commerciante) “Dovrebbero fare cose più pratiche 
e aiutare l’imprenditore diciamo del cemento perché si  fermata questa 
impresa e poi ci sono troppe tassa da pagare anche per le persone che 
dovono costruire in edilizia perché c’è bisogno che questi uomini tor-
nino a lavorare.
I 23 (M, 21, studente) “Io credo che la battaglia da portare a casa ora 
sarebbe il reddito universale, che però dia davvero un reddito nella mi-
sura universale che non abbia quelle criticità che ha messo Emiliano, 
sostanzialmente una misura familistica, una misura insufficiente.
I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “ Devono eliminare le spese inutili le deve elimi-
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nare, ecco. Le spese....ma queste sono cose che ti dirà chiunque qualun-
que persona di buon senso, ecco non è che sto dicendo cose, sto dicendo 
cose che tutti pensano.
I 26 (M, 67 commerciante) “Deve funzionare il lavoro, chi non è racco-
mandato..allora tutta sta gente raccomandata non fanno nu cazz. Vanno 
solo là per perdere tempo....le strade so sporche e a munnezza non si 
ritira e si vanno a nascondere perché si imboscano e non fanno niente. 
L’ordine, la serietà e servizio, a famiglia come funziona: se un capo di 
famiglia non dà l’esempio la famiglia è squilibrata.
 I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “Se parliamo di regione ad esempio vor-
rei più attenzione per i fondi UE che poi vengono ripartiti tra le varie 
regioni per essere investiti e la regione Calabria non partecipava per-
ché i parlamentarti là oppure i consiglieri regionali per esempio se uno 
si occupa dell’area sociale diciamo le politiche sociali, va a vedere se 
c’è questo fondo se può essere finanziati insomma occuparsi veramente 
della propria terra, della proprio regione io l’unica cosa che mi aspetto 
da qualsiasi parte è pensare al cittadino sfruttare tutto quello che abbia-
mo a disposizione anziché arricchire il proprio portafoglio.
I 31(F, 51, insegnante) “La prima cosa che mi viene in mente è a favore 
dei giovani e quindi l’occupazione io credo che sia veramente una piaga 
sociale quindi una manovra snella e facile per dare lavoro ai giovani 
perché credo che la società dipende proprio del lavoro ai giovani.
I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Il lavoro è la priorità su tutto perché poi è nor-
male che nel momento in cui io napoletano di base non riesco a trovare 
lavoro e devo portare avanti una famiglia mi arrangio a fare le cose 
più brutte anche poi c’è chi dice no preferisco vivere di stenti ma non 
mettermi in mano a cose strane.-”...e poi la vivibilità ora io ti parlo di 
Napoli ti ripeto perché ci vivo e la conosco e ti assicuro che uscire per 
strada e vedere...non è bello uscire per strada per farti un passeggiata 
beccare i militari che piantonano le varie piazze”
I 36 (M 52, medico) “ la prima cosa che dovono fare i politici è ridurre 
la tasse perché la pressione fiscale loro dicono che è sempre la stessa 
però l’inflazione se l’è mangiata....questa è una cosa che negli anni ‘80..
come la chiamavano? Ah la svalutazione”.
I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “Vorrei dai politici locali una maggiore atten-
zione al territorio visto che in questo momento il territorio sta soffrendo 
per le criticità di tipo ambientale sia a livello locale sia a livello provin-
ciale perché il paese in cui risiedo voglio dire adesso c’è questa situa-
zione da risolvere (ILVA).”
I 40 (M 20, studente) “Allora ad esempio al Primo Ministro chiede-
rei un ampliamento della spesa pubblica. Primo sopratutto istruzione, 
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nell’ambito della sanità, nell’ambito delle opere pubbliche a livello 
strutturale e infrastrutturale dato che il nostro Paese è carente in alcu-
ne aree particolarmente in Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia rete ferroviaria ad 
esempio”.
I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) “ Delle cose da fare? Ad esempio intanto ini-
ziare  a pianificare andando sul concreto...argomento del giorno non 
giriamoci intorno l’argomento più caldo è sempre lo stesso perché la 
gente deve portare il pane a casa e poi tutto il resto si sistema piano 
piano...quando la gente lavora e porta a casa lo stipendio inizia a tirare 
fuori anche il sorriso”.
I 42 (F, 26, studentessa) “partendo dalla mia esperienza diciamo che la 
cultura è un po’ al centro di tutto diciamo specie su questo territorio e 
poi appunto la cultura intesa in maniera totalizzante diciamo dalla for-
mazione a diciamo all’accesso della cultura quindi al cinema piuttosto 
che teatro l’acquista di libri eccetera per fare un esempio una bella espe-
rienza del comune di Barletta sul reddito di formazione”.
I 43 (F, 31 studentessa-lavoratrice) “In ordine sparso...allora maggiore 
incentivi per i giovani e chi mi favorisca a un mio progetto di vita quin-
di che sia aprirmi un’attività o inventare qualcosa produrre qualcosa 
credo che mi sia dato spazio e anche materialmente darmi uno spazio 
cioè tipo ti parlo di Napoli al cose che vorrei tipo tutti gli spazi del 
comune un elenco di tutti gli spazi che il comune ha a disposizione e 
metterli a disposizione”.
I 44 (M,35 disoccupato) “ Io ad esempio ho molto apprezzato De Ma-
gistris che per la questione che ha fatto molto aumentare il turismo a 
Napoli ed è stata una grande risorsa...ci sono molti miei amici che si 
sono sistemati con Air b&b”.
I 46 (M, 51 personale Ata) “ Le prime priorità sono far stare bene le 
persone trovare le loro diciamo cioè sport, stadi, piste e piste pedonali, 
strade camminare parchi queste cose qui.
I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) “ In un popolo civile ci vogliono i servizi, 
sono la prima cosa....Strade ospedali, scuole queste cose qua. Poi dopo 
avrebbero fatto questo poi dice qual’è la cosa più essenziale il campo di 
calcio, ti faccio un esempio una cazzata , può venire dopo.
I 49 (M 57, disoccupato) “Appunto prima di tutto tasse ridotte rispetto 
a quanto effettivamente perché poi tasse significa come vogliono far 
capire tasse paghi tali tasse perché servizi una più una equa ripartizione 
cioè se una persona è più facoltosa dovrebbe pagare tasse in maniera 
diversa rispetto a chi è più povero”.
I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “due impianti...siccome c’è una evoluzione 
del fatto dell’ambiente ed  Roccella ha ottenuto grandi riconoscimenti 
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l’investimento deve continuare sull’ambiente come? C’è un impianto 
di depurazione ? C’è la raccolta differenziata, l’umido non dobbiamo 
buttarlo.
I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “ forse pure pochi collegamenti con la città, 
abbiamo pochi collegamenti giusto un pullman che passa che fa un giro 
e uno è costretto a utilizzare per forza le macchine tipo per andare a 
Napoli due ore di Pullman perché fa un giro enorme....ecco su questo 
dovrebbero impegnarsi i politici locali”.
I 55 (M 57, clochard) “Avere un futuro più meglio...per cominciare è di 
Palermo? Va bene comincia a fare le cose per Palermo se lui ha questa 
mentalità che comincia a fare qualcosa per questa gente”.
I 56 (F 36, Dentista) “L’altro giorno parlavo con due mie amiche lesbi-
che di un problema che ora è un problema di stato  si parlava di questo 
fatto che loro vogliono un figlio....ecco secondo me i politici dovrebbe-
ro risolvere questi problemi...perché le persone etero pensano a me non 
riguarda, a me che me ne frega, ma molti ne soffrono e non è giusto”.
I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “Tu politico dei dirimi prima voglio realizzare 
questo, grandi sogni grandi utopie dopodiché organizzo la pratica per 
arrivare a quell’obiettivo lì non posso pensare solo qui e ora solo l’e-
mergenza non guardare  nient’altro perché veramente si perde  ogni 
slancio, la politica diventa solo emergenza, soldi e il sindaco diventa 
solo amministrare della città..non va bene”.
I 60 (F 23, Studentessa) “Vabbè per esempio la prima cosa il riuso dei 
beni confiscati o di immobili che non vengono utilizzati  che a Bari ce 
ne sono parecchi darli sia a persone che hanno bisogno a uso abitativo 
ma anche ad associazioni, cooperative, enti che possono diciamo usu-
fruirne a scopo sociale a scopo aggregativo
Capitolo 6
6.1.1 Clientelism as a system
I 33 (M, 62 esodato)“Io ho avuto a che fare, posso dire il nome?”
R “ Certo”
I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “con S.M. democristiano, è stato eletto presiden-
te della regione Sicilia poi inquisito con imbroglio della regione nella 
zona industriale e tutto nel mio periodo nero perché ero stato licenzia-
to..lavoravo per una industria privata e stavo magnificamente bene e lui 
venne per il famoso posto e ho visto come ragionava lui, di destra poi 
ho conosciuto altre persone di sinistra e l’ultimo uno di destra è stato 
anche un nostro assessore F. G. che lui forse era uno di sinistra nella 
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destra perché qualcosa l’ha fatto però sempre col proprio tornaconto”
R “Cioè”
I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “cioè, cioè che ti posso dire faceva avere dei fi-
nanziamenti  a me per poter fare un’opera turistica però indirettamente 
mi imponeva deve lavorare tizio caio e sempronio. Questa è una frase 
pesante che sto dicendo.
R “cosa non ti andava?”
I 33 “questo discorso dell’imposizione io ti facevo avere la diciamo la 
sovvenzione però tu mi devi far lavorare, ti interessa? Praticamente tipo 
un circolo vizioso, un autofinanziamento diciamo. Io li do a te, tu li dai 
a lui penso eh, ma è così. Boh non lo so, c’era un altro politico che io 
sono amico perché essendo di qua sono amico di tutti che lo chiamava-
no signor 5%”
R “perché”
I 33 “perché per ogni commissione che lui faceva avere prendeva il 5%”
I 33 “Andavo dietro ai vari politici di destra e di sinistra per il posto per 
me che ero disoccupato e mi prendeva per i fondelli diceva ci vediamo 
tra 15 giorni e lui per la sua carriera aiutava i compagni si, lui democri-
stiano faceva lavorare i compagni, ma vero posso sottoscrivere, faceva 
lavorare i compagni sicché noi diciamo sui elettori no...tanto pensava 
questi con la speranza di un posto dice tanto un voto me lo danno gli 
altri no”.
6.1.2 Clientelism as authority over a territory.
I 51 “no ti faccio un esempio teatrale nel senso come io vedo queste 
persone, c’è un’opera teatrale di Eduardo De Filippo che si chiama “Il 
Sindaco di Rione Sanità” c’è questo “guappo” di quartiere, quartiere 
Sanità, che in passato da piccolo aveva commesso qualche piccolo re-
ato...poi un giorno uccise il capo che lo umiliava e tramite i falsi testi-
moni si è salvato, nonostante avesse ucciso a seguito di un ingiustizia e 
da quel giorno si è messo a risolvere i problemi del quartiere. Ora cosa 
fa questo signore di rione sanità? Casa sua è diciamo lo studio di uno 
psicologo, di un avvocato, di un politico, accoglie i bisognosi, accoglie 
chi è vittima di strozzini e grazie al suo potere costituito in maniera non 
legale risolve i problemi.-”...Va quindi analizzata meglio questa cosa, io 
vedo D.M. , M. li vedo come il sindaco di rione sanità. Cioè loro sono 
una parte del sistema anche corrotto anche sbagliato ma grazie al loro 
sistema corrotto e sbagliato riescono a risolvere problemi della gente.
I 51 “Hanno risposto ad una esigenza”
R “Ad una esigenza”
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I 51 “Hanno risposto ad una provincia che moriva di fame. Voglio dire 
ad una città del Sud che subisce, che è sempre all’ombra di Napoli, è 
all’ombra di Avellino, è all’ombra di Salerno, che per tanti anni è stata 
definita un’oasi felice per il semplice fatto che nessuno ci considerava, 
ma comunque nel frattempo venivano a sbirciare. Hanno risposto ad 
una esigenza, cioè voglio dire è normale che un padre, se uno non ha 
un lavoro è normale che un padre di famiglia espone questi problemi al 
politico.
R” il lavoro è un tema sensibile, come si fa in questi casi?” 
I 51 E’ diverso dallo stato il privato...nel primo caso fai proprio inter-
mediazione, mentre nel caso dell’imprenditore...voglio dire io chiamo 
il mio amico alla Ferrari c’è sti’ ingegnere lo vuoi? Io so benissimo che 
è un imprenditore con i contro-coglioni e se è una persona incapace non 
la prende...a me stesso mi hanno chiesto una figura professionale io l’ho 
individuato, lo conoscevi, lo vedi e gli ho detto questo è vostro se vi sta 
bene altrimenti non fa niente...capisci che voglio dire?
I 51” Nel senso la politica come strumento per aumentare il proprio 
potere professionale è sbagliato. Perseguirla per questi  scopi è ingiusto, 
perseguirla per favorire il potere di altri è altrettanto sbagliato, perse-
guirla come strumento per valorizzare il proprio territorio e difenderlo 
è giusto. Ora non so se facendo quello che hanno fatto, hanno fatto bene 
o male so soltanto che hanno influenzato i processi, che hanno portato 
Avellino ad essere avanti rispetto a noi. Hanno avuto un Presidente del 
Consiglio e una buona classe dirigente e tutti, anche gli imprenditori e 
in generale la classe dirigente di quel territorio si è sentita investita e 
responsabilizzata. 
I 51 “Io non lo so se De Mita rubava, se i soldi andavano alla camorra...
Io so soltanto...pensa all’autostrada Napoli-Bari che passa per Avellino 
tra le montagne del Parteggio; passare per Benevento-Napoli ci mettevi 
mezz’ora, ora ci metti un’ora e dieci...questo significa determinare i 
processi, cioè tu crei due svincoli ad Avellino, Avellino Est e Ovest tra 
Mar Tirreno e Mar Adriatico e tagli fuori Benevento.” - “...e poi la ben-
zina la fai ad Avellino, e paghi le multe ad Avellino, e metti a lavorare 
gente di Avellino ecc. ecc.”
6.1.3 “Desperate” Clientelism
I 45 (M 34, disoccupato) “Vabbè io penso che...per la comunità c’è 
bisogno comunque di fare...in un certo qual modo raccordo con gli altri 
sindaci della zona, con le altre amministrazioni per cercare di creare 
qualcosa che possa essere utile alle nostre terre, non so i prodotti tipici, 
igt quello che cerca di preservare la natura perché qui già non c’è niente 
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quindi... facendo pozzi di petrolio ora vogliono fare le trivellazioni qui 
nel Sannio e ste cose danneggiano e non portano nessun beneficio”.
R “è un tema importante questo per te?”
I 45 “Certo, ti faccio un esempio, qui in zona, come penso in ambito 
nazionale si pensa soltanto ai soldi, agli appalti, alle opere pubbliche 
e basta, niente più, non è che c’è un’idea di progresso che può essere 
diversa, ecologica, puntare non so sull’arte, sulla cultura. -”e poi i con-
sorzi per coltivare ulivi e viti che dovrebbero essere resi pubblici che il 
nostro olio non ha niente di meno di quello Toscano ad esempio”.
I 45”Cioè in Italia come qui c’è sempre stata la botta”.
R “Cioè?”
I 45 “La spinta l’aiutino per sistemare le varie persone nei posti. Qui per 
avere il posto c’è bisogno della botta, lo so che sono termini dialettali 
ma qui si usa così”
R “ e che ne pensi sinceramente?”
I 45 “Ma assolutamente nulla. Sicuramente c’è tanta gente di valore 
che magari è stata inserita anche in posti importanti e che svolge bene 
il suo lavoro, ma c’è anche tanta gente che non meritava nulla e magari 
una persona valida è a spasso. Poi se ci sono delle persone che devono 
essere aiutate che sono veramente in difficoltà...se ci sono due posti 
alla forestale e il sindaco deve scegliere è normale che io preferisco che 
venga dato a quello che ha due-tre figli è normale.
I 45 “Sì è vero non è il metodo che mi piace, anche perché conosco del-
le persone che sono state aiutate... un aiutino così non per un lavoro a 
tempo indeterminato fisso. A me non mi è mai stato offerto, giusto non 
so una cosa dopo la laurea se mi vuoi dare due o tre mesi un consulenza 
per una cosa piccola eh, non una cosa grande...conosco un mio amico 
che è stato un po’ alla comunità montana, part time per guadagnare 
200/300 euro al mese. A me non mi è mai stata offerta”
R “e ti ha fatto incazzare”
I 45 “Sì perché agli altri sì e io no come mai? Allora questo mi ha fatto 
capire che evidentemente se gli altri hanno avuto è perché tu alla pros-
sima elezione vuoi il voto da quelle persone io invece te l’ho già dato 
non ho diritto a nulla.
I 45” Giacché non ho mai avuto nulla e non voglio nulla perché voglio 
essere un uomo libero”
R “cioè?”
I 45 “Un uomo libero...che quello che faccio deve essere frutto del mio 
lavoro e non devo dire grazie a nessuno”.
6.2  Party oriented vote
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I 23 (M, 21, studente) “vabbè non sono un’utopista cioè non mi aspetto 
che tutto il programma che di fatto viene propinato viene pubblicizzato 
sia effettivamente realizzato; però cerco una convergenza in dei punti 
focali che di fatto caratterizzano le mie necessità, le mie idee . Quindi 
ti faccio un esempio se uno mi viene a parlare di reddito universale e io 
vedo che effettivamente c’è un progetto comunque intende realizzarlo 
io è normale che darò attenzione a questo candidato a questa forza po-
litica quindi sostanzialmente si diciamo uno sguardo al programma se 
ha ancora senso parlare di programma visto..., però appunto è normale 
che nel programma o comunque  vedo il programma vedo comunque 
qual è l’orientamento ecco forse magari si, si può dire che sono su-
perate le categorie destra sinistra, io non sono di questa idea perché 
purtroppo questa idea che c’è stata diciamo propinata dal diffondersi 
dalla democrazia e tutto ha permesso di fatto il riemergere dell’avvici-
namento tra quelli che sono l centro destra e centro sinistra e l’emergere 
di populismi vuoti di fatto; io credo che il programma o comunque le 
idee presenti in esso abbiano ancora un peso in termini di scelta una 
dimensione realistica di quello che può essere realizzato e quello che no 
non mi faccio illudere ma uno sguardo al programma lo si da, si segue 
la campagna elettorale”.
R “ e una volta scelto cosa ti aspetti, cosa vorresti?”
I 23 “io credo che la battaglia da portare ora sarebbe il reddito univer-
sale, che però sia davvero un reddito nella misura universale che non 
abbia quelle criticità portate da Emiliano, sostanzialmente una misu-
ra familistica, una misura insufficiente, una misura che può favorire 
del nero una situazione che tu a distanza di dodici mesi per rivedertelo 
confermato sei costretto di fatto, sei una situazione ricattabile, perché 
quasi esteso sono stati dati 130/140 euro a persona per una famiglia d 5 
persone per riconfermartelo devi sostanzialmente stare a spasso, quindi 
tu con quella cifra non puoi sopravvivere anche la parola dignità è una 
parola umiliata, tu sei soggetto a rischio di lavorare a nero anche il lavo-
ro socialmente utile, il baratto amministrativo che non c’è dignità altre 
misure è un’altra roba totalmente svilente, sapere che ha un’inadem-
pienza fiscale va a incidere sul figlio che non può accedere alle mense, 
a un servizio significa mandare a puttane l’articolo della costituzione in 
cui lo stato deve fare in modo di eliminare tutte le barriere credo che la 
battaglia principale sia su una misura di reddito che sia davvero inclu-
siva che non si limiti che non sia puramente assistenzialistica reddito 
reale che può dare quella marcia in più può diminuire questi problemi 
intesa misura su cui creare tutti quei parassitismi che è il problema che 
ti dicono che si crea magari sia anche accompagnato da percorsi reali di 
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inserimento nel mondo del lavoro che non sia il tirocinio, lo sfruttamen-
to legalizzato in cambio di offerte di lavoro veramente valide.”
R “ e che dovrebbe fare”?
I 40 (M 20, studente) “...per me il politico deve in un modo o nell’altro 
portare avanti il Paese, la collettività insieme al suo partito di cui egli 
è emanazione e che necessariamente poi rappresenta una parte della 
popolazione che l’ha votato all’interno di un quadro istituzionale fon-
dato sulla rappresentanza parlamentare”-” ...poi oggi i miei coetanei 
sono più sfiduciati, meno interessati a differenza di un mio coetaneo 
degli anni ‘70/’80 quando appunto questi si mobilitavano unitamente 
e compiutamente per riuscire a trasformare radicalmente lo stato delle 
cose presenti attorno a loro e quindi vi era uno spirito di aggregazione 
di comunità, a partire proprio dalle stesse università dove per esempio 
per l’appunto i ragazzi si riunivano, riunioni di ogni tipo.
R “misure in che senso”? 
I 40 (M 20, studente) “Allora per esempio io chiederei un ampliamento 
della spesa pubblica: Primo, sopratutto istruzione nell’ambito della sa-
nità, nell’ambito delle opere pubbliche a livello strutturale e infrastrut-
turale dato che il nostro Paese è carente di alcune aree particolarmente 
in Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia, rete ferroviaria ad esempio. Chiederei di 
attuare politiche di drastica riduzione del debito pubblico tramite chia-
ramente una vera e propria rinegoziazione”-”...e poi  vorrei una revisio-
ne dei trattati internazionali cioè opporsi a tutte quelle ingerenze che ci 
condizionano profondamente in termini militari ad esempio.
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “per quanto mi riguarda veniamo da 50-60 anni 
di malgoverno però all’ora, rispetto a oggi, secondo me quello che non 
mancava mai era il senso di appartenenza a un movimento, un parti-
to politico; i leader secondo me rispecchiavano quel preciso momento 
storico che in ogni caso era un senso storico che in ogni caso un senso 
di appartenenza forte con delle idee chiare poi si poteva governare...io 
per come ricordo, se un uomo politico apparteneva ad una corrente ben 
definita non c’era motivo alcuno che si potesse spostare da una parte e 
dell’altra...oggi ci si ritrova subito fuori da un partito per entrarne in un 
altro solo per la poltrona abbandonando quelli che sono probabilmente 
degli ideali e dei concetti politici che oggi secondo me non ci sono più”.
R “hai avuto esperienze, diciamo personali?”
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Io ho seguito molto da vicino la storica svolta di 
Fiuggi del Movimento Sociale Italiano che transitava in Alleanza Na-
zionale quel primo Gianfranco Fini di quel periodo aveva dato secondo 
me segni di continuità poi anche lui si è perso.
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Premettendo il fatto che il problema fondamen-
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tale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, pre-
mettendo questa cosa innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se oggi 
mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in Sici-
lia vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha penalizzato 
moltissimo....”-” e poi la sanità perché anche qui tocchiamo un tasto 
difficile, perché mio suocero è stato a Padova a curarsi e c’è un abisso 
tra i loro standard e gli standard siciliani.-”...e poi l’ambiente la pulizia, 
secondo me ancora...a me capita ancora oggi, nel 2016. una cosa che 
secondo me è di una inciviltà che non ha pari io ancora incontro gente 
che per strada abbassa il finestrino e butta la carta dalla macchina que-
sto secondo me a livello civico è una delle cose più gravi perché tu mi 
stai dicendo che te ne strafotti...”
R “ Non ti sei ritrovata insomma?”
I 57 (F, 62, psicologa)” Ma già è stato un errore l’Ulivo; io non l’ho 
votato perché non si può mettere insieme la democrazia cristiana abbia-
mo lottato una vita contro la democrazia cristiana e poi ci siamo messi 
insieme. Questo ha ucciso la sinistra, i valori laici: la Democrazia Cri-
stiana il Papa, il Vaticano che cercare di tenere tutti buoni e questo non 
va bene.”-”Io mi ricordo i tempi di Lotta Continua, quindi ricordi delle 
riunioni che facevamo, le manifestazioni, poi i tempi del femminismo, 
la lotta per i diritti delle donne quindi ricordo che più che altro questo.
I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “ La politica deve servire a realizzare grandi sco-
pi ideali, far si che quelli che sono ideali utopie diventano veramente 
realtà quindi avere a cuore il bene dell’umanità non essere autorefe-
renziali”- “Ma già dopo gli anni 70 la politica ha cambiato volto prima 
era sogno utopia i giovani erano protagonisti, mentre invece ora sono 
spettatori della loro vita.
I 57” Prima di tutto mi deve dire io voglio realizzare questo, grandi so-
gni, grandi utopie dopodiché organizzo la pratica per arrivare a quell’o-
biettivo... non si può pensare solo all’emergenza, ai soldi mo perché è 
crollato un tetto e il sindaco diventa l’amministratore e nella città non 
cambia nulla, pensiamo sollo alle emergenze.
R “e altro”?
“Si, certo e poi creare lavoro perché è veramente fondamentale anche 
il disagio che si vive in famiglia è fortemente influenzato dall’assenza 
di lavoro... i figli soffrono moltissimo...mi fanno riderei politici che si 
battono il petto parlando della famiglia di qua e di là, e poi non vedono 
l’ovvio...famiglie che soffrono letteralmente la fame”
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6.3 Patronage: the Missing Type
I 63 (impiegata 34) “Certo dove lavoro io la politica ha un peso, il po-
litico ha un peso”
R “In che senso?”
I 63 (impiegata 34) “penso innanzitutto che al matrimonio del mio capo 
c’erano V. e la G. e al mio invece non c’erano e non penso che ci sareb-
bero venuti....Poi va capito che significa raccomandazione: ora se a me 
mi mandano via perché E. ha deciso di sostituire 40 che c’erano prima 
con 40 dei suoi a me sembra un’ingiustizia anche se nel pubblico non 
essendo il privato può farlo”
I 68 (formatore 42) “Io non credo che lui era proprietario di un simbolo 
e secondo me è sbagliato”
R “ti ha deluso insomma”
I 68 (formatore 42) “Sì me e molti della mia zona perché...si insomma 
a B., negli uffici della Regione, negli uffici nuovi creati soprattutto da 
lui come l’Ente di promozione del turismo, ci ha piazzato soltanto i 
suoi, quelli del territorio di riferimento e della sua area e N.F. era il 
suo referente...in molti da queste parti dopo averlo sostenuto, aiutato in 
campagna elettorale e anche dopo si sono ritrovati fuori”
R “fuori da cosa?”
I 68 (formatore 42) “fuori dai posti dentro l’amministrazione regionale 
o agli enti collegati...insomma alla fine, soprattutto dopo il primo man-
dato che non era stato male, V. ha dovuto garantire e i suoi, quelli più 
fedeli, a partire da N.F. erano tutti di quel territorio e questo ha generato 
molto malcontento nella nostra provincia.
I 51 (M 25, studente) “ … fatto sta comunque Avellino adesso sta cer-
cando di creare un brand di territorio a crearsi un immagine e curarla e 
difenderla e hanno avuto una discreta classe dirigente oltre a De Mita”
R “In che senso?”
I 51 (M 25, studente)“ Io dico che i nostri cugini irpini sono un passo 
avanti a noi, probabilmente anche grazie a quella classe dirigente che 
comunque hanno avuto un capo di governo e comunque anche ottimi 
imprenditori e probabilmente loro sentendosi protagonisti ognuno di 
loro si è sentito un De Mita; e d’altra parte è così... Avellino stava all’I-
talia con De Mita come ora Firenze sta all’Italia con Renzi”.
R “ In che senso?”
I 51 (M 25, studente) “ Perché Renzi ...vedi no? Le nomine vengono 
tutte dalla Toscana; De Luca e i suoi assessori, le nomine, vengono 
tutti dall’area di Salerno. In Irpinia voglio dire... il governo della Dc 
ha portato tanto all’ Irpinia dall’ Italia ed è anche giusto che sia così...
cioè trovo normale, naturale che la cosa più vicina..uno come De Luca 
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intendo, faccia delle nomine che vengono da Salerno perché io penso 
che queste nomine siano legate a una questione di fiducia perché se io 
ho fatto il sindaco di Salerno, ho collaborato con dirigenti, assessori che 
stavano a Salerno e quindi reputo capaci li porto con me...come accade 
da Firenze e dalla Toscana”.
Capitolo 7
7.1 Different types of universal benefits
R “quindi questa arretratezza non è soltanto questione di soldi”
I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “ Ma no assolutamente... certo un tempo, se pur 
con molti limiti la Cassa del Mezzogiorno creava qualche condizione di 
sviluppo, anche tanto rubare, ma anche sviluppo ma è una condizione 
più generale...una condizione del luogo”
R “Una condizione del luogo?”
I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “certo...se tutto il complesso è piuttosto di livello 
basso allora siamo tutti portati a tenere comportamenti familistici, se ci 
fosse offerta di lavoro per tutti non ci sarebbe raccomandazione.Se ci 
fosse una mentalità di servizio all’ospedale non  ci sarebbe bisogno che 
io telefoni all’amico per farmi ricoverare prima o per tenermi un posto 
nella stanzetta o perché per un diritto devo rivolgermi a qualcuno che 
mi fa un favore. Dobbiamo invece uscire da questa logica, partendo 
dalle agenzie educative ovvero scuola e famiglia che devono esser luo-
ghi di crescita...altrimenti la povertà culturale che nasce dalla povertà 
di mezzi non si arresta. Ma voglio dire noi..noi siamo così ignoranti 
che noi non conosciamo le nostre tipicità..è dovuto venire un trentino a 
parlarcene...
R “ in che senso un trentino?”
I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Sì il vescovo B. quello che c’era prima...Io da lui, 
che veniva dal Trentino, ho sentito parlare di tipicità proprio da lui. Noi 
le nostre tipicità non le conosciamo, non le sappiamo valorizzare non 
sappiamo quale sono le nostre tipicità mentre lui le aveva capite”
R “e chi si candida in questi luoghi, insomma che aspettative ripone in 
lui? Che dovrebbe fare?
I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Mi aspetterei che sappia coinvolgere tutte le forze 
vere e vive e comprese le università, compresi le varie istituzioni che 
possono dare un contributo anche tecnico e scientifico per un progetto 
di zona e cioè io... mo’ torniamo alla tipicità, come faccio a capire quali 
sono gli sbocchi per determinare ricchezze che ci sono in un territorio 
se non c’è qualcuno che sappia dire “questa è la via”...che sia in grado 
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di avere una visione ecco, appunto un’idea di dove andare e dove con-
durre questo territorio”.
R “e che vorresti allora da un candidato, che aspettative hai oggi?”
I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “allora parlando liberamente io: par-
tirei dalle condizioni dei giovani...vorrei maggiori incentivi per chi ha 
delle idee, cioè hub o comunque qualcosa che favorisca un mio progetto 
di vita quindi che sia aprirmi una qualche attività...magari individuare 
degli spazi fisici..censire gli spazi vuoti del Comune, anche se nemme-
no loro sanno quanti e quali spazi sono (risatina). Insomma quello e 
dare più supporto a chi ha la capacità...
R “un aiuto ai giovani insomma..”
I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “ No, non credo, credo che aiutarmi 
sia una brutto termine, ha qualcosa di paternalistico, di cattolico, non 
mi piace. L’aiuto è qualcosa...quando tu dai e non hai niente in cambio, 
invece investire è un termine più...investire sui giovani!!”
R “in che senso?”
I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “e quindi investire è diverso: inve-
stire su qualcosa è diverso che aiutare perché è una scommessa e non si 
sa se si riesce o meno; mentre aiutare è una cosa che finisce e l’investi-
mento ha anche un ritorno per chi investe e per chi comunque produce 
qualcosa è una scambio e credo che di  questo ci sia bisogno. Un poli-
tico deve credere nell’innovazione e bisogna investirci si lavora in quel 
determinato campo e così si cresce...
R “e chi fa politica dovrebbe farsi carico di questo? Dovrebbe.....
I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “sì, che poi è quello che ho detto e 
dovrebbe attuarsi ovunque e credo sia compito della politica, di chi la 
fa domandarsi da qui a vent’anni cosa sarà questo Paese, al di là della 
durata della legislatura. Perché questa è una cosa che ho sempre odia-
to della politica, non avere mai un programma di lungo termine. Nel 
senso, voglio dire,tu programmi determinate cose che non riguardano 
solamente l’immediato e che anzi guardino lontano. Questo credo sia la 
responsabilità dei politici, pensare a lungo termine quindi magari al di 
là del consenso perché le cose più visibili creano più consenso nell’im-
mediato, ma sono specchietti per le allodole”.
R “e cosa ti colpirebbe allora nel programma di un candidato’”
I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “Personalmente idee innovative e originali nel 
senso che, essendo cioè una ragazza quindi ovviamente parlo per la mia 
età, qualcosa che possa interessare ai giovani qualche corso, qualcosa 
per promuovere appunto l’istruzione qualche collegamento universita-
rio al lavoro qualcosa che ti cattura non sempre le solite cose che si usa 
dire durante... poi dipende anche se vado a votare il sindaco”
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R “per esempio”
I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “qualcosa riguardante l’ambiente. Credo che in 
Italia abbiamo un patrimonio culturale che viene valorizzato poco e 
sopratutto una sporcizia... anche le raccolte differenziate non funzio-
nano quindi qualcosa che promuova l’ambiente e avvicini i giovani 
all’ambiente che faccia capire che l’ambiente va curato e qualcosa pure 
sull’Università cioè di collegamento con il mondo del lavoro”
R “ e altro? ”
I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “A Benevento abbiamo l’arco di Traiano, la chie-
sa di Santa Sofia e tanti altri monumenti che sono a livello di turismo 
zero: quindi insomma vorrei qualcosa che aumentasse il turismo a Be-
nevento anche perché una cosa assurda è che molte cose non sappiamo 
valorizzarle. Poi mettere in sicurezza la città dopo l’ultima alluvione 
abbiamo capito di non essere sicuri e ci sono stati danni e sicuramente 
perché non si sono fatte le cose al tempo giusto, quando andavano fat-
te”.
R “e cosa ti aspetteresti quindi”?
I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “Prima cosa per il sud, lavoro...e sanità. Ospedali 
che funzionino, il diritto alla salute come diritto che prescinda dalla 
latitudine in cui si vive e in cui ci si ammala che sia un diritto per tutti 
noi qui al sud moriamo di più anche perché non abbiamo gli ospedali 
giusti, si arriva al pronto soccorso e già al pronto soccorso non si sa in 
che ospedale ti devono portare perché qui è pieno e lì è pieno. Diritto 
alla sanità, diritto al lavoro e diritto allo studio perché da noi i ragazzi 
devono andare a studiare per forza fuori a Firenze, a Milano perché 
non devono avere qua possibilità e devono andare a studiare fuori? Le 
infrastrutture, il sud, il lavoro. Ecco questo per me.
R “e cosa vorrebbe quindi da un candidato?”
I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Ma... risolvere il problema dell’occupazione 
giovanile: perché io penso che ai giovani non stiamo dando speranze 
per il futuro, e quindi bisogna creargli prospettive nel nostro piccolo 
diamo da lavorare a 2000/3000 persone e quelli che sono dietro, le fa-
miglie...e bisogna migliorare le scuole; l’istruzione non è più fatta come 
una volta; prima uscivano dei ragazzi diplomati in maniera seria; oggi 
la scuola è fatta anche di insegnanti che hanno timore dei ragazzi, bul-
lismo, delinquenza. Allora non esistevano queste cose quando andavo 
a scuola io ci si alzava in piedi davanti all’insegnante, si studiava; oggi 
invece no. Io dico: se uno va a scuola non va bene a lavorare adesso e 
creargli il problema...cioè i giovani bisogna motivarli, spronarli fargli 
capire che nessuno ti regala niente e che ormai ti tocca competere a 
livello globale e allora occorre rimboccarsi le maniche”
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R “quindi istruzione, come problema...”
I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Si, perché bisogna creare i presupposti 
per inserirli nel mondo del lavoro, creare un collegamento tra scuola 
e mondo, del lavoro proprio oggi c’è un taglio netto a volte arrivano 
dei giovani a fare dei colloqui che proprio non capiscono niente, ed io 
creerei in questo feeling con le scuole professionali, non dico umanisti-
che scientifiche ma professionali, creare un collegamento dalla scuola 
direttamente col mondo del lavoro per fargli capire quello che effettiva-
mente si aspetta il mondo del lavoro dal mondo della scuola mentre c’è 
un taglio netto perché poi non ti servono a nulla e poi ci devi lavorare 
sopra per fare formazione questa formazione la potrebbe dare la scuola 
di concerto con il mondo del lavoro...questo dovrebbero fare i politici 
e la politica!!!”.
R “E tu invece cosa vorresti? Cosa servirebbe per te?’”
I 28 (M, studente 21) “Io credo nel reddito minimo garantito, che se-
condo me risolverebbe molti problemi perché se tu a me mi dai 80 euro 
a settimana, e io senza lavorare me ne prendo 600 non vengo a lavorare 
da te allora tu per assumere personale devi adeguarti ad un salario mi-
nimo. E quello è un modo per creare dignità lavorative per sconfiggere 
un certo tipo di lavoro a nero che è un problema reale”:
R “cioè”?
I 28 (M, studente 21)”cioè che magari un ragazzo che lavora al bar 10 
ore al giorno per 5 giorni a settimana lo fa per arrotondare e non ha 
possibilità di scelta e tu su queste cose devi intervenire  in che modo? 
Offrendo alle persone la possibilità di rifiutare questo genere di sfrut-
tamento e chi ti propone qualcosa deve offrirti qualcosa di adeguato 
e quindi si combatte in questo modo. E poi il reddito minimo aiuta il 
collocamento
R “in che senso?”
I 28 (M, studente 21) “Nel senso che io Stato, che io pubblico non vo-
glio spendere i soldi a caso e quindi sarò più incentivato a trovarti in 
fretta un lavoro per evitare di spendere quei 600 euro al mese che devo 
darti se non lavoro. Semplice.
R “cosa ti aspetti? Cosa dovrebbe fare il candidato?”
I  32 F, aiutante domestica 46) “Bè occuparsi dei problemi di Beneven-
to...che poi è la disoccupazione, la sanità insomma forse..e poi le leggi 
contro il femminicidio...sì forse sono un po’ di parte perché donna....
(risata)
R “cioè”?
I  32 (F, aiutante domestica 46) “no no è che mi fa molta rabbia perché 
penso che le donne cioè non vengono considerate nemmeno dalle per-
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sone che dicono di amarle e lo stato nemmeno fa niente e i politici e 
poi vediamo i dati...quante ne vengono uccise...insomma ci vorrebbe la 
forza di reagire a queste situazioni...”
R “è una cosa importante per te”?
I  32 (F, aiutante domestica 46) “si si, lo penso e io so che a Benevento 
ci sono dei casi del genere; forse non se ne parla però andrebbe aper-
ta assistenza anche nei paesi...insomma vorrei si impegnasse in que-
sto...e poi..vabbè poi l’ambiente sicuramente l’ambiente. Sicuramente 
c’è molta gente ancora incivile che lascia la spazzatura per la strada e 
quindi bisogna insegnare alla gente come fare...che questa è casa loro e 
devono rispettarla. Lo so che non è una cosa semplice da fare per chi si 
candida...però voglio dire sono loro che si sono candidati...(risata)
R “e quindi se ci fossero elezioni, cosa si aspetterebbe da un candidato? 
Quali “priorità” come dice Lei?”
I 34 (M 74, pensionato) “è una domanda molto difficile...perché in Ita-
lia c’è un meccanismo per cui è difficile individuare responsabilità per 
il cittadino...difficile capire chi gestisce determinate situazioni e quin-
di... Si dice che serve la politica...a Siracusa c’è la crisi della monnezza 
giusto? E il popolo cerca la politica...io se dovessi fare un ragionamento 
più di giustizia inizierei pensando, per così dire agli ultimi, cioè quelli 
che pur non avendo voce non riescono a farla arrivare a chi comanda 
perché questa voce non ha molte mani per mettere firme e votare. Chia-
ro? Però ci sono i disabili in questa città, e sono tanti. Quelli che vivono 
in una condizione abitativa pesante ci sono e sono lì...
R “chiaro”
I 34 (M 74, pensionato) “poi su un piano generale scuola in Italia c’è 
ma questa scuola prepara a che cosa? Fare diventare tutti filosofi... sono 
meccanismi molto pesanti sui quali bisognerebbe intervenire in fretta e 
poi un piano che tocca tutti e di cui siamo tutti responsabili che è la qua-
lità della democrazia perché nel momento in cui non c’è partecipazione 
non c’è democrazia e oggi è un problema...serio in Italia”.
R “ e cosa vorresti che facesse? Quali priorità?
I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) “In un popolo civile ci vogliono i servizi, 
sono la prima cosa. Quando ci sono i servizi c’è sviluppo, perché senza 
servizi lo sviluppo non arriva mai; e dopo se facessero una cosa del ge-
nere si potrebbe parlare delle cose prioritarie. Scuole, strade, ospedali 
queste cose qua. Poi fatto questo poi ti faccio un esempio? Dico una 
cazzata: il campo di calcio, quello poi, può venire dopo.
R “servizi quindi”
I 47 (M 35, personale ATA)” Sì...io l’ho vissuto sulla mia pelle, io sono 
stato là (Bergamo) senza macchina, era meglio senza macchina; non 
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avevo picci (preoccupazioni), prendevo il treno alla stazione, prendevo 
il bus e andava dove cazzo volevo e io non me la sentivo di venire qua 
solo perché quando arrivi a Lamezia sei morto. O hai qualcuno che ti 
viene prendere o niente...e se arrivano i turisti che gli dici? O ti affitti 
la macchina o se hai qualche parente che ti viene a prendere..capisci 
perché da fastidio sta cosa qua”.
R”e quindi che vorresti dal prossimo candidato?”
I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “senti a parte migliorare la raccolta differen-
ziata,magari utilizzando il l’umido per fare il compost..direi il turismo. 
Io penso un Roccella Slowfood con una sede al Castello e percorsi di 
degustazione...Il discorso però è che tu devi conoscere devi far cono-
scere i prodotti, gli agrumi, il mare produrre origano e poi tutto si tiene. 
È importante fare rete perché ormai il turismo va in quella direzione le 
persone vogliono fare una vacanza differente.
R “ e cosa vorresti da questo candidato? Cosa ti aspetti? 
I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “Il teatro (risata)
R “(risata) “certo il teatro e poi?”
I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “No seriamente...poi forse non lo so qualche 
possibilità per i ragazzi, che ci stanno ste cose che lo Stato offre pure 
questi piccoli lavoretti, servizio civile, che magari sembrano stupidag-
gini, per i ragazzi di 20 anni magari che stanno qua senza far niente 
perché non c’è lavoro magari qualche opportunità così di lavoro anche 
saltuario e poi vabbé ci mancano tante cose forse pure i collegamenti 
con le città abbiamo pochi collegamenti giuso un pullman che passa 
che fa un giro e uno è costretto per forza ad utilizzare la macchina per 
andare a Napoli e ci metti due ore in pullman perché fa un giro enorme 
per arrivare a Napoli.
R “E tu cosa vorresti di chi si candida? Quali aspettative hai?” 
I 62 (F , 51 impiegata) “Bè se ragioniamo per priorità sono i bisogni del 
cittadino Ma non solo del cittadino in generale voglio dire il bisogno di 
lavoro e naturalmente questo un candidato non può dartelo però chie-
derei ad esempio il sindaco un Paese più pulito, non mi scandalizza ve-
dere la carte per terra però bisognerebbe promuovere maggiore cultura 
ambientale e poi attenzione ai ragazzi”
R “cioè”
I 62 (F , 51 impiegata) “ i ragazzi nella stragrande maggioranza com’è 
giusto che sia devono trascorrere il tempo al pub, al bar ma anche forse 
bisognerebbe dargli qualche opportunità in più degli impianti sportivi 
che possono essere fruiti gratuitamente, delle piste ciclabili dove poter 
eventualmente andare in bici; ma non perché voglio fare la salutista ma 
solo perché tanta gente vorrebbe fare dello sport ma non se le può per-
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mettere. Ma anche valorizzare quello che abbiamo, come il palazzetto 
dello sport che abbiamo che costa, che ha avuto un costo e che non si 
utilizza su queste cose interverrei perché gli amministratori locali han-
no più mezzi per queste cose rispetto a creare lavoro ad esempio...che 
è difficile.
R “Sì, cosa sarebbe importante fare, cosa vorresti e ti aspetti”
I  20 (M, 43 avvocato) “Sì bè allora guardando un attimo al mio mestie-
re bisognerebbe anche garantire la certezza della pena perché in Italia 
c’è un senso di impunità pauroso. Ormai è penetrata nelle nostre menti 
l’idea che non va in carcere nessuno quindi bisogna rivedere il sistema 
di attuazione delle pene...ridurre tutte le misure alternative al carcere...
stare ai domiciliari non è la stessa cosa...è una questione di giustizia 
rispetto alla collettività...come si vive in un mondo dove non esiste la 
certezza della pena.
R “e oggi che vorresti da un candidato? Cosa ti aspetti?”
I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “massima attenzione alla giustizia, a partire 
dalle tasse che insomma così non va bene.
R “ In che senso?”
I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “il fatto per esempio che io mi sono comprata 
questa casa con grandi sacrifici e non mi piace che mi si tassi continua-
mente questa benedetta casa, l’ho pagata non me l’anno regalata, ho pa-
gato le mie tasse all’acquisto, continuo a pagare tutte le tasse di questo 
mondo e non ho mai la garanzia che questa è veramente mia allora che 
differenza c’è tra stare in affitto e comprarla?.
R “e poi?”
I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “una maggiore attenzione al territorio a par-
tire dal Turismo. Io per esempio vorrei un treno per Milano e uno per 
Torino e che funzionassero le ferrovie perché sono abbandonate, poi 
parliamo di turismo e non siamo a vocazione turistica, non ci sono strut-
ture vengono qua da lontano ma quanto gli costa l’autostrada? Quindi 
scoraggiamo i turisti che poi arriva e non c’è un posto dove andare a 
ballare, non c’è niente, non un divertimento e quindi diciamo che siamo 
a vocazione turistica, ma ce lo diciamo e ce lo raccontiamo soli....”
R “E tu cosa vorresti, cosa ti aspetti da chi fa politica?”
I 39 (F, 38 veterinario) “a livello locale o in generale?
R “come vuoi tu, come preferisci”
I 39 (F, 38 veterinario) “attenzione per il territorio che in questo mo-
mento sta soffrendo per le criticità ambientale sia a livello locale che 
provinciale... occorre bloccare la costruzione di nuovi termo-valoriz-
zatori. Poi maggiore attenzione al turismo perché il rilancio di questo 
territorio nasce dal turismo, pensa che noi ci troviamo a pochi passi 
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da Lecce che non ha grosse industrie ma ha un reddito pro-capite più 
alto del nostro nonostante qui qualche industria è che bisognerebbe fare 
l’imprenditoria un po’ in tutti i settori, sopratutto agricoltura e turismo.
R”e cosa vorresti “mettere sul campo”?
I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “a livello territoriale punterei sul 
dare un indirizzo chiaro allo sviluppo del territorio, quindi scegliere un 
livello economico su cui puntare...Bisogna capire il territorio, cosa può 
offrire in termini di risorse naturali, umane cosa può vendere bisogne-
rebbe essere bravi a vendere quello che di buono abbiamo. Poi sul piano 
nazionale bisognerebbe agire sulla magistratura e sulle leggi dello stato 
per mettere ordine al disordine normativo che vige che blocca la libera 
iniziativa del cittadino. Poi secondo punto ridurre la tassazione per tutti 
ma in particolar modo per chi la ricchezza la produce e non la evade e 
terzo fare attenzione ai giovani non come assistenzialismo io vorrei che 
ci fosse l’idea che qualsiasi giovane che oggi ha un’idea, anche in Italia 
possa diventare com Zuckerberg cioè che la giovane gli venga consen-
tito di esplodere se ha un’idea innovativa”.
R “E cosa ti aspetti quindi? Dal politico intendo”
I 59 (M, 58 artigiano edile) “La prima cosa che penso è il lavoro, ma 
lavoro non per me, lavoro per tutti. Chi è già avviato, chi deve iniziarsi 
nel mondo del lavoro questo, solo questo. Poi uno dice come creare 
lavoro non è facile, non è una cosa che un giorno o l’altro ti inventi. Poi 
lavoro per far stare qui la gente nella zona che ormai qualsiasi paese e 
non solo i paesini si stanno spopolando i paesi quindi è per questo che 
la gente se ne va che manca lavoro”
R “e quali sono le tue aspettative ecco?”
I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “premettendo il fatto che il problema fonda-
mentale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, 
premettendo questa cosa, innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se 
oggi mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in 
Sicilia ancora vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha 
penalizzato tantissimo questo popolo per mille ragioni già partiamo a 
livello nazionale che ricordo ancora quando c’è la possibilità di andare 
in pensione dopo 19 anni e 6 mesi e un giorno vuoi che l’età pensio-
nabile ormai non sappiamo più dove è arrivata, dove arriverà quindi 
il discorso del posto fisso, i posti che siano comunali, regionali, posti 
statali io chiaramente oggi il ricambio avviene dopo tanti anni da questo 
punto di vista anche noi facciamo un po’ pochino pare che sia il cane 
che si morde la coda perché se alla fine c’è tanta gente che decide a un 
certo punto, tanti giovani soprattutto, che decidono di emigrare fuori 
paese per andare a cercare fortuna perché probabilmente gli altri paesi 
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offrono grandi opportunità diverse rispetto a quante ne offre il tuo Pae-
se. Capisco però che potremmo starne a parlare per mesi senza trovare 
soluzione.
R”e tu che vorresti invece? Cosa ti aspetti?”
I 13 (M, 61 personale Ata) “Prima di ogni cosa a livello governativo 
creare posti di lavoro per sti giovani per esempio: che non sanno dove 
aggrapparsi e non è giusto che i nostri giovani, compresi i miei figli, che 
sono già andati via, con tre figli non ne posso avere uno a casa perché 
nel suo paese non è riuscito a trovare il pane quotidiano per poterci ri-
manere questo deve fare un buon governante e non chiacchiere...
R “quindi lavoro”
I 13 (M, 61 personale Ata) “Certo lavoro in tutto... perché se l’agricol-
tura è abbandonata è colpa dei governanti perché se tu la finanzi... mio 
figlio quando è andato al nord però non ha trovato niente...per me è il 
lavoro la cosa principale, perché quando c’è il lavoro c’è tutto”.
R “e davanti al tuo candidato quali aspettative porresti? Cosa chiede-
resti?”
I 18 (F, 56 rappresentante commerciale) “Le priorità da mettere in fila, 
vabbè è banale, il lavoro, sopratutto per dare una speranza ai ragazzi 
che vogliono fare: per esempio io credo molto, vedo molti giovani che 
stanno tornando ad amare l’agricoltura non come veniva fatta un tem-
po, ma con i macchinari, un’agricoltura che possa aiutare questi giovani 
perché la prima cosa è aiutare i ragazzi a realizzare i sogni perché non 
sognano più e anzi se ne vanno.
R “cosa si aspetta da un candidato “attento”, come dice Lei”?
I 31(F, 51, insegnante) “Immediatamente mi vengono in mente due 
cose e la prima è rivolta a voi giovani a favore di voi giovani:  quindi 
l’occupazione io credo che sia veramente una piaga sociale quindi una 
manovra snella e facile per dare lavoro ai giovani perché credo che la 
società dipenda proprio dal lavoro dei giovani rappresentate il futuro. 
Lavorare anche significa mettere su famiglia e quindi immediatamente 
l’economia inizia a girare e muoversi quindi non è un lavoro fine a se 
stesso la realizzazione io ho studiato e mi voglio realizzare attraverso 
il lavoro cosa giustissima e sacrosanta dico ma se veramente vogliamo 
risolvere il problema e la crisi economica secondo me il lavoro significa 
anche spendere soldi e fare circolare denaro questa è la prima cosa che 
mi viene in mente e farlo attraverso provvedimenti snelli...veloci.
R “Certo...capisco e cosa ti aspetti quindi”?
I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) “I nostri politici, i nostri governanti di dovreb-
bero avvicinare alle idee debbono venire debbono ascoltare e per me è il 
lavoro la cosa principale e sulla frase “il lavoro è dignità” io non accetto 
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repliche è così punto e basta. Non ci sono altri cazzi, il lavoro è dignità e 
una persona che non ha lavoro specialmente chi ha il mutuo e situazioni 
particolari non oso immaginare che situazione vivono questi poveretti 
e quando manca il lavoro manca la dignità perché comunque ti presenti 
non sai chi sei...non sai come sei combinato in questo mondo qua....”
R “avvicinarsi certo, in che modo?”
I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) delle cose da fare per esempio intanto iniziare 
a pianificare andando sul concreto lasciamo perdere le cose astratte e 
i ragionamenti fascinosi, iniziando ad avere settimanalmente degli in-
contri per esempio un incontro mirato a: argomento del giorno qual è 
non giriamoci troppo attorno l’argomento più caldo è sempre lo stesso 
perché la gente deve portare il pane a casa e poi tutto il resto si sistema 
piano piano ma si rimetterebbe perché quando la gente lavora e porta lo 
stipendio a casa inizia a tirare fuori il sorriso a tirare fuori anche proprio 
i sogni che prima rimangono chiusi non nel cassetto
R “e cosa vorresti allora? Cosa ti aspetti’”
I 49 (M 57, lsu) “a livello politico bisognerebbe essere più forti e ga-
rantire maggiore possibilità di lavoro insomma alle persone...tramite 
interventi dello Stato”
R “in che senso”?
I 49 (M 57, lsu)” per esempio lo Stato interveniva creava posti di lavo-
ro attraverso diciamo finanziamenti per esempio erano che si doveva 
loro attraverso lavori stradali per dire allora tu impegnavi delle persone 
tramite... cioè praticamente chiamavano in un certo qual modo degli 
incentivi. Adesso invece che succede? Succede che le direttive europee 
fanno sì che lo Stato non si può impegnare in questo modo e lo Stato 
stesso non si può opporre alla Comunità Europea e quindi lascia fare 
solo alle imprese private che non riesce ad uscirne da questa situazione 
da solo”.
R “E per te cosa si dovrebbe fare? Cosa si ti aspetti insomma?”
I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Lavoro. Qua il primo problema te lo dico per-
ché mi sto trovando in difficoltà io ho un buon cv alle spalle ma a 30 
anni sei troppo grande preferiscono prendere i ragazzini 18/19 contrat-
ti trimestrali stagisti senza esperienza ma gli vanno bene e loro non 
preferiscono te. Poi non ti dico io che comunque bene o male riesco a 
galleggiare però ci sono comunque persone, famiglie che hanno figli 
che veramente arrivano a fine settimana arrancano...e questo il napole-
tano lo sa, perché molti di loro vivono nel centro storico e vivono altri 
problemi come la spazzatura e altro, ma è il lavoro il primo problema...
che poi se non hai lavoro che vo fa? E te ne vai a rubare che devi fare”
R”E nonostante ciò tu cosa vorresti? Cosa ti aspetti?
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I 3 (M, 51 precario pubblico) “ma guarda se parliamo di polis, di cosa 
pubblica, bisognerebbe riprendere a dare diritti ai lavoratori che sono 
stati cancellati, un rilancio della scuola della sanità ma prima di tutto il 
lavoro e i diritti dei lavoratori che anche questo qui (Renzi) sta cancel-
lando e sta facendo tutto il contrario di quello che ha detto”.
I 27(F, 53 insegnante) “Io vorrei onestà da parte di tutti e rispetto delle 
regole perché senza il rispetto democrazia non c’è, non c’è democrazia 
ognuno si prende un bastone e fa quello che vuole.
R”Certo. E poi che altro?”
I 27(F, 53 insegnante) “e poi lavoro, lavorare con più coscienza per cre-
are lavoro...io per tornare al discorso dei sindaci che non fanno niente 
ho visto delle strutture abbandonate per 55 anni e quelle strutture pote-
vano essere usate per creare lavoro e questo non è un gioco, non è un 
gioco. E poi basterebbe così poco per creare opportunità per farci stare 
bene tutti ma noi nella Ionica siamo un insediamento greco-romano la 
gente invece che andare a Shalm el Sheik viene qua e si riempie il cuore 
di cose belle. E poi dico, sono stata a Vicenza per fare un intervento e 
i medici erano tutti meridionali mo dico ma perché per lavorare devi 
andare via? Certo mo si sceglie l’Europa è una visione completamente 
diversa e ben venga però non mi sembra giusto che io debba lasciare 
mio figlio o mio figlio debba lasciare o io personalmente debbo lasciare 
la mia terra perché qua non ho la possibilità di fare un lavoro che in Au-
stralia è retribuito dieci volte tanto? E anche questo è sbagliato credo.
R “certo, il merito che spesso manca. Ma oggi che chiederesti?
I 65 (F, 45 commessa) “mmhh domanda difficile. Senti se, potessi al 
politico locale, ma anche nazionale perché no, gli chiederei una sola 
cosa: fare in modo che le persone possano lavorare in serenità a partire 
dai piccoli imprenditori.
R “in che senso?”
I 65 (F, 45 commessa) “ in che senso? Nel senso che i piccoli impren-
ditori come la titolare per cui lavoro, è gente afflitta dai vincoli, ma che 
ti posso dire...vincoli non solo di tasse, che quelle lo sappiamo insom-
ma...ma anche vincoli di tipo burocratico. Per esempio, per dirtene una, 
l’altro giorno sono arrivati due vigili e hanno detto alla mia titolare che 
l’insegna non andava bene, dopo 25 anni dice che siccome è centro 
storico certe insegne non vanno bene... ora capito..capisci che voglio 
dire?” 
R “se avessi un candidato del quale ti potessi fidare quali aspettative 
riporresti in lui?”
I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “non è valorizzato (il territorio) mi aspet-
terei che le nostre cose dove c’è l’opportunità sfruttarla, noi abbiamo 
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una opportunità si potrebbero creare delle cose veramente carine quindi 
cercare di sfruttarla al massimo in estate abbiamo Montecovello è mol-
to carino un anno hanno fatto il Covello Summer Fest è stato fantastico, 
il comune li ha aiutati come ha potuto, nel piccolo ed è uscito una bella 
cosa allora tu hai capito che quella può essere una fonte di guadagno 
per il paese non sto parlando perché se viene il turista vengono tu porti 
dei gruppi carini magari ci sono dei ragazzi di Cosenza c’è chi viene 
quindi c’è un’area camping abbandonata che cosa fai tu cerchi di valo-
rizzare l’area camping di mettere i bagni e aggiustarli così quando viene 
il turista invece di farlo gratuito puoi fare un campeggio per recuperare 
quello che magri spendi di investirlo, ti fai pagare il suolo, una minima 
cosa e quindi valorizzare quello, insomma fare delle cose per valoriz-
zare le nostre cose”.
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